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This thesis investigates the relationship between the
Court of Justice of the European Communities and national
courts of the member states of the European Community as
interpreters of Community law. The principal thrust of the
analysis is toward the development of an appreciation of the
contextual factors which influence this relationship and
which, it is argued, must form the basis for any evaluation
of the legitimacy of the techniques of cooperation which are
being developed by Community and national judiciaries.
Chapter I is concerned with an analysis of attempted
general descriptions of the Community juridical structure.
The finding is that traditional descriptive categories are
of little value because of the particular political history
of the European Communities and because of the variety of
jurisdictional relationships established by the treaties
involved. It is suggested that some new terminology which
might avoid inappropriate political connotations and sim¬
plistic analogies be employed, herein, "shared jurisdiction."
Chapter II develops the content of Community jurisdic¬
tion sharing within the institutional order of the ECSC and
EEC and as between Community and national institutional
orders. The system described is relatively "untidy," but
some general patterns emerge when the ECSC and EEC decisional
processes and modes of implementation are compared.
Chapter III then outlines the position of the Court of
Justice in the Community institutional order. In the
exercise of its numerous competences it is suggested that
the Court is given the fundamental role of arbiter of the
jurisdiction sharing system and that its position is in
some important respects analogous to a court exercising a
federal, constitutional jurisdiction.
The limitations of this federal constitutional control
are explored in Chapter IV from the viewpoint of the avail¬
ability of the Community Court forum for the resolution of
various types of conflicts concerning Community law. The
broad finding is that restrictions on the jurisdiction of
the Court of Justice, particularly in respect of the EEC
Treaty, necessarily result in the allocation of numerous
Community law questions to national courts. This, coupled
with the essentially normative rather than institutional
impingement of the EEC on national legal orders, highlights
the importance of judicial jurisdiction sharing under Arti¬
cle 1n of the EEC Treaty as a means for insuring the rule
of law in the European Communities.
Chapter V examines the Article 177 jurisdiction from
the perspective of the Community Court's opportunity to
interpret Community law. Two major restrictions on such
opportunities are found in the Inability of the Court to
consider certain norms which are either formally or sub¬
stantively the result of "law generating" activity at the
Community level and in the Treaty's failure to provide
access to the Community forum save on the initiative of
vi
national courts. These restrictions are analyzed in the
context of the broader jurisdiction sharing system of which
judicial jurisdiction sharing forms a part, and some sugges¬
tions are made concerning changes in present practice which
are thought appropriate to the system in general.
In Chapter VI the functioning of judicial jurisdiction
sharing is pursued through an analysis of the division of
control between national courts and the Community Court over
the various elements of decision making in cases where re¬
ferrals are made by national courts under Article !??• The
inevitable inaccuracies of attempts to describe this divi¬
sion of competences or "sharing" through categorical formu¬
lation of criteria are exposed and some examples are given
which illustrate what is termed "the flexible approach."
This latter approach is an attempt to take into account the
various contextual factors influencing decision making and
jurisdiction sharing in particular cases.
Chapter VII concludes the study with a brief and tenta¬
tive evaluation of the present approach to judicial juris¬
diction sharing under the EEC Treaty. The conclusion is that
the present balance between firm principle and flexible
technique seems, in broad terms, appropriate to the jurisdic¬
tion sharing system as a whole.
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CHAPTER I. Introduction: An Approach to Community
Jurisdiction Sharing
This study has as its focal point the interpretive
jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Commu¬
nities under Article 177 of the EEC Treaty. It began as a
study of that one article and of the relationship created
between the Court of Justice of the European Communities and
Member State courts by its provision that:
"The Court of Justice shall be competent to make
a preliminary decision concerning:
(a) the interpretation of this Treaty;
(b) the validity* and interpretation of
acts of the institutions of the Community; and
(c) the interpretation of the statutes of
any bodies set up by an act of the Council, where
such statutes so provide.
"Where any such question is raised before a court
or tribunal of one of the Member States, such court or
tribunal may, if it considers that its judgment de¬
pends on a preliminary decision on this question,
request the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon.
"Where any such question is raised in a case
pending before a domestic court or tribunal from whose
decisions no appeal lies under municipal law, such
1 Although we shall have something to say about referrals
of questions of validity, there is no extensive analysis of
the special problems which may arise in such referrals. Our
primary emphasis is on interpretation, and this is where the
major jurisprudential developments have been.
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court or tribunal shall refer the matter to the Court
of Justice."^
Despite the author9s desperate efforts, the study could
not be kept within the confines of Article 177» That article
is but one of the jurisdictional provisions relating to the
competence of the Court of Justice. It fits into an overall
pattern of jurisdiction and is explicable only in terms of
that pattern.
Given this expansion, the development of the jurispru¬
dence under Article 177 still resisted satisfactory analysis.
The resolution of the problems presented by discreet invoca¬
tions of the Community Court°s Jurisdiction under Article
177 has not necessarily been predicated on any basis which
could readily be found in that article or through that
article's place in the overall competence of the Court.
Many of the problems which have arisen in this framework have
raised additional issues of considerable magnitude.
For example, Article 177 provides for the referral from
national courts to the Court of Justice of questions of the
interpretation of the Treaty - a seemingly straightforward
2 There are other jurisdictional provisions which might be
thought to involve a renvoi a tltre pr^iudlolelle to the
Court of Justice. Chevalller, Commentaire de l'artiole 177
du Traits C.E.E. a 1'usage des juges et des iusticlables
francais 6-12, The'se, Paris, 1964 (polycopie'), lists ECSC
Treaty, Art. 65(4); Art. 16 of the ECSC Protocol on Privi¬
leges and Immunities, and Regulation 17 (EEC), Art. 9»
para. 1.
The first and third of these provisions really involve
review of a renvoi to the Community executive, and the second
is not primarily a jurisdiction to rule on prejudicial ques¬
tions, although it apparently could be so used.
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provision. But what if (as has been the case) a particular
Member State constitutional system considers the Treaty as
incorporated (at whatever level) into national law, and the
government of that state objects to the jurisdiction of the
Community Court to hear referrals by its courts of questions
of treaty interpretation on the ground that those questions
involve national, not Community, law? The jurisdictional
issue almost necessarily puts in question the basic nature
of the Community system, or indeed whether there is a
Community legal system distinct from Member State legal
systems. This is a problem which is not soluble through
textual exegesis. It can only be approached in the context
of the general operation of the Community - its goals, its
history, its decisional process, its methods of implementa¬
tion.
Thus the scope of the study was necessarily expanded
again to include an analysis of the relationship of Commu¬
nity and national law and of the general operation of the
Community necessary to an evaluation of that relationship.
At this point the data began to get out of hand, for it
became increasingly clear that the general questions about
which we have been talking were misdirected. There were no
satisfactory, corresponding general answers.
The Community became like the elephant in the parable
of the blind men, but multiplied to include several ele¬
phants and several score of blind men. Whether the Commu¬
nity is rigid like a tree or flexible like a snake or broad
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as a wall depends on where you touch it, Nor does the gift
of sight reduce the complex!ty, Generalization may he a
virtue when it transforms legs, trunk and sides into an
elephant. It is less than salutary when it necessarily
chooses among varying interpretations of events, texts with
divergent implications, and goals upon which there is no
common agreement, in order to provide a general description
of the Community system, of the relationship between Commu¬
nity and national law, and of the relationship between the
Court of Justice and Member State courts under Article 177«
Thus, in the hope of providing an analysis which is not too
seriously misleading, it has been necessary to attempt to be
broad in inquiry and yet specific in statement.
Of course, specificity can be extreme. Data must be
structured to have meaning and as the study progressed an
internal structure emerged - a structure which is based more
on a feeling for the relationships involved in the Community
than on an attempt at a categorical formularion, It is this
feel for the system that the author would like to convey by
means of an approach which is hopefully general enough to
avoid eclecticism, yet sufficiently specific to give some
appreciation of the complexity of the relationships involved.
This general feel for the system came to be represented
by the term "shared jurisdiction," It would be useful at
this point to state what is meant by that concept in the
form of a straightforward definition. Unfortunately, it is
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Impossible to do so, The development of the content of this
terminology is the function of the whole study0 However, it
is possible to describe the considerations which have Im¬
pelled the coining of this particular shorthand reference
both to the relationship between Community and national
courts under Article 177 and to the Community organizational
scheme as a whole, Such a description will serve the addi¬
tional purpose of exposing some of the background of Commu¬
nity developments,
Terminological Ambiguity
One of the virtues of developing a concept which has not
been applied previously to specific Institutional arrange¬
ments is its deliberate vagueness, A new term should have
no confusing connotations of specific description in the
absence of detailed analysis. We begin with a question
rather than a conclusion, and even a cursory survey of the
literature on the European Communities suggests that this is
an important consideration.
One occasionally has visions of vast forests laid waste,
of pulp mills putting on additional shifts, of a significant
decrease in the level of unemployment in areas where paper-
making is a major industry, all as a result of the rather
unworldly occupation of jurists with the problem of analyzing,
elucidating, classifying - above all classifying - the nature
of European Communities, The project is endless because it
is self-perpetuating, Xes thesis can always be demolished
by Y®s concrete example or Z®s redefinition of terms, perhap
even by the resurrection of the ghost of A® s argument that
everyone thought dead these ten years„ The forestry service
is busy planting seedlings, and it is well advised to do so„
The problems involved in a juridical classification,
even a juridical analysis, of the Community structure often
seem insoluble0 At best they require so many qualifications
to the solutions proposed that exception and rule become con
fusedc Nor is the exercise frivolous0 People have to deal
with these constructions, and they have a real desire and
need not to find themselves communicating interminably at
cross purposeso
The root of the trouble is both political and termi¬
nological „ Where relationships are purposely vague, the
jurist is at a disadvantage because he is accustomed to des¬
cribing situations that are less politically fluid„ The
juridical translation of what facts can be pinned down is
made difficult by de Tocquevllle®s sage conclusion that the
mind of man more easily invents new things than new Ideas,
and we are constrained to employ a multitude of inadequate
and improper express!ons„
Terminological ambiguity is, then, hardly surprising,
but it is made more acute, for one thing, by the Inevitable
attempt to describe the Community legal structure in rela¬
tion to and by comparison with pre-existing structures,
structures which are themselves not free from ambiguity,,
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Are the Communities international organizations?^ Of
course, but what do we mean by that term? International
organizations are formed for diverse purposes and in a wide
variety of shapes and sizes. Moreover, the Communities com¬
bine structural features, competences and means of action
rarely found in other international organizations, and then
more often singly than in con junction.^
This problem is sought to be overcome by invoking the
term "supranational", a concept which has a longer history
than the Community experiment,^ but of which the latter seems
to be the only modern example, perhaps the only example ever.
3 On the place of the European Communities in contemporary
international legal thinking, see, e.g., Friedmann, The
Changing Structure of International Law 113-14- (1964-); Jenks,
The Common Law of Mankind 218-20 (1958); Starke, Introduction
to International Law 61, 119 (5th ed. 1963); de Valk, La
signification de 1®integration europeeme pour le developpment
du droit international moderns (I962).
4- See, Mathijsen, Le droit de 1a. Communaute Europ^en du
Charbon et de l®Acier: une £tude des sources 149-50 (1958).
5 Reuter, International Institutions 210 (transl. 1958)
attributes its first use to H, Wehberg (uberstaatllch) in
his proposals for an International Prize Court, and to L. S.
Woolf. It was intended to indicate not merely "coordination"
but "subordination" of state action to an international con¬
trol mechanism.
6 Zurcher, The European Community - An Approach to Federal
Integration, in Systems of Integrating the International
Community 71 (Plischke ed. 1964) cites the Swiss cantonal
confederations and the Zollverein as supranational forerun¬
ners, but the similarities between these organizations and
the European Communities cannot be pressed very far. See,
Keeton, The Zollverein and the Common Market, 1963 Cur. Leg.
Prob. 1. Moreover, Zurcher would classify the EEC and fiura-
torn as something short of "supranational."
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There is, alas, no agreement on what the acid test of
supranational!ty might be,'7 nor is its use officially sanc¬
tioned by the treaties except in relation to the High
Authority of the Goal and Steel Community,,
"Federal" is an oft-employed characterization, but it
must be used with care, If by federal one means the particu¬
lar balance of competences between two levels of government-
operating on the same territory and population characteristic
O
of a federal state, the label is clearly not applicable,,
On the other hand, "federal" can be used in a more general
sense - a sense which allows almost all social and political
arrangements involving composite groups to be described as
in some manner federal in structure.^ Moreover, federalism
has both normative and institutional aspects,,*0 The standard
federal organization might be thought to involve the concur¬
rent application of two sets of laws or norms and the
7 Compare. e,R,, Robertson, Legal Problems of European Inte¬
gration, 91 Recueil des Cours 105, 143-48 (195?) f Rosentiel,
Reflections on the Notions of "Supranational!ty", 2 J„ Common
Market~Studies 127 (1962); Schwarzenberger, Federal ism and
Supranational!sm in the European Communities,™rS~CuF7~L"eg,
p^SbTTTTT^ir: ~
8 See, e.g., Wheare, Federal Government 13 (1953)° Emphasis
on a particular division of powers requires a denial of the
"federal" status of the Community arrangements,, See, e.g..
Cardis, Fdddralisme et Integration Europ£erme 140-41 (1964)0
9 See, e»go, Friedrich, International Federalism in Theory
and Practice, in Systems of Integrating the International
Community 120 (Plischke ed„ 1964); Wiebringhaus, Le Droit
Surop^en fane au problem du statut des accords internatlonaux
dans les"""structures fdddratlves^ I961 Rivista dTTilrTtto
europeo 367-86,
10 See generally, Scelle, Manuel de Droit International
Public 251-360 (1948),
concurrent jurisdiction of two sets of institutional or
governmental organs„ An organization might, on the other
hand, be only normatively federal, that is, it might evi¬
dence two sets of laws but only one level of governmental
machinery,, The converse situation would, of course, be pure
institutional federalism. This distinction has some import¬
ance in relation to the Community situation which, in varying
degrees, involves both normative and institutional federalism
Some of the more perplexing problems in the Community legal
system may, indeed, be said to stem from an imbalance between
normative and institutional aspects of the Community's
peculiar federal structure.
It has also been said that the Communities' organ!za-
11
tion is a. "constitutional" system - not in the sense of a
state constitution, but sufficiently analogous to allow one
to talk about it as an advanced aspect of "international
constitutional law" or more precisely "the constitutional law
of international organizations."^2 This is a difficult
11 Lagrange, Les ProblernesJuridiques et Economiques du
March^ Commun 43 (i960); Bebr, The Relationship of European
Coal and Steel Community Law to the Law of the Member States;
A~Peeuliar Legal Symbiosis, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 767, 788 (1958)
Speech by M. Battaglia in the European Parliament, 17 June
1965, No. 79 Debats IX/65, p. 231.
Some writers occasionally get a bit carried away and be¬
gin speaking of the "sovereignty" of the Communities and of
the task of international constitutional law as the "subord¬
ination" of state law. E.g„ , de Valk, op. cit. supra, note 3,
at 100, 118.
12 See, Opsahl, An "International Const!tutional Law"?,
10 Int'l & Comp. L. Q. 7&0 (I96I). ("International consti¬
tutional law" will not here be employed in the more general
sense of the "basic organizing norms of international society
For our purposes some institutional structure, beyond state
governmental agencies performing "double functions", is pre¬
sumed .)
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concept because it requires a delicate balancing act
between thinking of constitutional law in this context as
simply the structural norms of an international, organiza¬
tion and, on the other hand, emphasizing nation-state con¬
stitutional characteristics, such as the ubiquitous
Kompetenz-Kompetenz. In the former case international, con¬
stitutional law becomes inseparable from the law of inter¬
national organizations, while in the latter one is bound to
conclude that no international organization really fits the
definition0
But let us not readily abandon this idea of the Commu¬
nities as a constitutional system, for an attempt to describe
the Communities "constitutionally" seems to be at the base
of the whole terminological problem® The delimitation of
the province of a const!tutional law of international orga¬
nizations may Indicate the approach which must be taken
toward a juridical description of the Community structure,,
There Is, of course, some problem in defining constitu¬
tional law at the national level„ Formal definitions based
on the existence of a constituent document fail to cover
certain rather obvious situations, but a. substantive approach
also tends to cause difficulties, e.g., in making distinc-
1 k
tlons between const!tutional and administrative law® Even
13 -A discussion of the evolution of ideas about the nature
of constitutional law appears in Mcllwain, Constitutionalism
(Great Seal ed« 1958).
14 There seems no means by which administrative law can be
defined except formally by reference to an existing institu¬
tional structure admitted to be "administrative." See, e0g.,
Jaffe, Administrative Law 1 (1954).
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so, the substantive approach seems the lesser evil, and
national const!tutional rules might be thought of as those
legal norms which are concerned with the extent and distri¬
butions of state power among governmental organs and with
the relationship of the exercise of that power to individual
rights and duties
Purged of the idea of "state," and perhaps "govern¬
mental" to the extent that it is a. derivative concept, this
definition can serve as the point of departure for a deter¬
mination of what the "const!tutional law of international
organizations" in general, and of the European Communities
in particular, might be about. The significant aspect of
the definition is that it emphasizes the concern of consti¬
tutional law with, not only the organization and distribu¬
tion of power,but also the relationship of its distribution
and exercise to the legal status of persons within its
jurisdiction, As applied to international organizations
this "ccnstitutional" perspective can provide the ground for
distinguishing between the "constitutional law of interna¬
tional organizations" and simply the "law of international
organizations," for the latter may be concerned only with
internal institutional and administrative structures and
with the relationships of organizations with their employees,
15 See, e.g,, the description of the province of constitu¬
tional law in Mitchell, Constitutional Law 2 (1964),
12
A constitutional law analysis of an international
organization must ask how the international structure
organizes the society subject to it: What interests are
represented in the institutional order; how are they repre¬
sented; what power or influence is guaranteed them and in
relation to what types of decisions? In what form are deci¬
sions taken; to what extent do they affect the legal rela¬
tionships of persons within the institution's jurisdiction
and by what procedural means? What basic values must be
respected in the decision-making process?
This constitutional approach can be applied to any
International organization. The question is not whether
international organizations affect individuals, but in what
way the latter are affected. Of course, the fewer direct
contacts between the organization and individuals within
its area of jurisdiction the more difficulty there is In
relating structural arrangements, decision-making processes
and institutional values to the rights and duties of private
legal persons. The particular international society is then
less well organized and is of less interest from the stand¬
point of constitutional analysis.
The European Communities are particularly interesting
from the constitutional viewpoint because of the number and
variety of both direct and indirect relationships of private
legal persons to the international, decision-making structure.
13
Writers have begun to talk In terms of a. new constitutional
1 f)
status, the status of being an "Europea.no" However,
clearly this status is ultimately determined by an exercise
of collective, or state, rather than individual competence0
Individuals cannot "join" the Community independently„ We
are still dealing with an international structure0 In the
more concrete terminology of the social scientist, what is of
interest is the extent and manner in which the primary social
group, the state, allows participation by its members in a
wider group whose common interests may not always coincide
with the primary-group interest, notwithstanding the locus
of ultimate power to determine status„ ? The constitutional
law analysis of an international organization must investi¬
gate the nature, mode and scope of such participation which,
in effect, is to describe the institutional and jurisdic¬
tional structure of the organization and how its operation
affects and is affected by the primary group®s structure and
competence 0
To put it another way, the ultimately derivative quality
of individual membership in a given international or trans¬
national group is a function of the basic fact that interna¬
tional organizations and their Member States must share both
16 See, e.g., de Valk, op. clt„ supra, note 3» at 83-9^;
Duclas, L9Europ^en; Exploration d'une categorle jurldique
nalssante", 1961 R.G.D.I.P. 260-300.
17 See discussion of international institutionalism in
social terms in Reuter, 0£. clt. supra, note 5°
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terr 1 tories and populations,. This convergence of operational
spheres produces, depending upon the peculiar arrangements
involved, a certain tension, a certain balance, between
international and state power and influence. In order to
investigate the relationship of individuals to an interna¬
tional institutional structure and to analyze the exercise
of power at the international organizational level, interna¬
tional constitutional law must include within its analysis
the relationship of the given international organization to
its Member States - the "federal balance" of the system0 It
must ask, in the particular circumstances of that international
organization, how it and its members share their jurisdictions,,
It seems, then, that to speak about the European Com¬
munities as a. constitutional system is necessarily to combine
all the ambiguous terminology and to speak in terms of an
"internatlonal, federal, constitutional system,," It is to
say no more than that the Communities' juridical structure is
based on particular instances of and procedures for jurisdic¬
tion sharing. Our thinking had best not be cluttered with
labels derived from different contexts until a fairly specif¬
ic analysis of Community organization will allow us to put
them in their proper perspective.
Political Neutrality
The terminological problems involved in classifying the
Community structure have more than academic significance. A
choice among "federal," "supranational," or "international"
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by persons involved in the integrative process often implies
a difference in the speaker's degree of political commitment
to the integration of Europe and gives a. key to his ideas
about the purposes of the institutional order constructed0
The inability of commentators consistently to apply a well-
understood juridical concept to the Community reflects the
Community's foundation in diverse interests and purposes,,
There were, of course, common ideas, aims, problems and
1 ft
experiences at the base of the Community development,, It
built on two, more general, post-war European ideas: (1) the
desirability of institutionalized political collaboration to
express views formulated in a common European framework and
to thereby avoid nationalistic fragmentation of sentiment
allowing beligerent action, and (2) the necessity of economic
cooperation on a continental scale in order to permit a
rationalized expansion and a general raising of living
standards. The Schuman Plan carried forward the first idea
by proposing the creation of an independent executive and the
neutralization of the "arsenal of Europe" and by making the
proposal clearly a first step toward a firmer and more general
union,, In the economic sphere the common market in coal and
steel moved beyond the idea, of "cooperation" to that of
TB There are numerous general works on the history, politics
and economics of European integration. Some of the more read¬
able include: Camps, Britain and the European Community:
1955-1963 (1964-); Diebold, The Schuman Plan (1959); Haas, The
Uniting of Europe (1958); Reuter, La Communa.utd' Europ^enne
du Charbon et de l'Acier (1953); Robertson, European Institu¬
tions (1959); Schmitt, The Path to European Union (1962).
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"integration,,"^ Nor were the political and economic consid¬
erations wholly distinct; they were recognized to be mutually
reinforcing. ^
Moreover, the simple fact that six countries joined the
EGSC, and later the Common Market and EURATOM, indicated that
they, or at least the persons and groups within them who had
effective power to influence policy, took these ideas about
political and economic integration more seriously than those
who were within the broader European developments in the
Council of Europe and O.E.E.C., but who opted out of the Com-
21
munity experiment. This concrete expression of political
will by the six had common roots in similar wartime exper¬
ience and loss of faith in national institutions. Perhaps
also of some influence were very old ideas about "natural
22
unity" and a common cultural heritage.
The construction of the European Communities can indeed
be viewed as a reaction, springing from common experience,
against both nationalism and the classical and looser forms
of international association connected with it. But this is
a very partial picture of the economic and political consid¬
erations involved. M. Schuman®s Plan was "European," but it
19 See Robertson, European Institutions xiii (1959)°
20 Reuter, 0£. cit. supra, note 18, at 3O-3I0
21 See generally, Benoit, Europe at Sixes and Sevens (I96I);
Camps, The Free Trade Area Negotiations, P,E„P, Occasional
Paper No. 2, 6 April 1959°
22 Northrop, European Union and United States Foreign Policy
111-3? (195^)> Schuman, Pour L8Europe 117 (1963).
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also satisfied an urgent need to reorient a national foreign
policy that was increasingly unsuccessful. The Germans, or
at least Adenauer and his associates, were "supranationally"-
minded from a determination to avoid a. resurgence of nation¬
alism, but the ECSC was also the most attractive method of
obtaining the removal of allied controls. The Dutch were
completing their retreat from Empire and their economic
interest was turning inevitably back to Europe. If long-
term Belgian mining problems were to be solved, the ECSC
might provide a means of cushioning the shock and of obtain¬
ing assistance in the transition.
The prevalence of attitudes based on particular interests
was even more pronounced within the nation states concerned.
After an exhaustive analysis of national and pressure group
positions, Ernst Haas has concluded that the acceptance of
ECSC is best explained in terms of "the convergence of
demands within and among the nations concerned, not by a
pattern of identical demands and hopes. "2-^ Italian partici¬
pants in the forma.tion of the Community, to take one national
example, could have been and were actuated by motives ranging
from a strong ideological commitment to a United States of
Europe to concern about the serious excess in the national
labor force. The negotiation of the ECSC Treaty was, then,
not a conference of wholly like-minded delegates bent on
23 Haas, The Uniting of Europe 286 (1958).
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carrying their common aim through to its logical conclu-
p|t
si on, The Treaty which emerged is a document full of
ingenious compromise, hammered out over months of negotiation
in order to harmonize competing interests with fundamental
aimsThat the structure thus erected is juridically elu¬
sive is not surprising.
But ambiguity and variety of political purpose does not
end with the Goal and Steel Community, The history of the
formulation of the European Economic Community Treaty evi¬
dences the same variables, but with a. slightly different
mix. By the time the EEC Treaty was drafted, the post-war
political situation had changed substantially. The ideo¬
logical commitment to Europe had received a body blow in the
failure of the Defense and Political Communities, Govern¬
ments tended to take a rather sterner look at their possi¬
bilities for controlling the regulatory structure of the new
2 6
Community, whatever logic dictated about the necessity for
25 The techniques of drafting used in the Committee stages
did keep political wrangling to a minimum, Schuman, 0£, clt,
supra, note 22, at 165-72,
25 There is still animated debate over whether the Treaty
contains a coherent economic policy. See discussion in Zehn
Jahre Rechtsprechtung des Gerichtshofs der Europaischen
Gemeinschaften 13-56 (1965)°
26 The logical connection between economic integration and
the political structure for its control is a recurring theme
in the Community development. See, e,g,, Hallstein, Economic
Integration and Political Unity in Europe, Community Topics
Nq5 2 (1961); Schuman, op, clt, supra note 22, at 155-50;
Spaak, Speech in Council of Europe, Consultative Assembly,
21 October 1955» HI Official Report of Debates 617 (1955);
Commission of the EEC, Third Annual Report 15-19 (i960).
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its independence0 Some of the compelling ideological reasons
for submerging national policy in a broader framework had
disappeared,, At this juncture, the economic content of the
movement seems to have far outweighed the overtly political,
On the other hand, the years of association in the ECSC
had proved the system workable a.nd had built up a kind of
27
esprit among the participants. ' National interest groups
had begun to identify with the "supranational" enterprise
and to band together to seek to influence its operation.
Many who had predicted gloom, doom and failure at the incep¬
tion of the ECSC now favored a. general common market. Nor
was the ideological content of the general "European move¬
ment" really a dead letter. It was only thought that, con¬
sidering past failures, the overtly political had better be
dropped in favor of a. pursuit of political ends by economic
o O
meanso
This almost systematic confusion of purposes is perhaps
the moot characteristic element of the "relance Europeen"
2? Haas, op, clt, supra, note 23, at 514-20, claims that this
substantially affected the negotiation of the Rome Treaties,
Contra, Cartou, Le March6 Commun et le Droit Public 4 (1959)°
28 See, e,g,, Joint Declaration, Action Committee for the
United States of Europe, 11th Session, Bonn, June 1, 1964,
There is earlier European experience, particularly in
Germany, which tends to demonstrate the impetus of economic
integration toward political union. Fisher, 3 History of
Europe 930» 963 (1935); Henderson, The Genesis of the Common
Market 89-113 (1962).
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which culminated in the EEC and EURATOM treaties, Particular
interests had shifted during the years 1952-1957* but not
necessarily toward a more unified view of the common objective„
The Common Market Treaty was still constructed on a plural¬
istic base, Again there was hard bargaining, compromise, the
erection of a "coherent patchwork" that defies simple de¬
scription,,
Moreover, it is a patchwork that is expected to develop,,
The Common Market Treaty is much more a "framework law" than
is the ECSC Treaty,, It requires filling in by the Community
institutions„ These institutions are placed in a particular
working relationship with each other, but a relationship
which is subject to informal development and evolution, and
in some cases to treaty-based alteration over the transitional
period. The continual process of Interest identification as
the Community moves into the various subject-areas of its
competence2^ could progressively alter the political base of
29 As some progress was made in the agricultural field, for
example, about 100 transnational pressure groups developed
which seek to influence Community policy in the direction of
common interest, Lindberg, Decision Making and Integration
in the European Community, XIX Int'l Org, 56 (1956), The
1962-63 Yearbook of International Organizations listed some
216 non-governmental organizations operating on a Community-
wide basis. They ranged from the Committee of Hop Planters
of the Common Market to the European Union of Chambers of
Commerce .for the Common Market,
An interesting case study of evolution of interest
identification is provided by the influential Consell National
du Patronat Francais, In 1952 the Patronat predicted doom,
In 1957 Haas" lists them as having negative short-term expecta¬
tions, but in 1965 the association publicly deplored General
DeGaulle"s attitude toward the EEC, See, Business Week, July
10, 1965, p, 32.
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the structure, and hence the patterns of behavior within
it. The Community institutions and activities thus become
the battleground for the diverse interests which entered
into their formation and for the competing views of what the
organization®s general purpose was meant to be.
The juridical generalization written in these shifting
sands is either meaningless or soon erased„ Hence, we begin
by saying only that Community institutions and national
governments are cast by the Treaties into a relationship
whereby they share substantive jurisdictions., To say that
such jurisdiction sharing takes place is not to take sides
between those who view economic integration as preparing the
ground for and contributing to greater political integration
and those who see the political aspects of the Communities
as only necessary and burdensome evils for the realization
of economic ends.
The Variety of Jurisdictional Relationships
As might be deduced from the preceding discussion, the
plurality of substantive interests involved in the formulation
of the ECSC and EEC Treaties did not result in the creation
of clear patterns of institutional and Member State competence
in either Community. The "division of competences," if that
30 This process is sometimes directly fostered by govern¬
ments, for example, through changes in school curricula. See
High Authority's Fifth General Report (1957)0
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phrase may properly be used, in any specific instance depends
not only on which treaty and Community institutions are in¬
volved, but also on which area of economic activity (industry,
transport, agriculture, etc0) is being affected and/or on
the type of economic tool (tariff policy, price fixing,
monetary policy, subsidy, etc#) employed0
"Shared jurisdiction" is used to cover the multifarious
range of jurisdictional relationships within the Community
system, because the uniqueness and complexity of Community
arrangements will not conform to standard categories0 In
this context most, or perhaps any, of the traditional verbal
tools of legal analysis break down0 In discussing federal
systems, for example, we are accustomed to distinguish be¬
tween "separation of powers" and "division of powers" prob¬
lems#-^ In the Community structure elements of both ideas
are so fused that an analysis of the division of competences
in the Community based on these traditional categories would
be alfficult if not impossible0
Nor do standard categories fit the jurisdictional rela¬
tionship of Community and national courts under Article 177
31 This nomenclature is employed in federal- state systems
to distinguish between the constitutional aspects of institu¬
tional balance at the national level, a. la Montesquieu, and
the problems of national government-regional government re¬
lations# There is usually some overlap, but the federal
aspects of the separation of powers, such as the inclusion
of a House of States or Senate in the legislative scheme,
are minimized if not nullified in a federal-state arrange¬
ment by the ma,jority-voting rule# Kelsen, Law and Peace
126-4-4 (1942),
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with any greater facility. The relationship is not that of
an appellate court and inferior tribunals. Neither is it
that of courts exercising concurrent powers, nor of courts
invested with separate, exclusive jurisdictions,, Rather,
Article 177 provides for a somewhat more subtle "sharing" of
the power of decision between the Court of Justice and a
national court.
The Positive Value of "Shared Jurisdiction"
Although by this point it may be difficult to believe,
the "shared jurisdiction" terminology has not been developed
merely as a means of avoiding the politically charged and
technically inaccurate connotations of existing categories,,
To the extent that a shorthand reference to Community rela¬
tionships is necessary, and we can hardly do without some
general concept, the use of "sharing" in conjunction with
"jurisdiction" has been thought peculiarly appropriate to the
facts of Community life. "Jurisdiction" in its broadest
sense conveys the idea of a legally-defined scope of opera¬
tion, including aspects of territoriality, subject-matter
competence and mode of action. "Sharing" adds to this idea
of legally-defined competence connotations of flexibility
and cooperative action which in the European Communities are
essential ingredients for successful operation.
Nor should the use of "jurisdiction sharing" or "shared
jurisdiction" in a double sense - as descriptive both of
overall Community-Member State relationships and of particular
aspects of the allocation of judicial jurisdiction between
Zk
Community and national courts - be confusing when put into
context. This studied double entendre helps to emphasize
a recurrent theme, the connection between shared judicial
jurisdiction and the jurisdiction sharing pattern of the
Communities as a whole. The evaluation of the former
necessarily rests on ai appreciation of the latter.
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CHAPTER II. The Community Structure and Operation in General
The sharing of general spheres of opera.tion between the
Community institutional order and Member State governments
in terms of territory and population, of course, gives rise
to the necessity of further jurisdictional arrangements.
These further arrangements may be broken down into two general
categories: (1) jurisdiction sharing within the Community
institutional order and (2) jurisdiction sharing with respect
to the accomplishment of particular substantive alms.
I. Institutional Relationships
Within this category it is presumed that decision¬
makers at the Community level have jurisdiction to act in
specified ways in relation to whatever subject is envisaged.
But to say that Community rather than Member State organs are
competent to take certain action is not to say very much.
As was mentioned previously, we cannot here easily dis¬
tinguish between "separation of powers" and "division of
1
powers" problems. There is a significant sharing of influ¬
ence and power between organs representing independent
Community interests and those representing Member-State
interests within the Community institutional structure, in
addition to the a.spects of jurisdiction sharing to be found
by examining the relationships between Member-State and
Community institutional machinery in connection with the
accomplishment of specified ends.
1 Reuter, Juridical a.nd Institutional Aspects of the Euro¬
pean Regional Communities, 26 Law & Contemp. Prob. 38I, 382
(1961).
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A. The ECSC Structure
The original 3chuman proposal explicitly envisaged
only one Community organ, an independent or "supranational"
High Authority with direct powers of decision over the coal
and steel sector. (The unified Commission under the Merger
Treaty now exercises the competence allocated to the High
p
Authority in the ECSC Treaty. ) The other institutions were
developed primarily in an effort to fashion safeguards
against irresponsible, unwise or illegal executive action.3
Institutional safeguards were, indeed, necessary because the
usual method of international institutional control, by
state representation and veto powers in the primary decision¬
making organ, had been abandoned. The High Authority was
thus made politically responsible to an Assembly, legally
accountable before a Court of Justice, and subject to varying
degrees of control through the working relationship created
between it and the Special Council of Ministers. Some areas
of its activity were also made subject to consultation with
a Consultative Committee, appointed by the Council and com¬
posed of representatives of producers, workers, consumers
L
and dealers. However, the relationships between these
2 See infra, notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
3 The best discussion of the institutional history is in
Reuter, Communa.ut6 Europ^enne du Charbon et de l*Acier (1953) •
4 This organ seems to have had little real influence, prob¬
ably because membership in it is necessarily on a part-time
and amateur basis. See, Schmitt, The Path to European Union
116-125 (1962). Contra., Lagrange, Le pouvoir de decision
dans les Communautls europ^ennes, 3 Rev. Trim. Dr. Bur. 1,
12 (1967).
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institutions are more complex than simply the performance of
initiative, decisional, a.nd checking functions. (The Court
is left out of account here because it will receive a sepa¬
rate treatment in the following chapter.)
1• The Assembly
The desire for a political check on the execu¬
tive was fundamental to the Assembly's inclusion in the
institutional order. "Technocracy" - one of the principal
powers of darkness in modern political mythology - in the
form of the High Authority wanted controlling by some more
democratic institution.^ The Assembly's political control,
as provided by the ECSC Treaty, consisted primarily of a.
power to turn the High Authority out of office by a vote of
censure on its annual report. This was in effect to para¬
lyze the Assembly with power - rather like having the hydro¬
gen bomb and no ground troops. The Assembly fulfills its
checking role more effectively through a pattern of contin-
ous consultations, far in excess of that required by the
Treaty, that has built up between its committees and the
High Authority and through the separate examination and
5 This was felt even though the High Authority, which could
be expected to take account of the general interest, has a
basically democratic character when compared with the tra¬
ditional system of cartels in the European coal and steel
market which it replaces.
Interestingly enough, there was a. fragmentation of
German opinion between those wanting greater democratic safe¬
guards in the structure and those who thought that losing
the power German production had given German firms in the
old cartels was too democratic to begin with. Diebold, op.
cit. supra Chapter II, note 18, at 99.
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criticism by these committees of the various parts of the
executive's annual reports. Through the creation of its own
expertise, the Assembly then puts itself in the position to
be a positive force in the shaping of Community policy.
Indeed, building on the Hague Congress ideals and the Coun¬
cil of Europe experience, the positive role that the Assembly
might play in exposing progressive "European" sentiment was
an important additional consideration for the inclusion of
a "parliamentary" organ in the structure. In practice it
is this sort of political activity that has been the most
striking aspect of the Assembly's operation. Any element of
national influence that might have been built into the organ
7
by the appointment of its members by national parliaments'
has virtually been nullified by the Assembly's decision to
organize itself along party rather than national lines.
These developments have combined with a gen¬
erally pro-Community bias, produced by national selection
procedures which have largely excluded anti-Community ele¬
ments, to create an extremely progressive body - a body which
tends to support the independent executive in its confrontation
Z See, e.g., Parlement Europ^en, Seance du Mercredi, 2k Mars
1965» v/65 D^bats No. 77> p. I87. (Resolution on problems
of European political unity),
(This is, of course, a fairly recent example, but the
basic character of the Assembly's attitude has not changed
with its broadening to include the two "Rome" structures.)
7 This situation is expected to give way at some time to
election by direct universal suffrage. ECSC Treaty, Art.
21 (3); EEC Treaty, Art. 138 (3).
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with national interests and which adds to the Community-
oriented share of influence within the institutional order,
notwithstanding (perhaps, because of) its negligible share
O
of the Community's power to take binding decisions,, For
example, the Assembly called for stronger and more deter¬
mined action by the High Authority and criticized the
Authority's attempts to accommodate national interests
where such practices retarded authorized, independent action
by the Community executive.9
2o The High Authority and the Council
The crucial sharing of jurisdiction within
the institutional structure of the ECSC is, of course,
between the High Authority and the Council (now "the Commis¬
sion" and "the Council" under the Merger Treaty). "Sharing"
here covers at least four different types of arrangements:
(1) Both organs have certain powers that are exercised
entirely independently of the other„ The Council's powers
to act independently of the High Authority seem to fall
within three broad categories, internal administration and
appointments,^0 cases where the Authority has failed to
"S See generally, Heidelberg, Parliamentary Control and
Political Groups in the Three European Regional Communities,
26 L. & Contempo Probs. 4-30 (1961) .
9 Parldment Europden, Rapport sur le onzi^me rapport
general sur l'activite de la, Communautd Europe'enne du Charbon
et de 1'a.cier (June 18, 1963) „
10 ECSC Treaty, Arts. 9 para., 2, 29, 32 para. 4, ?8 (6).
(Note that some of the Council's "independent" powers are
exercised at the initiative of a, Member State government or
a Community organ other than the High Authority.)
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act,^ and additions to the subject-matter competence of the
12
Community or to Community membership. The High Authority,
on the other hand, has independent powers of a.ction either
of a normative or a penal nature, often both, in relation
to nearly all the substantive areas of the Community's opera¬
tion."^ (2) In addition, the independent executive has
numerous competences which are subject only to the "consulta,-
1 Zj, .
tion" of the Council. (3) A third and extensive category
of jurisdiction sharing involves instances where the High
Authority has both initiative and decision-making powers
but can act only with the "agreement," "confirmation," or
"authorization" of the Council or in the absence of the
latter's unanimous negative vote."^ This category includes
a number of important and sensitive matters, e.g., taxation,
direct intervention in the market, and action beyond the
powers specifically granted in the Treaty. (4) Finally,
there are a few cases where the exercise of jurisdiction in
Tl ECSC Treaty, Art. 59 (5) and (6).
12 ECSC Treaty, Arts. 81 para. 2, 98°
13 ECSC Treaty, Arts. 47 para.. 1 & 3, 50 (2) & (3)» 515 54,
59 (3), 60 (2)(a), 65 (3) & (5), 68 (2), 70 para. 4, 74, 88
para. 1, 91°
14 E.g., ECSC Treaty, Arts. 37 (2), 50 (2), 51 (1), 53 (a),
59 (6)7 60 (1), 61 para. 1, 62, 66 (1) & (4), 67 (2) & (3)>
68 (5), 73°
15 E.g.° ECSC Treaty, Arts. 50 (2), 53 (b). 54 para. 2,
55 (2~ffc), 56, 58 (1) & (3), 59 (D & (5), 66 (3), 68 (5),
74 last para., 88 para. 3, 95°
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a. particular instance is joint, either on the basis of a
1 f)
division of initiative and decision-making power, or
because of a coordinate division of power to control different
aspects of the same exercise of Community competence.^
These jurisdiction-sharing schemes are complex
enough in themselves, but in order to perceive how they con¬
tribute to a sharing of control within the institutional
structure between organs representing Community interests
on the one hand and Member-State interests on the other,
additional considerations must be taken into account,. We
must ask to what extent the composition and decision-making
procedures within the High Authority and the Council make
them repositories of the Community interest and national
interests respectively, and also what the functional rela¬
tionship of the two institutions has been in practice.
a. The Interests Represented
There seems little reason to doubt that
the High Authority conformed to the independent character
guaranteed it by the Treaty. Some problems arose in rela¬
tion to the choice of members by national governments and
TE E.g., ECSC Treaty, Arts. 59 (2), 61 last para., 72 para.
15 95 para. 4, 96.
17 See ECSC Treaty, Art. 56 last para. (This provision is
the only one of its type that the writer has discovered in
the Treaty. It may have been intended a.s a category (3) type
situation, but the wording indicates that the High Authority
and Council are expected to take separate decisions, each of
which directly regulates the concrete instance involved.)
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the distribution of membership "mysteriously" conformed to
the degree of importance of the Member-State coal and steel
18
industries, but no one suggests that the members of the
Authority acted in accordance with considerations other than
that of the Community interest with which they were chargedo
(Moreover, the selection procedures were designed ultimately
to produce an executive whose majority would vacillate bien¬
nially between co-opted members and those appointed by the
19
member governments. 7
The interest represented by the Council is
more elusive. Voting in the Council is based on two general
systems: (1) Where the Council is called upon to "agree"
to High Authority action, an affirmative decision requires
an absolute majority including the vote of a state repre¬
senting at least 1/6 of the total coal and steel production
of the Community or, failing four affirmative votes and in
the event that the High Authority persists in its attitude,
three affirmative votes with the same production qualifi-
2.0
cation. These general rules are subject to specific
21
exceptions. " (2) Other action is taken generally on the
TS See, Ljubisavljevic, Les probl^mes de la ponderation dans
les institutions europ^ennes, 100-103 (1959) (who also points
out that this same sort of "weighting" has occurred in the
Consultative Committee).
19 ECSC Treaty, Art. 10.
20 fiCSC Treaty, Art. 28.
21 J2CSC Treaty, Arts. 58 (3) (agreement unless unanimous
negative vote), 53(b) (agreement must be unanimous), 88
(approval by 2/3 vote).
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basis of an absolute majority including the vote of a Member
22
State representing a 1/6 share of production, or in respect
of certain provisions by means of a 2/3,^3 5/6^ or unanimous
vote.^
The absolute, or simple, majority is always
qualified by the 1/6 of production proviso, a procedure de¬
signed to prevent action in the face of joint Franco-German
p
objections. Oddly enough this makes a simple majority in
a six-member Community more difficult to obtain than the
2/3 majority, which presumably was included as an additional
safeguard to state interests. At any rate we might conclude
on the basis of the formal voting procedures that a. Council
decision represents state interests in different ways de¬
pending upon the topic under discussion, but generally a
collective rather than an individual state interest. In¬
cluded within this collective state interest might be any
number of elements, e.g., respect for basic treaty purposes,
concessions to domestic problems of various states, appre¬
ciation of changed economic conditions, considerations of
22 ECSC~Trea.ty, Art. 28.
23 ECSC Treaty, Art. 96 (calling conference to amend
treaty).
24- ECSC Treaty, Art. 10 (appointing High Authority).
25 ECSC Treaty, Arts. 58 (1) para. 1, 59 (2) para. 1 and
59 (6) para. 2 (instituting production control or consump¬
tion priorities).
26 The retention of this Franco-German prerogative was
considered important enough to require a para-lega.1 modifi¬
cation of the percentage from 1/5 to 1/6 on the accession of
the Saar to Germany in the Franco-German Treaty of 27 October
1956.
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technical feasibility, and the weight given any particular
element can be expected to shift from issue to issue. It
would appear that the Council can further the Interests of
a particular Member State, as opposed to the interests of
the majority or the collective interest, only in the few
instances where voting procedures allow a veto.
There is operational evidence that "collective
state interest" is reasonably descriptive of the interest
represented by the Council, but that it does not result from
27
the use of the Treaty's voting procedures. In practice
the Council rarely decides other than by unanimity. At
this stage of Community developments, rigorous use of
majority voting is politically dangerous. However, the re¬
liance on unanimity is not necessarily a means of weakening
the Community by re-introducing national vetoes. It is a
reasonable attempt to accommoda.te all the national interests
involved wherever possible and to arrive at common solutions.
Over time the participants in this decisional process begin
to take a broader perspective, to look at problems as common
ones, to become "systems oriented," or in Haas's terms to
negotiate in the "Community spirit." The question then be¬
comes whether this process transforms the Council into an
organ representing the Community interest, such that "col¬
lective state interest" and "Community interest" are synonymous.
27 See the discussion of Council functioning In Haas, op.
cit. supra. Chapter I, note 23.
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If it does, talk of jurisdiction-sharing within the institu¬
tional order is otiose.
This can hardly be said to be the case. For
one thing the High Authority, whose policies must be taken
as the incarnation of the Community interest, makes independ¬
ent decisions arrived at within the framework of and based
on its mandate under the relevant Treaty provisions. The
interest thus represented on a particular issue need not
coincide with the "collective state interest" developed
through the Council procedures above described. That it
should often do so, considering the variables involved,
seems improbable.
Secondly, the "Community spirit" of negotia¬
tion, built as it is on mutual confidence and cooperation,
is a fragile construction. When national interests are
sufficiently strong, there is an inevitable reversion to
particular, national viewpoints. If unanimity is to be pre¬
served, this may require the swapping of state A's position
on topic X for state B's position on topic Y. In this manner
the "collective state interest" represented by a Council
decision may in reality be a patchwork of particular state
interests. In this process the Community interest, that is
its stated goal with respect to X or Y, can become a second¬
ary if not an irrelevant consideration. The reversion to
national attitudes in one situation may be expected to carry
over into the whole pattern of decision-making until confi¬
dence is restored.
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We are then, when speaking of the High Author¬
ity and the Council, dealing with organs whose jurisdiction-
sharing relationships are relevant to the general problem of
how jurisdiction is shared between the Community and its
Member States„ But we still must ask how the operational
practices of these institutions influence the jurisdictional
balance between Community and Member State interests as
established by the Treaty,
bo Functional Relationships
As has been said, the primary activity
of the Coal and Steel Community is supposed to be carried on
by the independent executive. In general the High Authority's
tasks are to be carried out (1) on the basis of independent
action or action taken after non-binding consultation with
the Council or (2) through decisions taken with the agreement
of the latter. However, it would appear that in both cases
the effective power of decision has tended to shift from the
High Authority to the Council.
It is clear that, in relation to the first
procedural category, the High Authority has not acted as
independently of the Council, and hence of Member-State
interests, as it was designed to act. Consistent with its
practice of close collaboration with all parties interested
in particular, proposed action, the High Authority has con¬
sulted the Council in instances where it need not have. Such
consultation is specifically provided for in Article 26 of
the Treaty, but the Authority has tended to treat
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"consultations" in the same manner as situations requiring
agreement and. in this regard has provoked criticism by the
Assemblyo
The Council's role in the second category of
instances was meant to be importanto Numerous decisions
which significantly affect Member-State economies and in res¬
pect of which the Treaty gives only very general guidance
pO
may be taken by the High Authority<, State interests re¬
quired not only consultation but an effective power to
block -undesirable action. However, one suspects that those
interested in a strong Community executive must have thought
that the High Authority's initiative power and expertise
would give it a preponderant position in its relations with
the Council« This did not occur, at least in part because
under the ECSC Treaty the Council also organized itself on a
29
permanent basis through its Coordinating Committee0 This
meant that the Council was in a position to offer detailed
alternatives to High Authority proposals, alternatives
which the latter had to take into account if it was to
28 See, eogo, ECSC Treaty Art„ 53° This is not, however,
to say that the provisions requiring "agreement" are all
based on these considerations„ It is impossible in many
instances to discern why the High Authority-Council rela¬
tionship is based on agreement rather than consultation or
vice versa.
29 Query what sort of orientation these permanent officials
acquire?
On the development of Council-High Authority consulta¬
tion and the creation of "CoCor" see, Lagrange, Le pouvoir
de decision dans les Communautes europeennes, 3 Rev, Trim,
Dro Eur. 1, 14-16 (1967)0
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obtain Council approval,, High Authority Annual Reports,
particularly from 1959 until its replacement by the unified
Commission, revealed increasing difficulty in getting the
independent executive's proposals through the Council, as
well as an increasing need for Community action in areas
where Council approval or special Council action was
required.-^0
This last consideration may be the key to the
development of the importance of the Council in the ECSC
scheme and to the apparent hesitancy of the High Authority
to exercise its full powers. The specific powers provided
by the Treaty permit the regulation of a market whose prin¬
cipal difficulty is shortage,, Yet very soon after the Treaty
went into effect the problem became, and has remained, sur¬
plus. As a result the High Authority had to rely significantly
on those Treaty articles which permit the formation of new
policy with the Council's approval. The urgent necessity to
get approval in some areas must be expected to have affected
the degree of independence that could wisely be exercised in
others.
30 The High Authority felt called upon periodically to
justify its relationship to the Council by reference to the
changed conditions of the coal and steel market. See, e.g.,
"Europe's Coal and Steel Situation Reversed Since 1951,"
102 European Community 19 (Apr.-May 1967).
31 S^e Olivier, Aspects Juridiques de l'adoptation du
Traite C.E.C.A. a la Crise Charbonniere, 1967 Cahiers de
droit europ^en 163, 173.
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B. The BBC Structure
It has often been said that the Common Market
Treaty codified the operational relationships developed be¬
tween the High Authority a.nd the Council when providing the
jurisdiction-sharing techniques upon which the relationships
of the SEC Commission and Council are based. There is some
considerable degree of truth in this proposition, but one
should not get the impression that the EEC relationships
were consciously based on ECSC practice. The Council was
transformed into the principal decision-making organ in the
EEC structure because of the political reasons previously
mentioned and beca.use of the substantially different nature
of the Coal and Steel Community Trea.ty when compared with
the Common Market Treaty.
The former gives detailed treatment to an isolated
(however artificially) sector of the relevant economies. The
latter envisages the integration of the whole of the Member
State markets in goods, services, labor and capital, and
beyond that, the integration of the broader economic, social
and commercial policies on which those markets are based. It-
does so, in many instances, in a necessarily skeletal fashion.
Outside the provisions for the establishment of the customs
union, the EEC Treaty has sometimes been viewed as an insti¬
tutional and general policy framework for the concurrent
creation of "sector" programs of the ECSC type.-^ There is
32 Cf., Rapport fait au nom de 1a. Commission des affaires
etrangeres sur le pro jet de loi (No. 4-6 7 7)» Assembld Na.tiona.le
(France), troisi^me Legislature, session ordinaire de
1956-57, P. 171.
little difficulty in appreciating why the institution
representing national interests should have the primary
decisional competence in relation to these developments.
However, to concentrate on the ultimate decision¬
making power or to generalize about its locus by saying,
e.g., that the Council has the power of decision wherever
"delegations of sovereignty" have been made,scarcely
describes the jurisdictional relationships between the Coun¬
cil and Commission adequately. These jurisdiction-sharing
arrangements can be classified in terms of at least four
general categories.
The first and most important class of cases is
that in which the exercise of jurisdiction is joint: The
Council makes the final decision, but on the basis of a
Commission proposal which it can alter only by unanimous
vote. This procedure applies to virtually all of the "norma¬
tive" or "rule-making" decisions necessary to fill out the
legal framework of the Treaty.^
Secondly, there are instances in which the Council
and Commission act independently of each other. In fact,
there are more of these instances than there are provisions
for joint a.ction, but in terms of policy determination they
33 Ibid.
34 EEC Treaty Arts. 7; 8(1), (2), (3), (5); I4(2)(c), (5),
(7); 20. para. 3; 21; 25(1); 28; 33(5); 38(3); ^3; W3),
(4), (5), (6); 49; 51; 54; 55; 56(2); 57; 59, para. 2; 63;
69; 70; 75(1); 79(3); 87(1); 92(2)(d); 94; 98; 99; 100; 101;
103(2), (3); 108(2); 109(3); 111(2): 112(1); 113(3); 116; 126
127; 201; 203; 209; 212, para. 2; 227; 228; 235.
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are much less significant. In a number of cases the power
conferred involves only the performance of a function, not
the taking of an acte administratif, or, at least, not one
directed to or affecting persons outside the institutional
35
structure. When the Commission exercises an independent
power in terms of one of the five categories of administra¬
tive acts envisaged by the Treaty,^ it is most often in the
form of a decision authorizing a deviation from Treaty rules
35 In relation to the Commission see, e.g., EEC Treaty Arts.
20 para. 2, 124, 205, 207, 225, 229» and in relation to the
Council see, e.g., EEC Treaty Arts. 204, 206. See also, EEC
Treaty Arts. 138(3), 1^0 para. 4, 152, i5^, 157(1) para. 2,
159 para. 2, 160 para. 2, 165 para. 4, 166 para. 3, 172, 194
para. 2 and 196 para. 2, which give the Council extensive
internal administrative powers over the other institutions.
36 Article 189;
"For the achievement of their aims and under the
conditions provided for in this Treaty, the Council
and the Commission shall adopt regulations and direc¬
tives, make decisions and formulate recommendations
or opinions.
Regulations shall have a general application.
They shall be binding in every respect and directly
applicable in each Member State.
Directives shall bind any Member State to which
they are addressed, as to the result to be achieved,
while leaving to domestic agencies a competence as
to form and means.
Decisions shall be binding in every respect for
the addressees named therein.
Recommendations and opinions shall have no
binding force."
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by a Member State-^ or of a recommendation to Member Sta.tes
concerning the manner of fulfilling their Treaty obliga¬
tions. 3% However, the Commission alone may take some deci¬
sions or directives of broader application-^ and under four,
not totally unambiguous provisions, acts having the status
of regulations.^0 The Council's independent jurisdiction
seems to include five powers of a regulatory nature,^
up
five independent powers of "decision,and a special treaty'
making competence.^3
With respect to some of the instances of power to
take independent, binding acts, it is difficult to formulate
logical explanations for the failure to employ the joint-
jurisdiction procedure or to explain why one or the other of
the organs was chosen as the proper one to exercise the
particular competence involved. That the Council should
37 JSEC Treaty, Arts. 17(4); 25(2), (3) & (4); 33(2), para.
2; 33(6); 37(3) , para. 2; 46, para. 2; 73(1) , para,. 1 &
73(2); 80(1), (2); 91(1); 107(2); 115; 226. (Since some of
these provisions involve approval of action already taken,
they might better be considered as after-the-fact directives.
See, Ophuls, Les Reglements et les Directives dans les
Tra.ltd's de Rome5 I906 Cahiers de Droit Suropden 3.)
38 EEC Treaty, Arts. 14(6); 15(2); 27; 35; 37(6); 64; 71;
81; 93(1), 102(1); 108(1), para. 1; 111(5).
39 See EEC Treaty, Arts. 33(2) & (4); 79Wi 89; 90(3);
93(2), para. 1; 97.
40 EEC Treaty, Arts. 10(2), 22, 48(3), 91(2).
41 SEC Treaty, Arts. 75(3), 84(2), 121, 136, 200(3).
42 EEC Treaty. Arts. 45(3); 73(1), para. 1; 76; 93(2),
para.. 2; 108(3), para. 2. (In three of these cases the power
is to countermand independent Commission decisions.)
43 EEC Treaty, Art. 238.
determine rules for association (Art,, 136) or financial
contributions by states (Arte 200(3)) seems clear, but why
is it given what seems to be an escape clause power in rela¬
tion to transport (Art. 75(3)) when the general power to
grant special deviations lies with the Commission?^ The
establishment of technical rules on customs administration
(Art. 10(2)) and the computation of the common external
tariff (Art. 22) are perhaps not sufficiently important to
require Council action, but why is the Commission also given
the seemingly broad, power to determine the conditions under
which workers of other Member States may remain in the Mem¬
ber State of their employment (Art. 48(3)(d))? Here, as in
numerous other instances, the student of the Community legal
system finds that he is attempting to fit together a jigsaw
puzzle that has some political pieces missing.
The formal "consultation" procedure of the High
Authority with ECSC Council finds little place in the EEC
Council/Commission relationship. In a. general manner they
are exhorted to consult together on the basis of mutually
45
satisfactory arrangements, but the Commission is required
to have non-binding consultation with the Council only when
negotiating treat!es^ and the latter must obtain the former®
W See articles cited in note 37 supra.. (This deviation is
probably explainable as a concession to Dutch interests.)
45 SfiG Treaty, Art. 162.
46 EEC Treaty, Arts. 111(2), para. 3» 113(3)» para. 2.
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opinion only in relation to certain internal administra-
47 48
tive ' and budgetary matters a.nd when acting on questions
of treaty revision^ or the admission of new states
The fourth category of jurisdictional relationships
is hierarchical - the Commission may be charged by the Coun-
-51
oil with the implementation of the latter®s determinations^
or, in other circumstances, the Commission may exercise
powers conferred directly by the Treaty but under the condi-
52
tions laid down by the Council. This jurisdiction sharing
based on delegation most clearly distinguishes the Commission'
Council from the High Authority-Council relationship,. Many
have likened it to national divisions between legislative (or
"quasi-legislative," whatever that means) and administrative
competences,t>ut this comparison tends to generate more
heat than light. Because the comparison is necessarily based
on the nature of the acts rather than the nature of the body,
those making it, having passed "through the looking-glass,"
have great difficulty making particular examples come out
right-way-round.
W? SEC Treaty, Arts. 153; 212, para. 1.
48 EEC Treaty, Art. 203(2).
49 EEC Treaty, Art. 236.
50 EEC Treaty, Art. 237.
51 EEC Treaty, Art. 155 > sub-para. 4.
52 EEC Treaty, Art. 213.
53 For a particularly facile comparison see Graupner, The
Rules of Competition in the European Community 137-46 (1965)0
^5
A rather interesting wrinkle on this question of
delegation is that the delegation may in many cases be made
only at the proposal of the delegate and must be repealed by
the same means. It is partly for this reason that the Coun¬
cil has granted powers to the Commission in the area of
agricultural policy which must be exercised in consultation
with Management Committees made up of Member State repre¬
sentatives and has reserved the power to modify or revoke
Commission regulations promulgated over the objections of
these Committees. There is some substantial question in
this writer's mind concerning the propriety of such a reser¬
vation by the Council of authority to act on agricultural
questions without a Commission proposal.
We might also ask whether the Commission might
implement Council action on its own initiative under the
mandate of Article 155» para,. 1, that it "ensure the appli¬
cation of the provisions of this Treaty and of the provisions
enacted by the institutions of the Community." The answer
to this question lies in defining what we mean by "initia¬
tive" and "implementation." Clearly the Commission has
considerable initiative power to recommend action to the
Council and to the Member States, to inform itself and in
turn the Community about common problems and even to charge
Member States with violations of the Treaty before the Court
5^ See, Bertram, Decision Making in the EEC: The Management
Committee Procedure, 5 C. M. L. Rev. 24b (1967-68). See also
infra at notes 100-101 and accompanying text.
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of Justice. Moreover, these initiative powers may be em¬
ployed as devices for implementing Council decisions. How¬
ever, if we are speaking of a power to implement which in¬
cludes a competence to issue binding decisions, directives
or regulations, then the power to take such action must be
found in some specific grant in the Treaty or in an act of
the Council.^ Any other interpretation would make the Com¬
mission the preponderant decisional, as well as initiative,
organ in the EEC and would radically affect the Community-
Member State jurisdictional balance.
Of course, as we noted in relation to the ECSC
Treaty, the body exerting the preponderant influence in the
EEC structure may depend more on operational "conventions"
than on the textual division of competences. This was recog¬
nized at the time of the drafting of the EEC Treaty.The
partition of initiative and decisional powers in the more
important areas of Community operation represents a compro¬
mise between "supranational" and "intergovernmentalist"
sentiment among the Member States and is, in that sense,
deliberately ambiguous.
To a certain extent the shift in influence from
the High Authority to the Council evidenced in the
5f> The second, third and fourth paragraphs of Article 155
make this reasonably clear. See, Cartou, Le March^ Commun
et Le Droit Public 74-76 (1959).
56 Chambre des D^put^s du Grand-Duche/ de Luxembourg, Lois
du 30 Novembre 1957» Marchd Commun, Euratom, Institutions
Commun, Documents et Discussions Pariementaires 1957»
p. 650-51.
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functioning of the ECSC structure seemed to have been re¬
versed in the EEC institutional order in the early years of
its operation. This may be explained in part by the circum¬
stances under which the Commission had the good fortune of
working. The attacks levelled against the Economic Community
by other European states and the necessity of presenting a
common front in several international conferences and nego¬
tiations helped to start the EEC off on a note of cohesion
which favored the maximizing of the Commission"s role. Very
favorable economic conditions also played a significant
part, and the Commission, by its rapid and effective work
during the early years of the Community, seized these oppor¬
tunities for exerting its influence.
Commission reports exude confidence, competence
and accomplishment and leave no doubts about the Commission's
position as defender of the Community interest. Nor is there
any doubt that the Commission interprets that interest in
political as well as economic terms and intends to use all
the means at its disposal to develop the institutional order
in the direction of the more progressive "European" senti¬
ment.-^
However, since the "agricultural" crisis of 19&5
and the Luxembourg communique which ended it, the Commission
57" These attitudes were evident from the inception of the
Community. See, e.g., Premier Rapport General de la
Commission de 1a. C.E.E. 13 (1958).
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has had to be more circumspect. As the communique discloses,
the basic thorn in the French side all along was the way
the Commission had been playing politics.Le petit quere
between France and the Commission is still very much a fact
of Community life.
In its more euphoric days the Commission has gone
so far as to deny that the Council represents a coalititon
of Member State interests in its primary decision-making
role, because such decisions are generally in the form of
approval of the Community interest as formulated by the Com¬
mission.-^ However, this statement must be understood as
something less than a. frank appraisal of the functional rela¬
tionship of the Council and Commission. It discounts, for
example, the impact of the Committee of Permanent Representa¬
tives which has significantly lessened the Commission's
monopoly on expertise and hard data in the formative stages
of a Community decision.^0 Moreover, treaty provisions
58 2 CCH Common Mkt. Rep„, para. 9084.
59 Introduction to the Fourth General Report of the Com¬
mission of the EEC (1961). The parliament has questioned
the extent to which the Commission's power of proposal is
being used effectively to shape Community policy. See,
e.g., Question dcrite No. 7, C.E.E., Porte-parole de la Com¬
mission, 19 mai 1987.
60 See Patijn, Permanent Representatives and 'Chefs de
Cabinet', in I967 Common Market No. 11, pp. 28I-83.
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notwithstanding, unanimity is the rule of Council opera¬
tion and., as the resolution of the 1965-66 crisis witnesses,
that procedure is not expected to change radically.
The Commission has itself recognized the effect
of crises on the "systems orientation" or "Community Spirit"
of the Council and its Permanent Representatives. Specific¬
ally beca.use it feared loss of inter-partner confidence and
demands for strictly reciprocal concessions which would jeop¬
ardize the rational introduction of integration measures,
the Commission in 1963 set out a. comprehensive action program
(Cp
for the second stage.
In fact, the balance between independent Community
and Member State power and influence in the institutional
order probably varies from issue to issue even where the same
legal and conventional procedures are applicable. An exten¬
sive investigation of decision-making procedure in the field
of agricultural policy^ has revealed that the process is
ponderous, complex and variable. The steps involved include:
oT The Treaty reads as of ma.jority voting were the general
rule, Art. 148, but only three instances have come to my
attention where a. simple majority is sufficient. Arts. 4-9,
128, 236. A tabulation of the specific provisions on voting
in relation to substantive matters reveals that there are
roughly an equal number of provisions calling for a quali¬
fied majority or for unanimity. About 1/3 of the latter are
transformed into the former during or after the first two
stages of the transitional period.
62 Sixth General Report of the Commission of the SEC 15-1?
(1963).
63 Lindberg, Decision Making and Integration in the European
Community, 19 Int'l Org. 56 (1965). ~ ~~ = ~
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(1) Commission proposal, after consultation with various
interest groups and. consultative committees made up of
national officials.0^ (2) The talcing of national positions
on the proposal by the competent national authorities..
(3) Joint analysis of national positions at the technical
level. (4) Political negotiation in the Council. (5) Re-
introduction of a Commission "Package-Plan" based on the
negotiations. (6) Use of deadlines and crisis techniques to
force decision. (7) "Tying in" of various areas outside
the primary one in order to achieve acceptable compromise.
Within this process the Commissions powers as
initiator, technical expert and catalyst-liason organ were
found to be extremely significant, but it must be noted
that this may depend upon the sector involved and the people
in charge. The pressures toward conformity with the Commis¬
sion's proposals in the original or revised versions become
very great as negotiation proceeds. However, non-conformity
within the system remains possible and there is always the
chance that a national decision taken outside the Community
procedures may prevent agreement. The latter is essentially
what happened in the 1965=66 breakdown of Council discussions
on agriculture, a situation which also illustrates how
~U£ The Commission has gone far beyond the terms of the
Treaty in the association of national officials with the
formative stages of Community policy. The Treaty establishes
four consultative committees, but by 1965 the Commission had
created thirty-one additional groups. Gaudet, The Challenge
of the Changing Institutions, 3 C.M.L.Rev. 143, 14-8-4-9 (19°5)°
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politically-oriented, proposals, there independent Community
financing under Parliamentary control,^ may logically be
"tied-in" with primary areas of discussion,.
Parliamentary activity under the SEC Treaty follows
much the same lines as that described in relation to the
ECSC Assembly,, Control over the independent executive was
f)6>
strengthened by allowing a vote of censure at any time and
this, given the parliaments general attitude, could tend to
strengthen the Commission's hand in its dealings with the
Council„ The Parliament was also given a power of proposal
in relation to the budget^ and, as under the SCSC Treaty,
must be consulted in relation to certain activities,, Consti¬
tutionally it is a weaker institution under the SEC than
under the ECSC Treaty because it has no control over the
primary decisional organ. Attempts have been made to estab¬
lish a close, "conventional" relationship between the Parlia¬
ment and the Council, but they have not proved particularly
"S3 Commission Proposal of 31 March 1965 =
66 EEC Treaty, Art. 144-.
6? EEC Treaty, Art. 203(3).
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fruitful.68
C» The Combined. Executives
The concurrent operation of three separate Com-
69
munitles has caused difficulties. Logically the treaties
should be amalgamated, but this step has been impossible
because such negotiation would Invariably raise latent polit¬
ical disagreements which are presently thought to be in-
70
soluble. A partial solution pending full unification of
the treaties has been devised in the form of a Treaty Insti¬
tuting a Single Council and a Single Commission of the Euro-
71
pean Communities.' This, in effect, formalizes and ration¬
alizes the close cooperation that has necessarily taken place
among the separate executives. The single Council and Com¬
mission will still function under the specific provisions of
£TS By holding a colloquy with the Parliament and the three
independent executives in November 1959 > the Council showed
some willingness to cooperate with the Parliament, but it
declined to bind itself to more far-reaching consultation
commitments proposed by the Parliament.
The Parliament was particularly unhappy, for example,
about the Council's failure to consult it until after the
signing of the Greek Association Treaty. The argument that
this was in accord with national practice failed to impress
the European parliamentarians for they toad no effective
power to influence the Treaty after it was formalized. A
suggestion was even made that the Parliament sue the Council
before the Court of Justice. Debats (Parlementalres) 19
September 1961, p. 4-0-42.
69 See, e.g.. Kapp, The Merger of the Executives of the
European Communities, Chapter I (1964).
70 See, e.g., Pescatoie, Les perspectives du developpement
institutionelle a 1a. suite de 1a. "crise du Marche7 Commun",
in Colloque sur la. Fusion des Communautes Europ^ennes (Liege,
1966).
71 French text at 1 Rev. Trim, de Dr. Eur. 440 (1965)0
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the three separate treaties, but the line between EEC and
ECSC operational procedures must be expected to become even
vaguer under the new arrangement.
The few developments of note in the "unification"
treaty are that the Parliament's control functions under the
ECSC Treaty have shifted to the EEC model, as have the ap¬
pointment procedures for the new Commission, and the inde¬
pendent financing arrangements of the Coal and Steel Commun¬
ity will now tend to be submerged in the much larger single
budget for all three Communities0 There is presently some
concern about how the new Commission may work in practice
and whether its past level of influence can be maintained,,
This depends on many factors, not least of which are the
membership and presidency of the new executive and whether
"Parkinsonian" principles will operate to make the interim
fourteen-member Commission less cohesive and decisive than
the nine-member EEC Commission has been.
IIo The "Division of Competences"
In a federal state constitutional structure we are
accustomed to thinking in terms of a division of competences
by subject-matter between federal and state governments.
This division is often complicated by overlapping and con¬
current jurisdiction, but each level of government has the
power to regulate its proper sector in much the same manner,
by establishing directly effective norms and by enforcing
them independently of the policy determinations of the
coordinate federal or state authority., On the other hand,
in relation to the classical (to the extent that there is
such an abstract animal) international organization, one
tends to be concerned, not only with the organization*s
subject-matter competence, but also with what form its policy
determinations take and how they may be applied and enforced.
If we consider even one of the more progressive norm-creating
structures, the I.L.O., we find that the agreed rules become
effective only through ratification or adoption by individual
state governments and there is no breach of an international
obligation if the attempt at ratification or adoption fails.
More common would be international organizations in which
any new formal norm-creation is effected by additional
treaties or protocols.
Although certain points of similarity may be discovered,
the division of competences between Community and Member-
State institutional orders cannot be subsumed under either
of these simplified, traditional categories, nor is it
really a combination of the two. Again we are faced with
rather complex techniques of jurisdiction sharing which vary
from subject to subject and which are qualified fundamentally
by the jurisdiction-sharing scheme within the Community in¬
stitutional order outlined above. It must also be recog¬
nized that the extent and nature of the powers afforded the
Community institutions are not always a function only of
ideas about the desired Community-Member State balance of
power; the Treaty provisions are also based on decisions
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concerning the powers any "governmental" agency should have
to intervene in the relevant market and the nature of the
economic facts sought to be regulated,
A. The ECSC Approach
The general approach to jurisdiction sharing under
the ECSC Treaty has been to carve out a specific economic
sector and to give the Community institutions extensive powers
of direct control over that sector- The concrete jurisdic¬
tion-sharing problems that arise in this context are very
like those encountered in a federal-state system - where does
one subject-matter competence end and another factually-
related one begin?"^ The "factually-related" competence in
this case is the general Member State jurisdiction over
tangential and interdependent sectors and over general
economic policy.^
72 Thus control over a particular subject matter may "imply"
certain powers, Federation Charbonniere de Belgique v. High
Authority, Case No. 8/55, II Rec. 291, 29 Nov. 195&, but the
implication is limited by the necessity of balancing Com¬
munity competence with Member State competences. Italian
Government v. High Authority, Case 20/59, VI Rec. 663, 15
July I960; Netherlands Government v. High Authority, Case
25/59, VI Rec. 723, 15 July i960. See also, Re Amendment of
ECSC Treaty Article 56, V Rec. 533, 17 Dec. 1959; Barbara
Erzbergbau A. G. v. High Authority, VI Rec. 367, 10 May I960;
De Gazemenlljke Steenkolenmijen v. High Authority, Case
30/59, VII Rec. 1, 23 Feb. 1961.
73 A good example of how this division of jurisdictions can
create crises for the sector under Community control is pro¬
vided by the difficulties experienced in the coal sector
because of the lack of an overall energy policy. See,
Twelfth General Report of the High Authority 72-80 (196^).
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However, the description of the division of compe¬
tences in the ECSC Treaty cannot be left at this general
level. One author, talcing a properly particularistic ap¬
proach, has isolated five categories of competences set out
in the Coal and Steel Community Treaty:' (1) Competences
exclusive to the Community, (2) Concurrent Community-Membere¬
state competences, (3) Competences reserved to the Member
States, (4-) Member-State competences which must be exercised
in accordance with Community-determined policy, and (5)
Member-State competences the exercise of which must be harmo¬
nized among the six partners. Within the first three cate¬
gories the Community and Member-State institutional orders
exercise coordinate functions of norm-creation, application
and enforcement, but in the latter two the division of
competences has juridical as well as substantial aspects.
Category four, "bound competences," involves situations in
which individual rights and duties are applied and enforced,
and sometimes created, by Member-State machinery, but under
the direction of trea.ty norms or of binding decisions or
recommendations by the Community institutions. The fifth
category envisages general cooperation between the Member
75
States directed at collective action on common problems.
7^+ Prieur, La Communautd Europeenne du Charbon et de
l'Acier 128-35 (1962).
75 This is really a redefinition of Prieur's "competences
harmonisees." Id. at His example, Art. 10 of the Con¬
vention on Transitional Provisions, still fits, but it must
be noted that the competence becomes "bound" if member
governments fail to agree on harmonized action.
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This cooperation is usually undertaken at the initiative or
under the guidance of the Community institutions.
Bo The EEC8s Shift of Emphasis
The same categories may he used to describe the
division of competences provided by the EEC Treaty, but the
emphasis seems to have shifted from the federal-type division,
categories one through three, to Jurisdiction sharing based on
the juridical divisions of function found in categories four
and five* To put it more concretely, the Community exer¬
cises its jurisdiction on or through Member States in a
larger proportion of cases under the EEC Treaty than under
the ECSC arrangement and the necessity of a joint exercise of
power to produce a single result becomes the predominant
characteristic of jurisdiction-sharing in the general common
market.
This shift in emphasis, like most things in the
European Communities, has both political and economic roots.
"Institutional federalism," the placing of enterprises sub¬
ject to national governmental control under the coordinate,
direct control of the ECSC institutional order for purposes
connected with coal and steel production, makes economic
sense in an oligopolistic sector traditionally subject to
state intervention. This sort of direct relationship between
Community institutions and enterprises is less important
where the aim is to integrate whole economies on the basis,
primarily, of eliminating artificial barriers to the free
play of ma.rket forces. On the political side, it is
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perfectly obvious that the political implications of creat-
ing the same direct Community institutional control over
the whole economy in the EEC Treaty that the ECSC Treaty
creates over the coal and steel sector would have been
enormous. The predominant "institutional federalism" of the
ECSC has thus been transformed into a hybrid "normative-
institutional federalism" which involves policy creation at
the Community level, either by a Treaty provision or an in¬
stitutional determination, and the association of national
governmental machinery in varying ways with the execution of
the common policy.
This comparison between the two treaties can be
amply illustrated0 The ECSC may generate its own funds by
taxing the enterprises subject to its jurisdiction; it may
directly finance projects in the coal and steel sector and
set up joint financing structures of any type appropriate to
implement Community objectives, control production and prices,
regulate agreements and concentrations, and sanction viola-
77
tions of its determinations. ' Its primary administrative
tools in the exercise of these competences are decisions,
individual or general, which directly affect the legal posi¬
tion of coal and steel enterprises. Policy determination,
75 An excellent analysis of the two general methods of
association or "subordination" of state machinery in the
implementation of common policy appears in Cartou, Le Marc he7
Commun et le Droit Public 78-84- (1959)»
77 See generally, ECSC Treaty, Chapters II-VI.
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implementation and enforcement take place wholly within the
Community institutional structure. There are few instances
where the Treaty merely creates an obligation for Member
States.Only occasionally, where Member State governmental
competence to deal with questions relevant to the whole
national economy (e.g., in the areas of wages and labor
mobility, transport, and commercial policy) is recognized as
strongly influencing the coal and steel sector, is the Com¬
munity given jurisdiction which must be exercised in conjunc¬
tion with or through Member State authorities.^
The position is quite different under the EEC
Treaty. For one thing there are many more instances where
action is to be taken by Member States in accordance with
80
obligations assumed under the Treaty. This is true in
substantial part because the Treaty envisages a gradual elim¬
ination of quantitative restrictions and customs duties along
with the gradual creation of a common external tariff, whereas
Q -I
the ECSC Treaty accomplished the former all at once and
dealt with the latter only to the extent that the failure to
create a common external tariff might result in serious
82
damage to internal Community production. Second, the vast
7*8 See, e.g., ECSC Treaty, Art. 69.
79 See, e.g., ECSC Treaty, Arts. 68(2), (3); 70; 74; 75<>
80 See generally, EEC Treaty, Part Two, Title One.
81 Convention on Transitional Provisions, Art. 8.
82 ECSC Treaty, Art.
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majority of all Community actions under the Treaty of Rome
require some measure of national implementation. Provisions
for the taking of "decisions" are almost exclusively con¬
fined to situations involving Commission supervision of the
fulfillment by Member States of their Treaty obligations. In
only two instances are decisions directed to individuals or
o q
enterprises envisaged. ^ By far the commonest powers con¬
ferred are powers to issue "regulations," norms which are
directly binding within all the Member States, or "directives"
to member governments, which are binding as to the ends to
be achieved but leave domestic agencies free to choose the
84
form and means of implementation.
It would seem a simple matter then to determine the
areas in which jurisdiction-sharing follows the RCSC-type,
subject-matter division and those in which joint action is
required by a tabulation of instances involving regulatory
competence and those entailing Community directives followed
by national measures pursuant thereto. Such a. tabulation
would, in broad terms, reveal that in the areas of the right
of establishment, free movement of capital and services,
fiscal policy, approximation of laws affecting Community de¬
velopment and balance of payments stability, Community insti¬
tutional competence is limited to the formulation of common
83 EEC Treaty, Arts. 79(4) and 89.
84 For a more or less complete list of articles providing
a competence to issue directives and regulations see, Ophuls,
Les Reglements et les Directives dans les Trait^s de Rome,
1966 Cahiers de Droit Europ^en 3«
rules which have no effect until implemented by national
governmental action. On the other hand, in the areas of
common external tariffs, agricultural policy, transport
policy, commercial policy, policy relating to economic trends,
regulation of competition, free movement of workers and the
allowability of state aids, the Community can exercise a
"directly-effective" regulatory competence.
However, this "regulatory" competence requires
some considerable explication - explication which qualifies
any firm conclusions that might be drawn from the simple
existence of a regulatory rather than a "directive" power
in specific cases and which reveals a great deal about the
essential nature of jurisdiction sharing in the SEC. The
power to issue "directly effective" norms does not neces¬
sarily involve a substitution of Community for national imple¬
mentation machinery, as is the case in the SCSC. Nor do regu¬
lations always affect individual subjective rights in the
same manner or to the same extent or create a direct rela¬
tionship between private legal persons and the Community in¬
stitutional order. Cases have already come before the Court
of Justice which involved serious questions of whether a
particular part of a "regulation" was or could be applicable
before the introduction of state measures of implementation.®^
"S3 E.g., Calsse Commune d9assurances "La Prevoyance Sociale"
v. Bertholet, Case No. 31/64', XI-6 Rec. Ill, March 11, I965.
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We might, for example, contrast the use of regu¬
latory competence in the fields of competition and transport-
tariff discrimination with its use in areas such as economic
trends, commercial policy or state aids0 Within the former
categories rights and duties are created for individuals and
enterprises within the Member States, measures of execution
are entrusted to the Commission and persons affected are
responsible directly to the Community for the performance of
the obligations imposed. In the latter cases the general
policies and criteria laid down in Community regulations are
made concretely effective through their application by Member
States.®^ Nor have the uses of the Community's regulatory
competence been exhausted by these two sets of examples.
Regulations may also be used to establish and regulate the
8 8
activity of bodies at the Community level, define the rela¬
tionship between the Community and its employees,®9 modify or
WT EEC Treaty Arts. 79 and 87; Regulation No. 11, 52/60
J.0, 1121 and Regulation 17, 13/62 J.O. 20^. (Note that Reg.
No. 11, Arts. 14- a.nd 16, require some measure of national
execution.)
87 The regulations adopted (Reg. 3/63, 1^/63 J.O. 153) and
proposed (See CCH Com, Mkt. Rep, para. 3821) under Article
111 reinforce the impression given by the wording of EEC
Arts, 9^ and 110-116 and by the nature of the activity regu¬
lated that national execution of common policies is contem¬
plated. Indeed it would seem that a decision addressed to
Member States will in most cases be more appropriate than a
regulation. See, e.g., Decision of the Council Relating to
an Action Program for the Common Commercial Policy, 90/62
J.O. 2353.
88 See, e.g., EEC Treaty Art, 127.
89 EEC Treaty, Art. 212
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complete certain treaty provisions^0 or create subjective
individual rights which modify but do not replace the appll-
91
cation of national legislative and administrative provisions.
The effect of regulations is different in these
various areas because the purpose of Community action is dif¬
ferent, To take the first examples given, regulations con¬
cerning "anti-trust" problems or transport discrimination seek
to deal with private interference with market forces whereas,
in the case of economic trend policy, commercial policy or
state aids, governmental activity is in question. In the
latter situations the use of a regulation rather than direct¬
ives is not particularly significant. In either case national
measures of execution are required, and often the Treaty pro¬
vides for either type of action at the Community institu¬
tions4 option.
The existence of a substantial number of Community
regulatory competences under the EEC Treaty need not, then,
substantially qualify the distinction that has been made be¬
tween the nature of the division of competences in the Coal
and Steel and in the Economic Community. That a directly
effective norm is promulgated does not indicate that direct
powers of control are being exercised by Community institu¬
tions in the implementation of that norm. Yet, the power to
issue regulations is significant because wherever "directly
90 E.g., EEC Treaty, Art. 14(7).
91 See generally, Reg. No. 3> J.O., 16/12/58, p. 561/58.
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effective" Community norms may be used a corresponding power
92
of execution could be delegated to the Commission or to
some specially constructed Community body.^3 Moreover, the
Community has a general regulatory competence which is bound
only by the requirement that it be exercised in pursuit of
the objectives outlined in the Treaty.^ Given appropriate
political decisions the Community's regulatory competence
is a potential tool for the transformation of the balance
between normative and institutional federalism in the Com¬
munity and hence of the jurisdictional relationship between
the Community and its Member States.
Three of the more important uses made to date of
the Community5s regulatory competence illustrate what complex
and various adjustments of Community and Member State compe¬
tences may evolve. Under the EEC Treaty's competition pro¬
visions, for example, it is clearly contemplated that an
implementation system excluding national application of the
Community norms might be created.9-5 Such a system would
involve a strict concurrence of jurisdictions, for national
92 EEC Treaty, Art. 155.
93 This is presumably an implied power of the Council. See
EEC Treaty, Art. 177, para. 1, (c). For a criticism of the
device of specially created administrative bodies in the
Community institutional order see Maas, The Administrative
Commission for the Social Security of Migrant Workers: An
Institutional Curiosity, 4 C.M.L. Rev. 5± (1966).
94 EEC Treaty, Art. 235.
95 EEC Treaty, Art. 87.
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governments would remain free to enact and enforce national
rules on the same subject. However, the Council decided to
allow the application of the competition rules in part by
national authorities and also to associate national cartel
and monopoly officials with the Commission*s execution of
96
the Treaty and regulations.
Likewise, Regulation No, 11 on discrimination in
transport rates, in enacting under Article 79 (3) the "provi¬
sions necessary to enable the institutlons of the Community"
to ensure compliance with Article 79 (1)» creates a system
for the collection of the basic information necessary for
enforcement which is applied and sanctioned by Member States,^?
However, within the same regulation the Council takes an es¬
sentially contrary approach where violations of the anti¬
discrimination provisions are found to exist. It implies a
Community power of direct pecuniary sanction against the of¬
fending carrier,an implication which can be and has been
99
severely criticized,
9Z Council Regulation No, 17, Arts, 9-10, 13/62 J,0, 204-.
See generally, Buxbaum, Incomplete Federation; Jurisdiction
over Anti-Trust Matters in the European .Economic Community,
52 Calif, L, Rev, 56 (1964-), for a discussion of the complex
problems involved in this division of competences.
97 Council Regulation No, 11, Arts. 5 para. 1, 6, 11, 13,
16, 52/60 J.O. 1121.
98 Id. at Art. 18.
99 Precigout, La sanction des infractions aux reglements
de la C.E.E., 5 Rev. du March^ Commun 14-2 (1962).
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The Council regulations on agriculture, which
account for about 95% of the regulations thus far issued, are
also instructive,, Agriculture is, of course, a special sit¬
uation. The objectives of a common policy had to go beyond
reduction of barriers to trade and general alignment of eco¬
nomic policies to take account of the special social and
structural features of national markets. A high level of
Community regulatory activity in that sector was probably
inevitable, but the means chosen to organize the more import¬
ant markets - the replacement of customs duties by a Community
levy system based on a Community price system - certainly
intensified activity at the Community level and made Articles
44 and 45, under which national action during the transitional
period was envisaged, substantially obsolete.100 However,
implementation of the common policy is largely in the hands
of the Member States and delegations of functions to the
Commission are somewhat qualified by the association with it
of advisory Management Committees for each agricultural sec¬
tor, composed of representatives of the Member States but
101
presided over by a member of the Commission. While levy
revenues presently accrue to Member States, they are in
effect made progressively applicable to the Orientation and
100 See, e.g., Council Regulation No. 19, Art. 18(1) & (3),
30/62 J.O. 933, April 20, 1962.
101 Id. at Arts. 17, 18, 23, & 26. Some insight into the
relationship of the Commission with these Committees is pro¬
vided in "Reponse a la question dcrit No. 156 pos6e par M.
Vredeling," C.E.E., Porte-Parole de la Commission, 20 avril
1967.
6?
Guarantee Fund, The Fund will eventually assume all financial
responsibility for price support interventions, export refunds
102
and structural programs. But, it will not, with the ex¬
ception of structural projects, finance them directly; it
will only make good state expenditure undertaken in accordance
with Community criteria,10^
Looking at these three examples, which are really
very partial descriptions of the nature of the regulations
promulgated in each case, one begins to perceive how extremely
flexible the Community regulatory competence is. In fact,
if a single adjective were to be applied to the whole of the
division of competences under the EEC Treaty, I would suggest
that it should be "flexibility."
This characterization applies equally to competences
involving Community action by means of directives. Directives
thus far promulgated raise substantial questions about whether
a significantly greater measure of discretion need be left
to Member States in their execution than when state implemen¬
tation of regulations or decisions is in question.10^ Indeed,
it is repeatedly suggested that directives might also have
"direct effect" in certain circumstances,10^ while at the
102 Council Regulation No. 25, 30/62 J.O. 991, April 20,
1962.
103 Council Regulation No. 17/64, 3^/64 J.O. 586.
104- See discussion by Sohier et Megret, Le Role de l'execu-
tif national et des legislatures natlonales dans la mlse en
oeuvre du droit communautalre, in Droit Communautalre et
Droit National 107, 108-16 (1965).
105 Waelbroeck, 1967 Cah. d. dr. eur. 184, 192-93 (Commen¬
tary on the Luttlcke cases).
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same time others decry the lack of effective implementation
of directives presently "in force,
Concluding Comments
The foregoing description of the general pattern of
jurisdiction-sharing in the European Communities is, perhaps,
a bit confusing. That cannot be avoided. The questions that
were posed about the constitutional organization of the Com¬
munities have been answered in different ways in relation to
different aspects of the structure, Recurring themes have
been "ambiguity," "flexibility," "complexity," Clearly the
"jurisdictional balance" of the system may develop in several
directions, or, in fact, in all of them at once,
An appreciation of the complexity and fluidity of the
legal relationships between independent Community and Member
State interests in general is a necessary background for the
analysis of the relationship of the Community Court with
Member State courts. These relationships are jurisdictional
and the Court of Justice, like all courts, must interpret
its own jurisdiction. In so doing it must take into account,
if not overtly use, what it deems to be the overall purposes
of the Community structure. By way of illustration, one
might note that the most important, or at least the most
notorious, decision on state and federal judicial jurisdic¬
tions in the modern history of the United States Supreme
106 Tall on, Le droit communautalre; Rd'allte's et illusions,
1966 Cah, d, dr, eur, 571•
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Court, Erie R» B„ v„ Tomklns, rests on little more than
its appropriateness tinder the American federal system,,
To the extent that the purposes of the Community struc¬
ture are unclear or undecided, the Community Court may find
itself with difficulties, or, perhaps, with opportunities0
Its decisions must be evaluated in the light of that vague
standard which relates them to the whole of the Community
organization - "appropriateness under the system,,"
T07 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
Chapter III. A Court in a. Community
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The appropriateness of determinations concerning Com¬
munity Court-national court jurisdictional relationships is,
of course, also related to the general function of the Court
of Justice within the Community system. In the widest possi¬
ble terms the Court has the task of ensuring the observance
of law in the interpretation and application of the treaties.
This function is carried out over an extraordinarily wide
range of jurisdiction. As one commentator has put it,
"[T]he Court is an administrative court,
with strong undertones of a. constitutional
court in specific instances, as well as a.
civil court. And in a few instances it operates
as an international court, a disciplinary
tribunal and even as an arbitrator."1
To be more specific the Court exercises a. jurisdiction:
(1) to determine the validity of executive action at the
2 1
suit of Community organs, Member States,J or third persons
4
affected by such action; (2) to enforce Community norms and
1 Bebr, Judicial Control of the European Communities 22-23
(1962). Similar statements are common in other discussions.
See, e.g., Campbell & Thompson, Common Market Law 10 (1962),
2 EC3C Treaty, Arts. 33(1), 35(1), 38(1); EEC Treaty, Arts.
173(1), 175(1), 180(b)(c); (EURATOM Treaty, Arts. 146, 148).
3 ECSC Treaty, Arts. 33(1), 35(1), 37(1), 38(1); EEC Treaty,
Arts. 173(1), 175(1), 180(b)(c); (EURATOM Treaty, Arts.
146(1), 148(1)).
4 ECSC Treaty, Arts. 33(2), 35(1), 36(2), 48(3), 66(5.2)
(6.2); EEC Treaty, Arts. 173(2), 175(3); (EURATOM Treaty,
Arts. 146(2), 148(3)), See also, EEC Treaty, Art. 184;
(EURATOM Treaty, Art. 156).
See also in connection with the determination of the
validity of executive action the provisions for referral
from domestic tribunals when such action is called in ques¬
tion in litigation before them. ECSC Treaty, Art. 41; EEC
Treaty, Art. 177; (EURATOM Treaty, Art. 150).
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decisions against Member States^ and against individuals and
enterprises;^1 (3) to determine matters of Community law on
referral from Member State Courts;' (4) to hear suits between
Member States concerning matters affecting their Community
g
obligations either under compulsory judicial procedures or
by virtue of a compromise;^ (5) to render binding advisory
opinions;(6) to hear cases concerning disputes between
the Community organs and their employees'*"^ and litigation
12
involving the general liability of the Communities;
(7) to order the removal of a member of the Communities®
3 ECSC Treaty, Art, 88; EEC Treaty, Arts. 93(2.2), 169, 170,
180(a), 225(2); (EURATOM Treaty, Arts. 21(3), 38(3), 81(3)
(4), 82(4), 141(2), 145(2)).
6 ECSC Treaty, Art. 36(2); EEC Treaty, Art. 173(2); (EURATOM
Treaty, Arts. 81(3)(4), 144(b), 145(2), 146(2)). Such cases
will take the form of an appeal by the individual or enter¬
prise against executive action directed to him, except in
the case of EURATOM Treaty, Arts. 81(3)(4), 145(2). It is
questionable whether the latter article should be included
under "enforcement" against individuals because Member State
action is yet required in order to sanction a violation thus
determined.
7 ECSC Treaty, Art. 41; EEC Treaty, Art. 177; (EURATOM
Treaty, Art. 150).
8 ECSC Treaty, Art. 89(1); EEC Treaty, Arts. 93(2.2), 170,
225(2); (EURATOM Treaty, Arts. 38(3), 142).
9 ECSC Treaty, Art, 89(2); EEC Treaty, Art. 182; (EURATOM
Treaty, Art. 154).
10 ECSC Treaty, Art. 95(4); EEC Treaty, Art. 228(2);
(EURATOM Treaty, Arts. 103(3), 104(3)).
11 ECSC Treaty, Arts. 3^* ^0, 47; EEC Treaty, Art. 179;
(EURATOM Treaty, Art. 152).
12 ECSC Treaty, Arts. 34, 40, 475 EEC Treaty, Art. 178;
(EURATOM Treaty, Arts. 12(4), 151).
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executives;^ (8) to suspend the execution of executive
action and make other interim orders in aid of its own juris¬
diction;^ (9) to hear appeals from a special arbitration
1 9
committee provided under the EURATOM Treaty; a.nd formerly
(10) to annul Member State action in one special case, wrong¬
ful use of the right to veto appointees to the High Authori-
1
ty. The Court may also make use of jurisdictional grants
19 1 ft
provided in contractual stipulations, Council regulations
and Member State laws.1^
The Court as Arbiter of the Jurisdiction-Sharing System
The description of the Court's jurisdiction quoted
above reveals that the Court suffers no less from termino¬
logical problems than does the Community as a whole, perhaps
more. All of the terms used, "administrative," "interna¬
tional," "constitutional," may be justifiably employed. The
Court does exercise control over an "executive" on the basis
13 EC3C Treaty, Art. 12(2); EEC Treaty, Arts. 157(2), 160;
(EURATOM Treaty, Art. 129).
14 ECSC Treaty, Arts. 39, 92; EEC Treaty, Arts. 185, 186;
(EURATOM Treaty, Arts. 15?, 158).
15 Art. 18(2).
16 ECSC Treaty, Art. 10(10).
17 ECSC Treaty, Art. 42; EEC Treaty, Art. 181; (EURATOM
Treaty, Art. 153)-
18 EEC Treaty, Art. 1?2. See, e.g., Regulation No. 11,
Art. 25; Regulation No. 1?, Art. 17.
19 ECSC Treaty, Art. 43.
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of criteria borrowed primarily from French administrative
law. It is concerned with suits about "treaties" a.nd involv¬
ing traditional subjects of international law. The control
exercised may be described as "constitutional" for a number
of reasons: because it is based on a "constitutional" docu-
20
ment, because it is a "rudimentary political control" in
21
certain instances, because of the nature of the acts which
22
may be annulled.
However, there is a more general reason for viewing the
Court of Justice as a court exercising const!tutional juris¬
diction. The three most important aspects of the Court®s
jurisdiction, (1) the jurisdiction provided to control Com¬
munity institutional action, (2) to declare the non-fulfill¬
ment by states of their treaty obligations and (3) to give
authentic interpretations of the Treaty, are the juridical
techniques by which the Court exercises its more profound
function as arbiter of the jurisdiction-sharing relationships
2 3
between the Community and the Member States. In thus regu¬
lating the exercise of their respective competences over
20 "...le Traitd se presente - je ne dis pas 'est® pour
6viter toute querelle doctrinal et jeajoute m§me du point
de vue de la Communa.utd' - se presents done du point de vue
de la Communautd", sous les apparences d'une Constitution
et d'une legislation ^conomique commune." Lagrange, Les
Problemes juridiques et economiques du March^ Commun 43
(I960).
21 Bebr, ojo, clt. supra, note 1, at 14-9.
22 Pescatore, La. Cour en tant que jurisdiction feddrale et
Const!tutlonelle, In £ehn Jahre Rechtsprechung des Gerlcht-
shofs der Europg-i schen Gemeinschaften 520 (I965).
23 Lagrange, La. Cour de Justice de 1a. C.E.C.A. 1954 R.D.P.
417, 434-35.
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individuals in accordance with the Treaties, the Court
2l±
exercises an essentially federal constitutional control. ^
That this should be the case is both substantiated and ex¬
plained by the rationale for the Court's creation,,
The existence of a court of law competent to supervise
the allocation of jurisdiction within the Communities is in
a. sense a logical outgrowth of the general Community develop¬
ment,, As organizations move away from classical, interna¬
tional, legal control through Member State participation in
decision-making, they must begin to substitute internal con-
2 5
trols of the national "check-and-balance" type. On the
other hand, given the novelty and fluidity of the jurisdic¬
tional relationships created, there were some initial doubts
concerning the appropriateness of the creation of a court of
law.
The jurisdiction given the Community Court is probably
better understood if approached from the standpoint of re¬
sponses to specific problems. Unfortunately for the student
of the Court, most of the documents that would fully explain
the impetus for the inclusion of specific jurisdictional
2A Feld, The Court of Justice of the European Communities
38 (196b).
25 Halm, Constitutional Limitations in the Law of the Euro¬
pean Community [1.963 1 1 Recueil des Cours 195, 202 (1964).
The simple fact that a court employing primarily "judicial"
procedures exists may be thought to reflect something about
the stage of the "federalizing process" in the Communities.
See Friedrich, International Federalism in Theory and Prac¬




provisions are secret, and statements by interested parties,
to the extent that any concerning the Court were made, are
often conflicting., However, some things are known and others
may be hypothesized without much fear of serious error,
1. Institutional Control
The primary consideration in the creation of the
2 7
ECSC Court must have been control of the High Author!ty, '
Even after the addition of the Council and Assembly, some
further means of control which would not compromise the execu¬
tive® s independence was necessary. In this regard serious
consideration was given to the creation of an organ exercising
2 8
a general political control over the institutional structure.
An institution exercising this type of competence seems to
have been desired, among other reasons, for purposes of flex¬
ibility should Member States encounter serious economic prob¬
lems in the implementation of the Treaty, It is in this area
of safeguard measures that the ECSC Treaty gives the Court of
Justice its one grant of jurisdiction which clearly goes
beyond the ordinary bounds of legal control,^ The weakness
of the Assembly0s political control also argued in favor of
2Z See statement by Dehousse, II/63 Debats No, 59» P° 60-61,
16/10/62,
27 See, e,g,, Rapport de la Delegation Franpaise sur 1a.
Traits instituant la C,E.C»A, (1951)®
28 Valentine, The Court of Justice of the European Com¬
munities 1 (1965) (Proposal attributed to Monnet's Commisariat
general du Plan)„
29 ECSC Treaty, Art, 37,
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the creation of a sort of "policy overlord" or, perhaps, an
arbitral tribunal to round off the institutional structure„
However, in the end a court of law was instituted, with juris¬
diction to annul High Authority action on grounds of incom¬
petence, major violation of procedure, violation of the Treaty
or any rule of law relating to its application, or detourne-
ment de pouvoir.
In order to uncover the rationale for the creation
of a judicial body with more or less well understood bases
for the exercise of its supervisory function, we must recall
what was said in the previous chapter concerning the "plu¬
ralistic base" of the Community,, All of the participants had
interests which had been painstakingly negotiated into the
Treaty. The institution of judicial control on the basis of
legal criteria must have seemed the best means whereby these
interests could be protected. independent political
agency to oversee High Authority action, which could not
only quash executive action but also substitute its own poli¬
cies, was not desirable. Two policy determinations may be
better than one,but conformity with the Treaty is not thereby
insured. An arbitral tribunal might have lacked the procedural
safeguards, definite legal criteria and continuity to maintain
30 It has been suggested that in general terms the power-
fulness of the Court may be explained by the weakness of the
Assembly. Mason, The European Coal a.nd Steel Community 40
(1955).
31 The Dutch were particularly outspoken concerning their
reliance on the Court to protect their interests. Haas,
Uniting of Europe 149 (1958).
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respect for the Treaty as a whole0^c
That this so-called "administrative" control of the
Court is fundamentally oriented toward maintaining the juris¬
dictional balance between the High Authority and Member States
is evidenced by the ability of state governments, individually
or collectively, to enforce legality of operation even where
their "interests," in an administrative law sense, are not
affected by a particular executive act„^3 The Court0s in¬
stitutional control is balanced and completed by giving the
High Authority, along with the Member States, an appeal
against the deliberations of the Council and the Assembly,
which is directed at keeping them within the bounds of their
competence and substantial procedural requirements®
2. Control of Member-State Action
Maintenance of the jurisdiction-sharing system
established by the Treaty also involves control of Member
State action® The Court is thus given jurisdiction to deter¬
mine at the suit of Member States or the High Authority that
Member States have not fulfilled their treaty obligations-^ -
a determination which may be Interpreted as synonymous with
32 On the distinction between the functioning of an inter¬
national court and an international arbitral tribunal see
Fachiri, The Permanent Court of International Justice (2d®
ed. 1932)®
33 jSCSC Treaty, Art® 33°
34 SCSC Treaty, Art® 38®
35 FCSC Treaty, Arts® 88 & 89® (Under Art® 88 the Member
State will be the formal plaintiff, but the aggrieved party
is really the Community represented by the High Authority®)
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a declaration of the exercise of an improper jurisdiction.,
This is true whether the State conduct in question takes the
form of a positive act encroaching on the subject-matter
competence of the Community institutions or of a negative
encroachment on that competence by virtue of a failure to
perform a treaty obligation embodying Community policy,, The
decisions of the Court of Justice in suits of this apparently
"international" type support the view that such litigation
is fundamentally concerned with the internal constitutional
order of the Communities, rather than with international
obligations in a contractual sense.^
3® 5EC Modifications
The basic ideas of judicial control over Community
institutions and Member States were carried over from the
ECSC Treaty to the general Common Market structure, but with
changes which reflect the different institutiona.1 balances
and "division of competences" of the latter. The shift of
decisional power to the Council required the provision of
judicial jurisdiction to hear appeals against the Council0s
actions on the same grounds and by the same parties specified
in the jurisdiction to review the action of the independent
executive,^ Likewise the increased policy role of the Coun¬
cil and the more flexible control of the Commission by the
"JE See, e,g., EEC Common v, Luxembourg, Cases Nos, 90/63,
91/63, X Rec, 1217, 1232, Nov, 13, 1964; EEC Commen v,
Luxembourg, Cases Nos. 2 & 3/62, VIII Rec. 813, 14 Dec,
1962.
37 EEC Treaty, Art. 173.
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Assembly may be related to the elimination of the Court's
explicitly political control in the area of state safeguard
measures
One might have thought that the importance of the
Council with its national representation in the EEC structure
should have resulted in limitations on the ability of Member
States to challenge executive action,, let this did not occur.
That it did not is perhaps explainable by reference to the
essential instability of Council-Commission relationships
and the supposedly built-in development toward major!torian
procedures in the Council, The increase in effective Member-
State influence in the institutional order was not so dra¬
matic that Member States were willing to forego their priv¬
ileged position with respect to challenging the validity of
executive action. The retention of this position is in a
sense counter-balanced by placing the reciprocal legal inter¬
ventions of the Council and the Commission on the same
footing
Of much greater significance is the recognition
in the Court8s jurisdiction of the basic shift in jurisdic¬
tion-sharing technique in the EEC from the "institutional
federalism" of the ECSC to what we have called "normative-
38 """Compare ECSC Treaty, Art, 37$ with EEC Treaty, Art, 115<>
The latter presumes judicial control under EE.C Treaty Arti¬
cles 164—88 in respect of "legality„" Cf. discussion in
Chapter IV at notes 62-68 and accompanying text,
39 Compare ECSC Treaty, Art, 38? with EEC Treaty, Art, 173»
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institutional federalism,," By making the Court of Justice
the authentic interpreter of Community law under Article 177,
the SEC Treaty gives the Court the function of maintaining
the full force of the Community policy-making jurisdiction,,
The cardinal Importance of this judicial jurisdiction in a
system employing decentralized, that is, Member State, appli¬
cation and enforcement can hardly be over-emphasized» Without
the unifying influence of the Court of Justice, community
law as applied by national tribunals could go off in at
40
least six different directions,,
Judicial Jurisdiction Sharing; The basic problem
Obviously, the "federal, constitutional" control exer¬
cised by the Court of Justice of the European Communities is
extensive and, in the complex and flexible Community struc¬
ture, politically significant,, By virtue of its competence
to oversee Community-Member State jurisdictional relation¬
ships, the Community Court, perhaps more than other aspects
of the Community institutional system, is novel in the
history of international organ!zations0 The only judicial
^0 As was mentioned previously, the negotiation papers are
mostly secret and hence there is no reliable evidence on the
source of the interpretive jurisdiction. It was not con¬
templated by the Rapport des Chefs de Delegation aux Mlnlstres
des Affaires Etrange'res (Spaak Report) in 19560
While each country tended to translate the rationale
for Article 177 into its own experience, there does not seem
to be any major disagreement between the parties on the
general purpose.of assuring uniformity of law, Funke, De
l'hlstorlque de 1°article 177 du traite instltuant la C,E,Eo
et des exposes des"motifs gouvernem.enta.ux a. son sujet, 13
Sociaale-Economische Wetgeving 5l&» 520-23 (1965)0
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forerunners which hear mentioning, the International Court
of Justice and the Central American Court of Justice, are
hardly comparable. Among other differences, the I.C.J. is
not primarily concerned with overseeing international insti¬
tutional structures, and where such competence is granted to
the Court by organizational charters recourse is seldom
Zii
made to it. The Central American Court was designed to
control a nascent federal union, but the union existed only
in spirit and, through the extrajudicial activities of the
ho
Court, quickly became a ghost. While elsewhere the growth
of international adjudication lags behind other develop¬
ments,^ in the Communities the Court of Justice has been
singled out as the aspect of the Community juridical struc¬
ture which comes closest to transforming the whole Community
h.L
legal system from an international to an autonomous one.
However, it would be too much to expect that, while
the whole of the Community structure is permeated by complex
adjustments of independent Community and Member-State juris¬
dictions, the Court should be exempted from the jurisdiction-
sharing pattern. There is, in fact, a partial exemption
41 Jenks, The Prospects for International Adjudication
31-38 (196*0.
42 Hudson, The Permanent Court of International Justice
42-70 (19^3)0
43 Jenks, o£. cit. supra, note 41 at 113®
44 Waelbroeck, Contribution a Isetude de la nature juridlque
des oommunautds europbennes, in Melanges Offerts "h. Henri
Rolin 506 (196473 ~~
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because the Court is institutionally autonomous - although
it has certain relationships with the other Community organs
and with member governments,^ its decisional competence is
exercised completely independently of the other institu-
4-6
tlons. For all practical purposes jurisdiction-sharing in
relation to the Community Court involves only the relation¬
ship of that Court with Member-State courts. Perhaps an
insight into the basic question which must be answered about
that relationship may be obtained by looking briefly at the
structure of judicial jurisdictional arrangements in the
oldest of the state federations.
An examination of the early history of the development
of the American federal court system ^ reveals that at least
one portion of the jurisdiction provided the federal courts
in Article III, section 2 of the United States Constitution
4\5The Court is, of course, appointed by the Member State
governments, ECSC Treaty, Art. 32, EEC Treaty, Art. 16?, and
judges9 salaries are fixed by the Council, ECSC Treaty, Art.
29, EEC Treaty, Art. 154. It notifies the Parliament on
certain matters, e.g., staff changes or in situations where
both have responsibilities as in the modification of the
ECSC Treaty (Art. 939 para. 4).
46 But, see, the suggestion in Feld, The Court of the
European Communities 56-58 (1964), that the personal biog¬
raphies of the Community Judges reflect a certain predis¬
position toward "Community orientation" and that the dif¬
ference between the selection procedure and the normal
European, national procedures for producing judges reveals
the comparatively "political" nature of the Court.
4? See generally, Hutchinson, The Foundations of the Con¬
stitution 81-93j 197-220 (1928); Kelly & Harbison, The
American Constitution: Its Origins and Development 1-166
(1948); Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial
System, 13 La.w & Contemp. Prob. 3 (1948).
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is peculiarly significant in the context of a dual judicial
and legal structure. It is the jurisdiction conferred ex¬
tending "to all casess in Law and Equity arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States and treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their authority" and
"to Controversies to which the United States shall be a
Party." With the exception of "proprietary" suits, the
former provision generally includes the latter and they may
be thought of jointly as "federal question" jurisdiction -
that is, jurisdiction to decide suits involving a claim of
right based on federal law.
This jurisdiction is, in fact, the portion of the
judicial provisions in the Constitution which most dramatic¬
ally altered the federal-state balance of power under the
U Q
confederation. It was designed to solve a specific
2T8 Jurisdiction in all cases "affecting Ambassadors, other
public ministers a.nd Consuls," and involving controversies
"between a State or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States,
Citizens, or Subjects" bears on external affairs which had
been the domain of the national government in the confedera¬
tion. Similarly, the jurisdiction provided in "Controversies
between two or more States," and "between citizens of the
same State claiming lands under Grants of different State"
can be viewed as only strengthening the feeble jurisdiction
previously exercised by national tribunals, as did the
grant covering "all cases of Admiralty and Maritime juris¬
diction." The diversity jurisdiction "between a State and
Citizens of another State" and "between citizens of different
States" was novel. However, its import was seen in relation
to avoidance of local and/or class bias, rather than as an
aspect of the broader federal-state balance of powers. See,
Warren, The Supreme Court and Soveriegn States 13 (1924);
Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United
States and . State Courts, 13 Corn. L. Q. 4-99 (1928); Friendly,
The Historic Bases of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 Harv. L.
Rev. 483 (1926); Interna. & Jaffin, Preliminary Analysis of
Concurrent Jurisdiction, 79 U. Pa. L, Rev. 869 (I93I).
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problem that had occurred in relation to sta.te courts.
During the confederal period these courts had generally
refused to recognize any rights not created by state law,^
If no alternative forum for the enforcement of nationally-
created rights were provided, the drafters of the Constitu¬
tion had every reason to believe that they might do so again
and, thus, thwart the Constitutional Convention in one of
its prime purposes: the prevention of state interference
with property rights and interstate trade.
Clearly the position of the courts was an integral part
of the whole realignment of state and national powers ef¬
fected by the Constitutional Convention, and the inclusion
of "federal-question" jurisdiction in Article III was far
from the end of the struggle between "federalists" and
"state's rights" elements over judicial control of federal
questions. Having won a battle, the "federalists" seemed
to have lost the war by their inability to have included
within the Constitution the establishment of any federal
courts other than a Supreme Court. Federal questions were
left in the first instance completely within the jurisdic¬
tion of state courts. Article VI, section 2, later a
49 For specific examples see, e.g., United States v.
Peters, 5 Cranch 115 (U.S. 18097TPenhallow v. Doane, 3
Dall. 54 (U.S. l795)o Madison was convinced that the
general uncertainty surrounding enforcement of private
rights in state courts contributed more to the movement for
reform of the Articles of Confederation than did specific
substantive weaknesses. 5 Writings of James Madison 2?
(Hunt ed. 1904).
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cornerstone of federal supremacy, confirmed this retention
of jurisdiction by state courts. Indeed, the "supremacy
clause" was proposed by an arch-defender of state8s rights
and was viewed at the time of the Convention as a state®s
rights victory.
However, it did not escape the notice of "state8s-rights"
champions in the state ratification debates that a simple
act of Congress creating lower federal courts and investing
them with full constitutional jurisdiction could completely
alter this situation. The federal-question jurisdiction was
attacked as being of "stupendous magnitude, without check or
limitation,and the issue was carried over into the first
session of Congress where state's rights supporters succeeded
in excluding federal question jurisdiction from the juris¬
diction accorded the lower federal courts established by the
Judiciary Act of 1?89.~^ A majority of Congressmen could not
be mustered to confer on federal courts the full measure of
50 Madison and Marshall defended the provision in the
Virginia Convention as essential to the proper functioning
of the government, because it made the judicial power co¬
extensive with the legislative. They pointed out that its
co-extensiveness was also its limitation, for the powers of
Congress were admittedly limited. Surely they must have
realized that their argument related only to cases arising
under laws, not to the jurisdiction over all cases arising
under the Constitution, but this was the only explanation
ever given. See discussion in Forrester, The Nature of a
"Federal Question", 16 Tul. L. Rev. 362, 364-67 (1942)."™"
51 On why this jurisdiction was omitted from the Judiciary
Act of 1789 see Frankfurter & Landis, The Business of the
Supreme Court 11 (1928); Warren, New Light on the History of
the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789" 37 Harv. L. Rev. 49,
53, 65, 125"0.923).
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constitutionally-provided jurisdiction until after the Civil
Waro
Without carrying this example any further, it is sug¬
gested that, notwithstanding divergent elements of time,
place, history, sociology or economics, it indicates the
"basic constitutional issue In the relationship between
judicial jurisdictions in any federal system - the respective
competences of the central and regional judiciaries to decide
questions relating to centrally-generated norms. If one
assumes, as is the case with the United States and the Euro¬
pean Communities, that the "federal" form is the result of a
centralisation, rather than of a decentralization of functions,
there should be a pre-existing general jurisdiction in
regional judicial organs. Thus, those courts will be compe¬
tent to apply "federal" or "community" norms, either as
directly effective law, or in deciding preliminary questions
in litigation otherwise properly before them on purely
"state-law" grounds.
In the Community setting, the question becomes one of
how the provisions establishing Community jurisdictional
competence regulate the powers of Community and national
32 Judiciary Act of 1875, 18 Stat, 470 (1875), The
political impetus for and intent of this conferral is dis¬
cussed in Bergman, Reappraisal of Federal Question Jurisdic¬
tion, 46 Mich, L, Rev, 17 (1947); Chadbourn & Levin,
Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions, 90 Univ, Pa., L,
Rev. 639 (1942); Forrester, Federal Question Jurisdiction
and Section 5, 18 Tul, L» Rev, 263 (1943).
The jurisdiction had been conferred earlier, Act of
February 13, 1801, 2 Stat, 89, 92, but was repealed almost
immediately by Act of March 13, 1802, 2 Stat. 132.
8?
courts to determine questions of Community law. There are
basically three types of possible jurisdictional allocations:
(1) Exclusive jurisdiction in either Community or national
courtSo (2) Concurrent jurisdiction, that is, a litigant
seeking a determination involving Community law may have a
choice of Community or Member State forums0 (3) Shared
jurisdiction - and here this terminology takes on a technical
meaning - that is, a division of jurisdictional powers
whereby decisions of different types by both Community and
national judiciaries may be required to settle a single con¬
troversy.,
The first problem in an analysis of the relationship
between Community and Member State Courts is then to describe
the pattern and relative importance of exclusive, concurrent
and shared judicial jurisdiction in the Communities in rela¬
tion to the concrete situations wherein Community law may be
applicable.
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CHAPTER IV. The Availability of a Community Hearing on
Community Questions - The Importance of Shared.
Jurisdiction
The general thrust of this chapter had best be revealed
at the outset for we shall here be involved in an examina¬
tion which could tend to obscure the major interest in a
flood of necessary details. Hence conclusions first:
(1) There is virtually no concurrent jurisdiction in the
Community and national courts. (2) There may be instances
where there is an exclusive jurisdiction in national courts
to determine questions which can properly be said to involve
Community law. (This discussion will be pursued in greater
detail in the following chapter.) (3) The shared jurisdic¬
tion of Article 177 provides a Community forum for numerous
issues which are outside the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Community Court.
The procedure by which these conclusions can be docu-
mented and explained is onerous. It involves an investiga¬
tion of the major areas of the jurisdiction of the Court of
Justice in order fco determine what types of controversies
involving Community law fall outside that jurisdiction and
hence into the area, of municipal court competence. These
are the controversies which can actuate the sharing techniques
of fiii'C Treaty, Article 177. .Even this is not sufficient. In
order to begin to appreciate the significance of the Article
177 jurisdiction a.s an aspect of the overall balance of
Community-Member State competences, it is almost indispensable
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that we include a concurrent investigation of the develop¬
ment of the Court®s jurisdiction under the ECSC Treaty. In
dealing with these problems, litigation involving Community
law might be categorized under two general headings:
(1) suits raising issues concerning the legality of Community
or Member-State action and (2) all other litigation involving
a claim or defense based on Community la.w.
Issues of Legality
Issues of the legality of public acts may be raised
either directly, that is, in litigation to which the
allegedly offending institution is a. party, or indirectly in
suits involving third parties. One of the notable charac¬
teristics of the jurisdiction of the Community Court is the
number of instances in which a suit nominally involving one
party has as its basis a challenge to the legality of the
auction of another, not a party to the litigation. That the
necessity for these indirect challenges to legality is a
function of the complexity of the overall jurisdiction-
sharing system of the Communities will become more apparent
as we proceed.
A. Community Action
1• Under the EC3C Treaty
Direct challenges to the legality of Community
acts, whether by means of a suit for annulment, declaration
of illegality, or damages, are exclusively within the
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competence of the Court of Justice. This applies equally
to litigation between Member States which might indirectly
raise such questions."' Although the Treaty does not require
that all litigation between Community organs be brought
before the Community Court, it seems inconceivable that such
suits should be brought before another forum.
We are left then with issues of the legality of
Community acts raised in suits to which the Community is not
a party and in which Member States are not principal parties
on both sides of the litigation. Such cases cannot be
brought before the Community Court except by means of a
jurisdictional stipulation in a national law or, possibly, in
a contract to which the Community was a party or which was
undertaken on its behalf.3 As Article 4-1 presumes,4 juris¬
diction over this type of litigation, that is, litigation
1 See" ECSC Treaty, Arts. 4-0, para. 3 and 92, para. 3*
However, the Court has indicated that this proposition may
not be indisputable. Socidtd Antoine Vloebergs S. A. v.
High Authority, Cases Nos. 9 & 12/60, VII Rec. 391, 426,
14 July 1961. The competence under Article 40 raises possi¬
bilities for positive or negative conflicts of jurisdiction
with national courts. Prieur, La Communa.ut^ fSurop^enne de
Charbon et de I'Aoler 1?1 (1962).
2 SCSC Treaty, Art. 8?.
3 ECSC Treaty, Arts. 42-43.
4 EC3C Treaty, Art. 41s
"The Court shall have sole jurisdiction to give
preliminary rulings on the validity of conclusions
of the High Authority and of the Council, where such
validity is in issue in proceedings brought before a
municipal court or tribunal."
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between private parties or private parties and a member
government, falls within the competence of national courts.
Howeverj that article also provides that any issue con¬
cerning the validity of Community acts must be certified to
the Community Court. In such a situation the jurisdiction
over the litigation is shared between the national and the
Community courts'D in rauch the same manner as under EEC
Treaty, Article 1?7.
But why should a party affected by Community action
not be allowed to contest the measure directly? The answer
to this question may be discovered only be an examination
of the availability of appeal to private persons affected
by decisions or recommendations of the ECSC authorities.
Various aspects of this problem, particularly the recours
en annulatlon, have received extensive doctrinal attention
in other contexts. For that reason this discussion will be
as brief as possible,
a» General Decisions
The parties primarily affected by the
Coal and Steel Community are the coal and steel producers.
The Treaty gives them the right to question the legality
5 Because they have little or no direct relation to the
problem of control over Community law, sharing devices,
e.g., Commissions rogatoires, Protocol on the Statute of
the Court, Art. *257 repressive action by state courts against
witnesses violating their oath in Community proceedings,
Protocol, Art. 27, or execution of judgments by state
courts, see, e.g., EEC Treaty, Arts. 187, 192, are not in¬
cluded in this discussion. See also, Article 1, Protocol
on Privileges and Immunities.
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actions of the High Authority before the Court of Justic
£
means of suits for annulment, a. declaration of
fiCSC Treaty, Art. 33:
"The Court shall be empowered to decide upon
applications, from one of the Member States or from
the Council, to quash decisions and recommendations
of the High Authority on the grounds of lack of powers
violations of basic procedural rules, infringement of
the Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its
implementation, or misuse of powers fdetournement de
pouvolr I. However, the Court8s enquiry into the case
may not cover the evaluation of the situation, re¬
sulting from economic facts and circumstances, in
the light of which such decisions or recommendations
were taken, except where the High Authority is accused
of having misused its powers or of having plainly
misinterpreted the provisions of the Treaty or any
rule of law relating to its implementation.
The undertakings or associations referred to in
Article 4-8 may, subject to the same conditions, make
applications against decisions and recommendations
concerning them that are individual in character or
against general decisions and recommendations which
they consider to involve a. misuse of powers ["detourne-
ment de ponvoir] affecting them.
The proceedings provided for in the first two
paragraphs of this Article shall be instituted within
one month from the date of notification or publica¬
tion, as the case may be, of the decision or recom¬
mendation. 85
liGSG Treaty, Art. 35'
"Wherever the High Authority is required by a.
provision of this Treaty, or of regulations in imple¬
mentation thereof, to take a decision or make a, recom¬
mendation and fails to fulfill this obligation, the
States, the Council or the undertakings and associa¬
tions, as the cane may be, shall have the right to
bring the matter before it.
The same shall apply if the High Authority,
when empowered by a provision of this Treaty or regu¬
lations in implementation thereof, to take a decision
or make a recommendation, abstains from doing so and




illegality,' or damages. Yet these enterprises and asso¬
ciations of enterprises do not have the presumptive interest
of Member States or Community organs - their standing to sue
is still based on the extent of their interest in the act
e omplained o f.:;'
Any system of administrative appeal must, of
10
course, be based on some criteria, of aggrieved interests.
In the Community structure a basic distinction, apparently
~6 "Tcontinued.)
If at the end of two months the High Authority
has not taken any decision or made any recommendation,
an appeal may be made to the Court within one month,
against the High Authority's implied refusal to take
action which is to be inferred from its silence on
the matter."
7 BC3C Treaty, Art. j6:
"Before imposing a monetary penalty or ordering
a periodic penalty payment as provided for in this
Treaty, the High Authority must give the party
concerned an opportunity to comment.
Against monetary penalties and periodic penalty
payments imposed under the provisions of this Treaty,
recourse may be had to the plenary jurisdiction of
the CourJ"«
In support of such recourse and under the terms
of the first paragraph of Article 33 of this Treaty,
applicants may contest the legality of the decisions
and recommendations which they are alleged to have
contravened.81
8 £03C Treaty, Arts. 34 and 40.
9 .3C3C Treaty, Art. 33(2).
10 See, e.g., the discussion of the interest requirements
developed by the French Conslel d'Etat in Auby et Drago,
11 Traits de Content!eux Administratif 489-524 (1962).
11
based on necessary Interests, is made between the appeal¬
ability of decisions that are "general" and those that- are
"individual." Enterprises and associations may seek to
annul the latter on four extensive and overlapping grounds,
but standing to sue for annulment of general acts can be
based only on an allegation that the act contains a. detourne
12
ment de "oouvoir with respect to the plaintiff". Leaving
aside for the moment the question of what this requirement
might be held to mean in particular cases, it is clear that
some allegedly "illegal" general acts can be attacked only
on the suit of a Member State or of the Council. Failing a
suit by one of these privileged parties, the illegal general
act remains in force. However, its legality may yet be
questioned in a suit contesting the validity of individual
13
acts which implement it.
11 What the real consideration was is very difficult to
determine. Compare. Bebr, Judicial Control in the European
Communities 1^7 (1962); Gaudet, The Legal Systems of the
European Community, in Proceedings of the i960 Institute on
Legal Aspects of the European Community 213 (I960); Lagrange
La Cour de Justice de la Communaute Europdenne de Charbon
et de'i8hoie'r, 1936 R.0.P."~TT.
12 ECSC Treaty, Art. 33.
13 ECSC Treaty, Art. 36. This article has been held to
represent only a. particular case of a general rule. Meronl
& Co. v. High Authority, Case No. 9/56, IV fiec. 9, 26, 13
June 1958. The principle may even extend to certain non-
acts, S.N.U.P.A.T. v. High Authority, Cases Nos. 32-33/58,
V Rec. 275, 303* 1? July 1959» hut not to individual deci¬
sions or to general acts having no legal connection with
the act principally appealed. Macchiorlatti Dalmas e Figli
v. High Authority, Case No. 21/64, XI-6 Rec. 226, 31 March
1965.
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The legal protection thus provided is essen¬
tial, but it does not eliminate issues of the validity of
general decisions from litigation before national courts.
It fails to do so because, although the Court seems to be
moving toward a. definition of "general" which would include
only those acts which require further implementation in res-
iq.
pect of their application to individual concerns,' this
definition does not equate "general" with "preparatory,"
From the time of its publication a. general decision of the
High Authority is directly effective xtfithin the national
15
legal orders and gives rise to rights or duties which may
be involved in litigation before national courts.
Given this possibility the manner in which the
Court defines "general" and "detournement de pouvoir with
respect to them" must certainly affect the number of such
cases that might arise in national courts. With regard to
the former the constant criterion has been an objective
determination of the act's scope and na.ture - a decision is
general because of its "quasi-legislative" nature and its
1 (
norma,tive affect ergo ernes. J In practice this abstract
test has meant that appeal cannot be limited simply by
nomenclature, or by including general and individual
14 See, Accieiere Fonderie Ferriere de Modena. v. High
Authority, Cases Nos. 55-59/53 &6I-63/63, X flee. 413,
9 June 1964.
15 -ECSC Treaty, Art. 15, para. 3.
lb See, e.g.. Fedechar v. High Authority, Case No. 8/55,
II flee. 199, 16 July 1956; S.I.M.S.T. v. High Authority, Cases
Nos. 36-38/58 & 40-41/58, V flee. 331, 352, 17 July 1959.
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17
provisions in the same act. Moreover, decisions individual
as to their addressees will not be considered as general with
respect to third parties, and the manner of' the adoption of
a. particular provision must be consistent with the exercise
of a normative competence in order for it to be considered
i 8
general. Moreover this objective approach has been miti¬
gated by concern that the definition applied to a particular
act should not shut off all avenues of appeal under the
Treaty .±:''
However, the use and manipulation of abstract
criteria is not consistently expansive of the Court9s juris¬
diction. It has, for example, foreclosed a line of approach
that might have provided an opportunity for private parties
to challenge the legality of all general acts before the
Court of Justice. The reference is to the Court's rejection
20
of Advocate General Lagrange's suggestion" that decisions
which are general as to individual enterprises might be con¬
sidered individual with respect to associations representing
21
their collective interests. x The Court's decision is
T? li~Hec. at 224-o
18 I. Nold K.G. v. High Authority, Case Wo. 18/57, v Rec.
89, 112-13, 20 March 1959.
19 See Conclusions of Advocate General Roemer. X Bee. at
463.
20 See his Conclusions in Assider v. High Authority, Case
No. 3/54, I Rec. 123, 172-73, 11 February 1955, and in
Feaechar v. High Authority, Case No. 8/55, II Rec. 199,
253, 16 July 1956.
21 II Rec. at 224.
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perfectly consistent with its general attitude toward the
definition of general acts, but one might ask why associa¬
tions have been given an independent right of appeal if their
interests are to be so closely connected to those of their
22
members.
The jurisprudential treatment of "detournement
de pouvoir with respect to them" has been both expansive and
contractive of the Court's jurisdiction-, The Court clearly
will not expand the concept of "detournement de pouvoir with
respect to them" to include the whole of the other three
21
grounds for annulment, ^ but neither will it admit that the
22 Indeed, it appears that the Court treats suits by associa¬
tions simply as suits by an agent representing one or more
individual, enterprise interests- See, e-g., Assider v. High
Authority, Case No. 3/54, I Rec„ 123, 139, H February 1955,
Wirtschaftsvereinigung Eisen-und Stahlindustrie v. High
Authority, Case No. 13/57, IV Rec. 261, 285, 21 June 1958°
Contra, Bebr, Judicial Control of the European Communities
7FTT962) .
23 See, e.g., Chambre Syndicale de la Siderurgie Franqaise
v. High Authority, Cases Nos. 3 & 4/64, XI-8 Rec. 567, 8
July 1965°
There Is, of course, some overlap between the grounds
for annulment, see, e.g., Hauts Fourneaux de Chasse v. High
Authority, Case No. 2/57, IV Rec. 129, 145-51, 13 June 1958,
and this has been thought to raise a problem in suits where
individuals allege a dd'tournement de pouvoir against a general
decision but can only prove some other ground on the merits.
The question, then, is whether the Court may annul the
challenged action on the proven ground or on a ground raised
of its own motion. Valentine, the Court of Justice of the
European Communities 116-17 (1965)° The answer must be nega¬
tive. When the non-existence of a detournement de pouvoir
is established, the Court no longer has a basis "for exer¬
cising jurisdiction. The situation is not comparable to
those in which the Court has, in cases involving no juris¬
dictional problems, examined on its own motion a ground
which was not alleged. E.g., Netherlands Government v.
High Authority, Case No.""6/54, I Rec. 2.01, 220-21, 21 March
1955°
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datournement must be of a special type, that is, disguising
Oh,
an individual decision as a general one. " The second propo¬
sition should, perhaps, have been admitted. Were the Court
to find a special interest in the act, that is, that it
2 5
affects an enterprise directly and individually, ^ it would
probably have to classify the decision as individual and,
hence, vitiated by the special form of detournement de pouvolr
that it has held is not required.
b. Individual Decisions
The Court's rulings with respect to
appeals against individual decisions have been so liberal in
terms of the interest required that issues concerning the
validity of such decisions should very infrequently appear
before national courts. Broadly speaking, only a plausible
and reasonably specific economic interest in the effects of
26
a decision is required. The decision need not affect the
plaintiff in a manner peculiar to himself, nor is it neces¬
sary that it affect him directly. For example, a. French
enterprise has been held to have sufficient interest to
attack a High Authority decision which authorised certain
German transport tariffs that were applicable 1o the
Q ry
plaintiff's competitors in Germany. '
1% I RecT at 139.
25 See, Modena, X Eec. at 44-8.
26 See, De Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen in Liraburg v, High
.Authority, Case No. 30/59, VII Sec. 1, 58, 23 Feb. 1961.
(Conclusions of Advocate General Lagrange).
2? Siderurgie de l3£st v. High Authority, Cases Nos. 2k 1
3V58, VI-2 Rec. 573, 598, 15 July i960.
o. Re oommendations
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of
the case last-mentioned above, Slderurgle de I9Est v. High
Authority, is that the enterprise was held to have an interest
in the High Authority decision although juridically it was
affected, if by anything, only by the national measures,
(This would certainly be the case had the complaint been
against the authorization of French measures directly appli¬
cable to the plaintiff,) The effect of "recommendations" on
individuals is often accomplished by this sort of two-stage
procedure, for they are used primarily as a means for coordi¬
nating Member State a,ction in areas where the High Authority
has no direct power of implementation.^ Moreover, because
?Q
recommendations only stipulate ends to be achieved, •" their
effect on persons other than their addressees seems even less
direct than in the case of decisions addressed to Member
States - that is to say, the competence and action of the
addressee Interposed between the Community act and those
ultimately affected involves some element of discretion. Thus,
in the context of appeal against individual recommendations,
the failure to require "juridical directness" as an element
of "standing" under Article 33 of the HC3C Treaty in the
Slderurgle de I8.Est case is especially significant. It seems
to indicate that under the iSCSC Treaty no distinction will be
2B See ECSC Treaty, Chapters VII, VIII & X.
29 RCSC Treaty, Art. 14.
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made on this ground between appeals against decisions and
those against recommendations, whether directed to enter¬
prises^'^ or to Member States.-^
However, it has been suggested that a distinc¬
tion, based on the maturity of the plaintiff9s interest in
the act, could be made between the allowability of appeals
against decisions addressed to a Member State and of appeals
against recommendations so addressed.Thus It might be
held that an enterprise had no actual, present interest in
a recommendation until the means by which the Member State
will implement it are exposed. This is a possibility, but
it is suggested that in order to show an Interest the plain¬
tiff should not be required to show that he is affected by
existing national action - only that he is affected by the
recommendation. Therefore, unless the Member State is in a
position to choose mea.sures in application of the recommenda¬
tion which would exclude the plaintiff from their effective
scope, his interest should not be considered only presumptive.
30 The use of recommendations directed to enterprises should
be infrequent. With few exceptions, e.g., Article 60(2)(a),
the High Authority may act with respect to these parties by
talcing a decision. However, it is empowered to use a recom¬
mendation in place of a decision whenever it deems it advis¬
able. iSCSC Treaty, Art. 14.
31 It is possible to sustain a.n argument that there is no
meaningful distinction between the effect on private parties
of a, decision or of a recommendation directed to a Member
State. In either case state action is required before the
Community policy can be applied to individuals. See, Savony
et Juley, Rapport a l"assemblee Natlonale (France), troisidme
Legislature^" session ordinaire, l956-57» P« I69.
32 Bebr, 0£. clt. supra, at ?4.
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Apparently the situation with respect to
appeal against general recommendations parallels that de¬
scribed in relation to general decisions. The exception of
illegality is, of course, a. possible remedy should the matur¬
ity of the plaintiff's interest raise difficulties in this
context.
d. Special Activity
The ECSG Treaty foresees that certain
activity of the High Authority should affect persons other
than producers of coal and steel, and those persons are given
a right of appeal by special provisions of the Treaty.JJ
Although the Court has not been required to decide whether
such appeals are limited to the legal grounds contained in
the general jurisdictional provisions, its practice indi¬
cates that both these limitations and the expansive concept
of interest developed thereunder are applicable.
It is, of course, also possible that the
interests of parties other than coal and steel producers may
be affected in instances where 110 right of appeal for annul¬
ment is afforded them.>J To a certain extent this situation
may be alleviated by a, suit for damages. However, because
33 J2CSC Treaty, Arts. 63(2) (b), 65(^0 » 66(5), 80.
3k Friedrick Storke & Co. v. High Authority, Case Ho. 1/58,
V Ree. 4-3, 62, k February 1959 •
35 See, e._£., I Mold. K. G. v. High Authority, Case Ho.
18/57, V Rec. 89, 20 March 1959.
36 SCSC Treaty, Arts. 33, ^8» 80•
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the possibility of raising issues of legality by way of
damages is a problem common to both treaties, we shall delay
its consideration until the appropriate point in our dis¬
cussion of appeal against Community action under the ESC
system.
e. Control d8 opportunite/
In at least one instance, the standard
legal grounds are irrelevant to the assessment of the validity
of High Authority a,ction. When the Court exercises juris¬
diction under Article 37» Its control is based on the general
criterion of the "justifiability" of the High Authority's
action.3? This fact has as its corollaries (1) the inca¬
pacity of private parties to make use of that jurisdiction
3? ECSC Treaty, Art. 3?:
If a. Member State considers that in a given case
an action of the High Authority or a failure to act
is of such a nature as to provoke fundamental and
persistent disturbances in its economy, it may bring
the ma.tter before the High Authority.
The High Authority, after consulting the Council,
shall, if there are grounds for so doing, recognize
-V-the existence of such a situation and decide on the
measures to be taken to end it, under the terms of
this Treaty, while at the same time safeguarding the
Community's essential interests.
When application is made to the Court under the
provisions of this Article against such a decision,
or against an explicit decision or a decision to be
implied, refusing to recognize the existence of the
situation referred to above, the Court shall con¬
sider whether the decision is justified.
If the Court quashes the decision, it shall be
the duty of the High Authority within the terms of
the Court's judgment to decide on the measures to be
taken for the purposes indicated in the second para¬
graph of this Article.
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and (2) the exclusion of ordinary appeals for annulment
against High Authority action taken pursuant to Article
qO
3?. Nor, under these circumstances, does it seem likely
that the taking of an illegal act could be considered a
fault giving rise to damages in an action under Article 40.
Query whether private parties might succeed in getting
issues of appropriateness before national tribunals?
There is also the special case of appeal
against the Assembly or the Council, which is limited to
Member States and the High Authority and to grounds of in¬
competence and major violations or procedure.3? However,
since the Assembly never and the Council seldom^0 may take
action creating individual rights and duties, these restric¬
tions on the Court's jurisdiction should not result in any
significant amount of litigation before national courts„
2. Under the .SEC Treaty
The general structure of the jurisdiction
provided in the Rome Treaty concerning direct challenges to
the legality of Community action parallels that of the Coal
and Steel Community Treaty. The language of Article 183,
which provides that "Subject; to the powers conferred on the
38 Niederrheinische Bergwerks-Aktiengesellschaft v. High
Authority, Cases Nos. 2-3/60, VII Rec. 261, 13 July I96I0
39 ECSC Treaty, Art. 38.
40 See, e.g., EC3C Treaty, Arts. 58(2) and 61(3).
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Court of" Justice by this Treaty, cases to which the Com¬
munity is a party shall not for that reason alone be ex¬
cluded from the competence of domestic courts or tribunals,
indicates that where the Court has power, that power is
exclusive. Jurisdiction is provided for suits directed
against the Council or Commission and seeking annulment of
41 42 /
acts, a declaration of their illegality " and/or damages.
Tvt EEC Treaty, Art. 173*
Supervision of the legality of the acts of the
Council and the Commission other than recommendations
or opinions shall be a matter for the Court of Justice
The Court shall for this purpose have jurisdiction in
proceedings instituted by a Member Sta.te, the Council
or the Commission on the grounds of lack of jurisdic¬
tion, substantial violations of basic procedural
rules, infringements of this Treaty or of any rule of
law relating to effect being given to it or of misuse
of powers (detournement de pouvoir).
Any natural or legal person may, under the same
conditions, appeal against a decision directed vo him
or against a decision which, although in the form of
a regulation or a decision directed to another person,
is of direct and individual concern to him.
The proceedings provided for in this Article
shall be instituted within a period of two months,
dating, as the case may be, either from the publics.-
tion of the measure concerned or from its notifica¬
tion. to the complainant or, in default of this, from
the day on which the latter learned of the said
measure.
EEC Treaty, Art. 1?5*
Should the Council or the Commission in violation
of this Treaty fail to act, the Member States and the
other institutions of the Community may refer the
matter to the Court of Justice in order to have the
said violation placed on record.
No proceedings arising out of the said reference
shall be heard unless the institution concerned has
been called upon to act. If within two months of
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As under the ECSC Treaty, the forced execution of Community
decisions may be stayed only by the Court,and Member
States are bound not to raise issues of legality even
indirectly,^ in suits between themselves, before any other
forum.
The possibility of raising issues of the
legality of Community acts before national courts is again
suggested by provisions for referral of preliminary questions
of validity to the Court of Justice, viz, Article 1??, How¬
ever, because "sharing" is sometimes discretionary under
4-1 (continued)
being so called upon, the institution concerned has
not made its attitude clear, the said proceedings
may be brought within a further period of two months.
Any natural or legal person may bring proceed¬
ings before the Court of Justice, under the conditions
laid down in the preceding paragraphs, on the ground
that one of the institutions of the Community has
failed to send him a formal document, such document
not being a recommendation or an opinion.
42 EEC Treaty, Art. 184:
Where a regulation made by the Council or the
Commission is the subject of legal proceedings, any
of the parties concerned may, notwithstanding ohe
expiry of the period laid down in Article 173(3)»
invoke the grounds set out in Article 173(1), in
order to submit to the Court of Justice that the
regulation in question does not apply.
43 EEC Treaty, Arts. 178, 215.
44 EEC Treaty, Art. 192.
45 EEC Treaty, Art. 219
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Article 177, paragraph 2 of the Rome Treaty, a different
relationship is established between Community and national
courts than was found in the context of the ECSC. This is
an important change, but it is probably not the most sig¬
nificant one made by the EEC Treaty which affects jurisdic¬
tion sharing in relation to litigation involving questions
of legality. Of greater moment is the shift in the import¬
ance of shared jurisdiction. In order to appreciate this
shift we must examine the changes under the Rome Treaty in
the Court's jurisdiction over litigation directly contest¬
ing the legality of Community action.
a. Appeal for Annulment
Article 173 of 'the EEC Treaty eliminates
two of the restrictions found in the ECSC annulment jurisdic¬
tion. Appeal is extended to any natural or legal person
and it may be pursued with respect to binding acts of the
Council. Extension of the appeal procedure in this manner
is a logical consequence of the different scope and internal,
structure of the general Economic Community, but other, more
restrictive consequences also follow.
(1) Regulations
The first is that regulations are
never appealable save by Member States, the Council or the
Commission. Restriction of appeal against regulations is
consistent with their increased legislative character under
the more general provisions of the Common Market Treaty, at
least in so far as this restriction applies to regulations
10?
promulgated, by the Council. On the other hand, it is
arguable that some more flexible attitude toward standing
might better comport with the regulatory competence of the
46
Commission. The difference between Council and Commission
regulatory competence is particularly noticeable where, for
example, the Commission exercises a competence delegated to
it and circumscribed by a Council Regulation. 1 This flexi¬
bility has perhaps been introduced by the criteria which have
been adopted for distinguishing "regulations" from "decisions#"
(2) Decisions
A preliminary hurdle in all annul¬
ment proceedings -under the EEC Treaty seems then to be the
establishment that the act complained of is a decision. The
formal criteria for this determination are straight-forward
enough - decisions have addressees and are binding on those
addressees alone, whereas regulations are of general appli-
48
cation. However, the jurisdictional competence tinder
Article 1?3 presumes that decisions may be "disguised" as
regulations and hence requires the abandonment of criteria
based on formal elements.
46 See Bebr, o£. clt. supra at 52~3»
4? See, Sgarlatta v. Commission, Case No. 40/64, XI-6 Reo#
279, 1 -April 1965» for an attempt to remedy this particular
problem by requiring that all acts by the Commission tinder
these circumstances be considered decisions.
48 EEC Treaty, Art. I89.
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The Court has recognized this necessity
and also that the same act may contain both regulatory and
decisional provisions However, an abstract, material dis¬
tinction is impossible. There is no material difference
between a regulation governing, for example, external levies
on pig meat, which takes into account the specific circum¬
stances of each Member State market,"^ and identical provi¬
sions which might be contained in six separate decisions.
Indeed, in certain situations decisions have been used inter¬
changeably with regulations.31 Therefore, the Court has said
that it must examine whether an act which seems to have
application to situations abstractly determined and which
has immediate legal effect is, in fact, of individual concern
to certain persons.By formulating this criterion the
Court seems to have overcome the problem of distinguishing
between regulations and decisions by subordinating that
determination to the further criterion of Article 173 that
complainants be individually and directly concerned by the
measure attacked.
Individual interest and its companion
requirement, direct interest, are then the important problems
<?9 Confederation Nationale des Producteurs de Fruits et
Legumes v. Council, Cases Nos. 16-17/62, VIII Rec„ 901, 14
December 1962.
50 See, e.g.. Regulation No. 9V65/EEC, 11? J.0„ 1958
(1965).
51 See Waelbroeck, The Application of EEC Law by National
Courts. 19 Stan. L. Rev. 1248, 1251-52 (196?).
52 VIII Rec. at 918.
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In determining the extent of the annulment jurisdiction pro¬
vided by the SEC Treaty. Because regulations are unappealable
in principle and decisions addressed to the appellant present
no difficulties, we shall assume in discussing these criteria
that the questioned act is a decision directed to another
person. In relation to such acts the appellant need not
prove that the decision is in reality directed to him, that
is, that the decision is only apparently directed to the named
53
addressee. v He must only prove his interest in the decision,.
However, that interest is not established by proof of eco¬
nomic impact, as it might be under the ECSC Treaty. "Interest8-'
or "concern" in the EEC context is 'understood in relation to
the juridical effect of the decision.
(a) Individual Concern
"Individual" refers not to the nature
of the act appealed, but to whether the complainant®s posi¬
tion with respect to it singles him out as comparable to an
54,
addressee."' Exactly what is meant by this formulation is
difficult to determine. The Court's rulings suggest that
the closest one might come to devising a practical test
would be to ask whether the Community institution knew or
could have known at the time of taking the decision that it
would, while operative, only affect certain specific parties
53* Plaumann & Co. v. Commission, Case No. 25/62, IX Rec.
197» 235, 15 July 1963. (Conclusions of Advocate General
Roemer).
5li- Id. at 223.
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and no others. If so, those parties are individually
affected no matter to whom the decision is formally addressed.
The restrict!veness of this requirement may "be suggested by
noting that the only case in which a decision directed to
another has been held to affect complainants individually
involved a Commission decision having retroactive effect.
("b) Direct Concern
"Directness" is a question not of
the plaintiff's degree of concern, but of whether the act
complained of requires application by an intermediate agency
exercising discretionary competence before it alters the
57
plaintiffs legal position. The direct effect requirement;
is extremely important in the context of the SEC Treaty. As
noted in the previous ECSC discussion, a requirement of
juridical directness could eliminate individual appeal
against all decisions directed to Member States.^ Since the
SEC Institutions must carry on a significant portion of their
operations through this medium, exclusion of third-party
appeals in such cases might be expected to relegate a con¬
siderable proportion of litigation touching on questions of
55 Compare, Alfred Toepfer v. Commission, Cases Nos. 106-
107/63, XI-8 Rec. 525, 533s 1 July 1965, with Getreide-
Import Gesellschaft v. Commission, Case No. 38/64-, XI-6 flee.
263, 270-71, 1 April 1965.
56 Cases Nos. 106-107/63, XI-8 Rec. 525.
57 IX Rec. at 238.
58 See notes 29-32 supra and accompanying text.
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the validity of Community decisions to national
59
courts.
Jurisprudential treatment of this prob¬
lem is sketchy. The Court has refused to say that, in
principle, decisions directed to Member Stares cannot form
60
the basis of suits by other natural or legal persons. Plow-
ever, in all cases save one, the Court has avoided the problem
of directness by finding that the plaintiff had no dhdividual
interest in the act complained ofVJi
62
Unfortunately, that one case Is not
particularly instructive. The suit involved a decision
authorizing measures of safeguard taken by the German govern¬
ment pursuant to Article 22 of Regulation 19. The Commission
argued that there could be no direct concern in this instance
because the complainant was affected by the German measures
which had already been taken and which the Commission only
approved. The complainantes argument in favor of direct¬
ness was based on the nature of the cooperation between the
Commission and the German customs authorities, for It
3*9 To date all litigation before the Community Court under
Article 173 involving decisions directed to a party other
than the plaintiff has concerned decisions directed to Member
States.
60 Plaumann & Co. v. Commission, Case No. 25/62, IX Rec.
197, 15 July 1963.
61 Ibid.; Glucoseries Reunies v. Commission, Case No. 1/6^,
X Rec. 811, 2 July 1964-; Getreide-Import Gesellschaft v.
Commission, Case No. 38/6^, XI-6 Rec. 263, 1 April I965.
62 Alfred Toepfer v. Commission, Cases Nos. IO6-IO7/63,
XI-8 Rec. 525, 532-33, 1 July 1965.
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appeared that the measures of safeguard had. been agreed
upon between them before they were taken in order to correct
a mutual mistake in the fixing of import levies.
The Court agreed that the Commission
action affected the plaintiff directly, but on grounds of the
peculiar provisions of Article 22 of the regulation rather
than on. the basis of the particular facts of the cs.se. The
Court reasoned that, because Article 22 makes approval,
suppression or modification of safeguard measures Immediately
effective and because clearly the latter two actions would
have the same force as the national measures replaced, it
would be illogical not to give approval the same juridical
effect. The Commission's decision was, thus, not a simple
authorization but a. "validation" of the national measures.
Advocate General Hoemer disagreed.
Saiterating the position that he has consistently developed
63
in previous cases, the Advocate General found a distinc¬
tion between suppression or modification of safeguard meas¬
ures and approval of them perfectly plausible. The distinc¬
tion is based on. the absence of an interposed Member State
discretion in the former cases. In the latter the national
government remains free to make use of the Commission ap¬
proval, to use only a part of the authorization or to decide
not to take measures of safeguard after all.
"Sjl See his Conclusions at IX Hec. 238 and X Rec. 832.0
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Obviously, Hsrr Roemer's "discretionary"
distinction, which has been supported by Advocate General
64
Gand and by the Commission, is a criterion of general
application. The question then is what the Courtis ruling
indicates about its future attitude toward the "Roemer-rule."
The answer is, probably, "nothing!" The Court®s position
may be read as consistent with either adoption or rejection
of a criterion based on Member-State discretion, if it is
admitted that the Court may have disagreed with the Advocate
General®s application of the standard in this particular
case.
Thus, the Court may have agreed with the
criterion, but concluded that Member-State competence to
alter or abolish the approved measures did not change the
existing situation in which those measures continued in force
on the strength of the Commission's authorization. There was
no question of whether the German government would use the
approval; it covered provisions already temporarily in
force.
Contrarily, the Court might have accepted
the full force of Roemer3s argument in relation to authori¬
zations, but also have realized that it applied equally to a
modification of safeguard measures. The latter action also
leaves the Member State free to abolish the measures en¬
tirely. Thus the decision could be read as saying that, at
o4 XI-o Rec. at 266-6?, 274-75.
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least In this context, discretionary competence attributable
to the addressee Member State is irrelevant in a. determina¬
tion of whether the decision directly affects another. This
sort of attitude could hardly be expected to be elevated to
the status of a. general rule, for it would be, in effect, a
reversion to the ECSC criteria of interest. Even confined
to the present situation it makes the administrative tech¬
nique of Article 22 an attractive means for the transforma-
66
tion of national into appealable Community action. "
This latter possibility will be further
developed in the discussion of the distinction between Com¬
munity and national law. For present purposes one need only
point out that it is extremely doubtful that the Court has
taken any general position on the question of the standard
to be applied in determining whether decisions directed to
Member States may be said to affect other persons directly.
The Court has assiduously avoided making a declaration on
this point, even in the face of a specific Commission re-
Cf.
quest for a ruling. It did so again in the instant case
by relying on the specific circumstances of Commission
activity under Article 22 of Regulation 19.
o5 Compare Regulation 19» Art. 22(2) with the standard
safeguard procedure of EEC Treaty, Art. 115. The Regulation
19 system is used in other agricultural regulations. See,
Reg. No. 20, Art. 15(2); Reg. No. 21, Art. 12(2); Reg. No.
22, Art. 12(2); Reg. No. 23, Art. 10(2); Heg. 13/64, Art.
16(2); Reg. No. 14/64, Art. 17(2); Reg. No. 16/S4, Art. 16(2).
66 XI-6 Rec. at 274.
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From our point of view the importance
of a ruling on this question, when it comes, is underlined
by the Advocate General's rejection of the plaintiff's argu¬
ment that there was special cooperation between the Comrnis-
67
sion and the national authorities in this instance. Close
collaboration with national governments in the preparatory
/o
stages of Community decisions is a normal procedure. w This
operational fact of Community life indicates why Member
States may fail to challenge irregular decisions and thus
why it may be left to individuals affected by them to seek
relief - relief which, if 'unavailable in the Community Court,
must be pursued in national courts. In these cases control
over issues of validity may be exercised by the Court of
Justice only through the jurisdiction-sharing provisions of
Article 177.
(3) Directives
There is no provision for appeal of
directives by parties other than states or Community organs.
It Is improbable that the Court could be convinced to include
these acts under the concept of "decision," for it has held
that, at least in respect to the regulation/decision distinc¬
tion, the categories of acts stipulated in the Treaty have
67 XI-8 Hec. at 5^0-41.
68 See Chapter II supra.
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precise and mutually exclusive characteristics.0-7 Even were
"decision" in Article 173 given a. generic meaning for pur¬
poses of appeal against directives, it seems very doubtful
that natural or legal persons could make out a direct and
individual interest in them. Of course, were such persons to
establish the required interest in a nominal directive, the
Court might find that in substance the act was a decision and
appealable a.s such.
This could present special problems in
cases where the Community is required to act by means of
directives, but because of the competence exercised these
70
acts may be only formally distinguishable from decisions.
For this reason the Court may hesitate to take a substantive
approach to the classification of "directives." To admit
the receivability of the suit in these special situations
might be to deny the Community's competence to act. On the
other hand, a directive which would, for example, clearly
require the repeal of a specific national measure affecting
certain individuals, lends itself to a finding of direct
interest in somewhat the same manner as a detailed SCSC
"recommendation." Thus, there is at leant the possibility
that individual appeal against directives might be allowed
in a. limited class of cases. For present purposes, however,
39 Confdde'ration Na.tiona.le des Producteurs de Fruits et
Legumes v. Council, Cases Nos. 16-17/62, VIII Rec. 901,
917, 1^ December 1962.
70 See, e.g., EEC Treaty, Art. 13(2).
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individuals appear capable of raising issues of the legality
of directives only in litigation before national courts, and,
again, the Community Courtis control over those issues de-
7 i
pends upon the shared jurisdiction.
b* Declaration of Illegality
Article 184- of the Treaty of Home mitiga.tes the
restrictions on appeal against regulations by allowing their
legality to be questioned where that issue is relevant to
litigation properly before the Court of Justice on other
grounds. This, of course, involves making out jurisdiction
in connection with a suit for annulment of a decision based
on the regulation or, perhaps, in connection with a suit
for damages.
Moreover, the text provides only that "regulations"
may be contested in this manner. Some liberalization of
this restrictive provision might be possible to include, as
72 73
under the JSCSG jurisprudence, internal decisions ^ and,
74
perhaps, external ones, if a. legal connection between such
decisions and the acts complained of could be established.
71 See~Chapter V infra, pages 173-188.
72 See cases cited in note 13, supra.
73 E.g., Decision of the Council Relating to an Action
Program for the Common Commercial Policy, 90/62 Jc0. 2353«
(The decision is purportedly addressed to Member States,
but much of it concerns activity to be taken by Community
institutions.)
74- E«g., Decision of the Council on Uniformization of the
Duration of Commercial Agreements with Third Countries,
71/61 J.o. 1274-.
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An early draft of Article 184 used "general decisions" in
75
place of "regulations,"'^ but this may simply reflect the
use of EC3C nomenclature before a decision to change the
denomination of administrative acts under the EEC Treaty had
been ta,ken.
The Court of Justice has also made it clear that
Article 184 may not be employed as a substitute for or as
a supplement to the jurisdiction sharing provisions of
Article 177» The two cases involxred in the development of
this rule are of some interest.
76
In the first case' it appears that pursuant to a
request of the German Government under Article 46 of the EEC
Treaty, the Commission issued a decision allowing the German
Government to impose a, countervailing tax on imports of
powdered whole milk. Germany implemented this authorization
by administrative order and assessed the tax against the
appellant importers. The latter appealed the assessment in
the German courts. They also appealed to the Court of Justice,
alleging that the Commission's decision, upon which the
national order and assessment were based was invalid. Juris¬
diction for this suit could not be based on the "appeal for
annulment6 under Article 173 because the decision was not
addressed to the appellants, nor was it of "direct and
75 Travaux Preparatoires, Traite Instituant la CEE, 381
(Cour de Justice, Luxembourg, 1962).
76 Milchwerke Heinz Wohrmann & Sohn v. Commission, Cases
Nos. 31 & 33/62, VIII Rec. 965, 14 November 1962.
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specific5 concern to them although addressed to another.
Nor could the national administrative action, through the
medium of which the Commission's decision did become of such
concern, be made the basis of a suit before the Community
Court under Article 173.
Instead, appellants invoked the somewhat ambiguous
terms of Article 184-, which provides
Where a regulation of the Council or of the
Commission is the subject of a dispute in legal
proceedings, any of the parties concerned may, not¬
withstanding the expiry of the period laid down in
Article 173s> third paragraph, invoke the grounds-
set out in Article 173> first paragraph, in order to
allege before the Court of Justice that the regula¬
tion concerned is inapplicable.
The "dispute in legal proceedings" relied upon was the im¬
porter's suit in the German courts. The basic issue pre¬
sented by this claim was whether Article 184- should be
interpreted only as extending the scope of review possible
in a,n action properly before the Court under Article 173, or
whether it should be read as granting an additional, com¬
pulsory, supervisory jurisdiction over national courts.
The Court acceded to the former view and dismissed
the appeal. The decision was based, inter al1a, on the re¬
spective competences of the national courts and the Community
Court as established in Article 177 of the EEC Treaty and
Article 20 of the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of
Justice. The Court recognized that to allow the parties in
a. case pending before national courts to address themselves
directly to the Court of Justice under Article 184 would
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circumvent the discretionary power of referral given lower
national courts under Article 177 and would nullify the
national courts® control over suspension of their own pro¬
ceedings in Article 177 cases, as envisaged by Article 20
of the Protocol.
In the second case^ the attempt was to use Article
134 to expand the scope of a 177 referral. The national
court had referred two questions of interpretation to the
Court of Justice which sought to determine whether Article
52 of Regulation 3> which ostensibly is concerned with the
social security of migrant workers, should be applied to
persons who were not migrant workers, were not making claims
on the basis of work-connected accidents, and were injured
before the effective date of the Regulation. In its sub¬
mission to the Court of Justice the defendant argued a
further point, viz., that, if an affirmative answer were
given to the questions of interpretation, should the Court
of Justice not rule under Articles 173 a^d 184 that the
Council had gone outside its powers in enacting the Regu¬
lation and that it was therefore inapplicable.
Interpreting this submission in its most plausible
light, that is, as an attempt to use Article 184 in connec¬
tion with a "dispute in legal proceedings" which was before
the Court under Article 177» the Court of Justice held that
under the latter provision parties to national litigation
77 Hessische Knappschaft v. Mai son Singer et Flls, Case No.
44/65, XI-11 Rec. 1191, 9 December I965.
could make submissions, but they could not change the
questions the national court had asked or introduce new
matters which tended to render them pointless. The scope
of a proceeding under Article 177 is to be determined from
the questions submitted by the national court. However,
having said this the Court of Justice went on to discuss
the point of validity and to find that the Council had acted
within its powers. Presumably questions of validity are
too important to leave unanswered simply because the Court"s
jurisdiction does not require it to answer,
c. Suit for Damages
A discussion of the possibilities for appeal on
questions of legality would not be complete without some
mention of the jurisdiction of the Community Court to ad¬
judicate controversies concerning the non-contractual lia¬
bility of the Communities, A party suffering pecuniary
injury may in such a suit raise issues of legality by claim¬
ing that the taking and executing of an illegal act involved,
or was a part of administrative practices which involved,
an administrative fault entailing the responsibility of
the Communities, This is possible under both ECSC Treaty,
Article ^0 and EEC Treaty, Articles 178 and 215, the provi¬
sions of which have been harmonized by Article 26 of the
Treaty Establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission
of the European Communities,
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The role of the suit for damages in supplying a.
community forum is somewhat different under the two treaties,
although the applicable legal principles are apparently the
same. In the i£i£C context the suit for damages might be
employed as a limited means for circumventing the require¬
ments of the annulment jurisdiction that the plaintiff have
a direct and individual interest; whereas under the more
liberal interest requirements of the SCSC annulment juris¬
diction coal and steel producers should almost never need to
resort to a suit in damages in order to raise questions of
the legality of Community acts before the Court of Justice.
The suit for damages becomes the refuge of the non-coal and
steel producer under the Treaty of Paris when he is affected
by an allegedly illegal Community act, or of a producer which
is affected by High Authority action but not in the capacity
which would give it standing under the annulment jurisdic¬
tion 79c/ xOil •
However, at this point in the development of the
action for damages under the two treaties it is extremely
difficult to predict the extent to which that action will be
useful in broadening access to the Community Court on ques¬
tions of the legality of Community acts. This is true because
a definitive statement of the principles governing the suit
for damages remains to be made. The existing jurisprudence
gives only limited guidance.
79 Socibtd Antoine Vloebergs S. A. v. High Authority, Gases
Nos. 9 & 12/60, VII Ree. 391, July 1961 (Conclu¬
sions of Advocate General Roemer).
1 2 "5_<c J?
It is at least clear from two decisions under the
Coal and Steel Treaty that the Court of Justice is willing
to allow certain inroads on the annulment jurisdiction's
BO
restrictions. In Meroni & Co. v. High Authority the Court
made a. clear distinction between the annulment and repara¬
tion jurisdictions®^ and allowed a suit under the latter,
although the act giving rise to the incidents complained of
had not been annulled. Moreover, in Sooist^ Antolne Vice-
ftP
bergs 3. A. v. High Authority, ' a party which failed to
qualify as a.n "enterprise" under .Article 80 was allowed to
bring a suit under Article 40 contesting the High Authority's
inaction in the face of alleged treaty violations by a Member
State. The Court rejected the High Authority's argument
that the ground alleged was intimately connected with control
of legality under Articles 33-35 and should be allowed only
on the basis of those articles. The reasoning behind this
rejection was that the object of suits under Article 40 is
not suppression of the executive a.ction but only reparation
ft ^
for damage resulting from administrative fault. J However,
FO" Cases Nos. 14, 16, 1?, 20, 24, 26 & 27/60 & 1/61, VII
Ree. 319, 333, 13 July 1961.
81 This distinction does not apply in the special circum¬
stances of suits by Community employees. See discussion in
Corton, La Concurrence des recours en annulation avec I5action
en reparation des dommagesT Rapport general, in Zehn Jahrs
Rechtsprechung des Geriohtshofs der Suropaischen Gemein-
schaften 332-33 (1965).
82 Cases Nos. 9 & 12/60, VII Rec. 391, 14 July I96I.
83 VII Rec. at 424-26.
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this distinction was somewhat qualified by the Court*s care
in pointing out that it was not in this case called upon to
decide whether the illegality of a positive act which had
net been annulled could of itself be alleged as constituting
such a fault.
This latter question seems to have been resolved
84
by Plaumann & Co. v. ISC Commission- decided under the pre¬
visions of the EEC Treaty. In that case the applicant based
his claim for damages, in effect, on the alleged illegality
of a decision directed to the German Government and coupled
this claim with an appeal for annulment of the decision. The
appeal for annulment was held inadmissible and the suit for
damages unfounded. In relation to the latter claim the Court
reasoned, "...an administrative act that has not been annulled
cannot of itself constitute a wrong causing damage to those
Q
subject to that administration.®s °
On the basis of these cases it would appear that a
distinction has been made between complaints alleging illegal
action and those, like the Vloebergs complaint, alleging
Illegal inaction. Although the Court has not said this ex¬
plicitly, the distinction is tenable. There is no prior
demand procedure under EC3C Treaty, Article 40 and EEC Treaty,
Articles 1?8 and 215 as there is within Articles 35 and 175
respectively of these treaties. Thus, it might be argued
W^Caielo. 15/62, IX Rec. 197, 15 July 1963.
85 IX Rec. at 225.
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that an appeal for damages resulting from inaction is not
based on a tacit negative decision of the Community Execu->
tive. The admissibility of the Vloebergs claim thus becomes
consistent with the Plaumann rationale. Moreover, Moroni is
distinguishable from Plaumann because the faults alleged
there did not arise from the decisions of the High Authority
(actes a.dmlnlstra11 fs), but from administrative practices
(aglssements materiels de 18administration) concerning their
implementation. Hence that case did not involve an issue of
legality in the sense that that phrase is here employed.
However, there are strong reasons to believe that
the definitive answer has not yet been given. The above-
quoted holding in Plaumann is not from the portion of the
opinion which deals with admissibility; It is a ruling on
the merits. This ruling may be read as indicating, not that
the plaintiff may not allege the illegality of an extant
decision in support of a claim of official fault, but that
such an allegation is not enough. The claimant must prove
86
fault in the sense of "maladministration," This Is not
necessarily proved by a simple showing that the act com¬
plained of involves a treaty violation, a failure to comply
with substantial procedural requirements, or even a d£fcourne«
ment de pouvoir» (At this stage in jurisprudential develop¬
ments, it is net possible to say precisely what proof is
86' See,~*VII Rec. at 469 (Conclusions of Advocate General
Rcemer).
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necessary to establish a fante, although it now seems to
have been recognized that a faute lourde or "grave fault" is
87
not required. '' ) So viewed the Plaumann decision merely
supports the juridical distinctness of the two types of
suits, as enunciated in Meronl; it does not deny the possi-
88
bility of their material connection in a particular case.
This seems to be the position of the Advocate General in
89
Plaumann although he thought that the failure to allege
anything beyond illegality in the claim for damages resulted
in failure to state a prime facie case and in the Inadmissi¬
bility of the request.
The Court's further statement, that it could not
by way of a recourse in indemnity make a ruling annihilating
the juridical effects of a decision which had not been
90
annulled, might also be explained by reference to the facts
of the case. It appears that the plaintiff's enumeration of
damages was based solely and precisely on the amount of cus¬
toms duties and taxes that he had paid as a result of the
Authority's decision. This is to equate the effects of non¬
existence of the act in law with reparation for damage caused
thereby. In so doing the plaintiff both seeks to substitute
87 See, E'irma E. Kampffmeyer v. Commission, Cases Nos. 5» 7»
and 13-24/66, XIII-3 Rec. 31?, 340, 14 July 1967.
88 See, VII Rec. at 3^8 (Conclusions of Advocate General
Lagrange).
89 IX Rec. at 247. See also the similar submissions in
Vloebergs, VII Rec. at 450-53•
90 IX Rec. at 225.
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an action for reparation for an action of annulment and fails
91
sufficiently to prove his damages under the former. Pre-
sumably some taxes and duties would have been due, even
under a proper decision.
Some care has been taken to deal with this language
in Plaumann because it is suspected that it will not be held
to imply a general prohibition against suits for damages
based on faults in respect of administrative acts which are
92
not subject to attack by way of annulment. Significant
consequences in other contexts militate against it. For
example, such a rule might mean that illegal, individual deci¬
sions could not give rise to damages unless attacked under
the annulment procedure within one or two months of promul¬
gation.^ This would be an extremely rigid approach and
would strike a balance between administrative convenience
and private rights that is far different from that estab¬
lished under the French administrative procedures^*" upon
9 5
which at least ECSC Treaty, Article 4-0 was based.
It would also leave us with the Vloebergs case and
the distinction between action and inaction earlier suggested,
91 ITTat 247-48.
92 Cf. Mathijsen, La fusion des voles de droit in Fusion des
Communaut^s Europdennes 94 124-25 (1965)•~
93 This limitation was explicitly proposed by the High
Authority in Vloebergs. VII Hec. at 424.
94 See, e.g., Laubadere, Trait^ elementaire de droit ad-
ministratif 474 (1957); Waline, Droit administratif 506 (8th
ed. 1959).
95 Lagrange, supra note 78.
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which, although tenable, is far from satisfying. Parties
contemplating the use of a suit in damages to contest inac¬
tion may certainly be expected to make an initial request to
the Community Executive, as did the plaintiff in Vloebergs.
If the Executive then fails to act, a tacit negative decision
exists in all but name.
It is, therefore, suggested that persons unable to
invoke the annulment jurisdiction of the Court of Justice
under the ECSC Treaty may yet contest the legality of High
Authority action before the Community Court to the extent
that a ground of illegality can be made a part of suit for
96
damages. "At least" is, with the exception of the special
cases above-mentioned,^ coextensive with "at most." If the
above analysis is borne out by subsequent developments, the
possibilities for direct appeal on issues of the legality
of Community acts might be expanded substantially under the
EEC Treaty.
There is some irony in this conclusion because an
action for damages will apparently, as in the case of annul¬
ment, require a "direct" and "individual" interest. However,
these criteria may be distinguished from their meaning under
Article 173• In the suit for damages these requirements re¬
late to proof of causation and to the degree of the plaintiff's
9% Contra, Cartou, La concurrence du recours en annulation
avec 1'action en reparation des dommages: Rappor tT~gdneraT"~
in Zehn Jahre Rechtsprechung des Gerichtshofs der Europaischen
Gemeinschaften 339 (1965) • But see, Blanchet, Id. at 3^7-^9<>
97 See notes 33-36 supra and accompanying text.
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concern. As under the EC3G annulment jurisdiction, the ques¬
tion of interest is factual rather than juridical. This, at
least, is the view of Advocate General Rcemer in perhaps the
most comprehensive review of the elements of an action for
98
"maladministration" available. He would require only that
the plaintiff be one of a small and well-defined group of
persons affected,99 no^ that he be alone prejudiced. More¬
over, he would allow the interposition of Member State action
in the chain of events producing the plaintiff6s damage.
"Directness" is a factual question of whether this interposi¬
tion or the act of the Community organ can be said, to be
the preponderant cause of the prejudice suffered. These
views are largely borne out in the Court's judgment in Flrrna
fi. Kampffmeyer v. Commission, although the Court was
there dealing with a decision taicen under Article 22 of Regti-
lation 19 which had previously been held susceptible of a
private appeal in the Toepfer case.
Certain of the scrap-metal-fund cases, which have
denied liability of the High Authority for acts of Dutch
101
civil servants, were concerned with a. similar problem -
98 Cases Nos. 9 and 12/60, VII Rec. at 450, 474-75°
99 Query how small and well defined the group need be.
M. Lagrange seems to have seen no problem of "individuality"
in a situation where a.11 consumers of scrap metal were af¬
fected. See, Compagnie des Hauts Fourneaux de Chasse v. High
Authority, Case No. 33/59* VIII Rec. 719* 765-67, 14 December
1962.
100 Cases Nos. 5, 7 and 13-24/66, XIII-3 Rec. 317, 14 July
1967.
101 See, e.g., F.E.R.A.M. v. High Authority, Case No. 23/59*
V Rec. 501, 517, 17 December 1959.
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imputability of the acts of a person in one public authority
1 02
to another public authority." However, those cases did
not deny the possibility that the Community might be respon¬
sible for such acts, either because the national authority
is acting as an agent of the Community institution or because
the Community institution has committed a fault in its es¬
tablishment or supervision of the program involved. The
development of such principles in the EEC context would be
of considerable importance. It would constitute a legal
recognition of the close collaboration between Community and
national administrations in implementing common policy and
would open up a. limited avenue of appeal for those unable to
establish standing under Article 173. One wonders, for
example, whether the plaintiff in Giucoserles Reunles v.
103
Commission might not have reached the merits of its claim
had it, while avoiding the errors of the Piaumann pleading,
based the suit on Articles 178 and 215.
3. Issues of Legality In the National Courts
At this point it is perhaps worthwhile to
point out that the unavailability of a Community forum for
the determination of an issue of legality of a Community act
does not necessarily imply that a national forum will be
available. Thus, to a certain, and abstractly ^indefinable,
102 See Waline, Traits de Droit Administratif 705 (8th
ed. 1959).
103 Case No. 1/6^+, X Rec. 811, 2 July 196^-.
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extent the limitations on the Courtis jurisdiction that we
are discussing bear only on questions of the general, availa¬
bility of legal redress in the Communities - not on the divi¬
sion of jurisdiction between Community and national judiciar¬
ies. The Community Court, it will be remembered, has exelusiv
jurisdiction in suits against the Community executives - that
is, in all direct challenges to legality. National courts
may only hear suits which raise such issues indirectly, and
such litigation depends upon the existence of an appropriate
setting. This would seem to require a. contentious situation
in which (1) one party has affected the other0s interests
by acting or refraining from acting on the basis of or in
violation of an act of the Community executives and (2) the
validity of the Community act can be made a relevant issue
with respect to the first party's conduct.
A good example of how this might occur is provided
by N. V. Internationale Credit-en Handelsverenlglng "Rotter-
i o/j-
dam" v. Minister of Agriculture & Fisheries. The plaintiff
contested the assessment of certain export duties as in vio¬
lation of SEC Treaty, Articles 12 and 16. The defendant
claimed that the assessments were allowed by a Commission de¬
cision pursuant to Article 226 authorizing the institution
of German import duties on certain products unless Dutch ex¬
port duties were imposed. The plaintiff countered this argu¬
ment by claiming that the Commission decision did not authoriz
T65 Cases Nos. 73/63 & 7^/63s x Rec. 1, 18 February 1964.
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the Dutch duties and that even if it did it was invalid
because vitiated by a d6tournement de pouvcir, The Dutch
court, assuming as the plaintiff claimed that the national
measures were barred by the Treaty articles, was clearly
faced with the issues of (1) whether the Commission decision
authorized the export duties and (2) whether it did so
validly. Both questions were ultimately referred to the
Court of Justice and were answered affirmatively„
The "Rotterdam" decision also demonstrates the
greater importance of the referral or shared jurisdiction in
providing a Community hearing on issues of the validity of
Community action taken under the EEC Treaty. The case is
typical of the manner in which issues concerning the validity
10^
of EEC decisions may be expected to arise in national courts
It is less typical of EC3C practice because of the limited
use of decisions directed to Member States and because of the
greater opportunity for individual appeal against decisions
directed to another. Although the case presents insufficient
factual data to permit concrete analysis, it is certainly
possible that under the ECSC rules the plaintiff in "Rotterdam8'5
could have attacked the decision directly. Moreover, had the
case concerned a directive to the Member State or a decision
addressed to a private party, we know from the outline of
jurisdictional practices sketched above that the chances would
105 See also, Flrma C. Schwartze v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle
fur Getreide 'and Futtermittel, Case No. 16/65, XI-1Q Rec„
1081, 1 December 1965«
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be very much greater under the SEC than under the SCSC
Treaty that any issue of validity would have to be contested
in litigation before a national court.
Cases might also be brought in national courts in¬
volving the legality of Community acts having no individual
addressees, that is, regulations or general decisions. For
example, since such norms are directly applicable to everyone
in the Member States, including the Member State governments,
a failure to abide by the Community norms may under the ap¬
plicable national rules give rise to a suit for damages by
persons prejudiced by such failure. The defendant might then
allege the illegality of the Community norm and the lack of
any duty on his part to conform to it. This situation has
arisen in at least one lower court in Germany, which held
invalid, without referral to the Court of Justice, Article 7
of Commission Regulation No. 102/64.
Again, the prospects for such situations to develop
are greater in the EEC than in the ECSC, This follows booh
from the distinctions outlined above between the appealability
of general acts under the two treaties and from the greater
necessity for "regulatory" action within the general provi¬
sions of the Rome Treaty. Under that treaty, as we noted in
Chapter II, the primary modes of action are through regula¬
tions or through decisions and directives addressed to
106 Verwaltungsgericht Frankfurt/M., Decisions of December
12, 1966, II 2.-986 and 937/66, Aussenwirtshaftsdlenst 1967,
67-71; 5 C.M.L. Rev. 75 (1967).
Member States. Since these are precisely the situations in
which individual appeal to the Community Court is most re¬
stricted and since the Member States and Community institu¬
tions that have agreed to these acts can seldom be expected
to challenge their legality, it would, indeed, seem a rare
case in which the Court of Justice should hear a direct chal¬
lenge to the legality of an act of the EEC institutions,
save in the instance of the individual decisions cf the Com¬
mission. If effective control over the legality of other
Community acts is to be exercised by the Community Court, it
would appear that the provisions of Article 177 for the re¬
ferral of questions of validity to the Court of Justice by
national courts will be crucial to that task.
For this rea.son, one is somewhat at a loss to ex¬
plain why Article 177 of the EEC Treaty fails to make manda¬
tory the referral by national courts of all questions of the
107
validity of Community acts as under EC3C Treaty, Article 41.A '
The limitation of the mandatory requirement to national
courts of last resort is, of course, consistent with the
general pattern of "jurisdiction" sharing in the EEC which
often leaves implementation to national institutions. Yet,
one cannot help feeling that this partition of competences
1,07 During the course of negotiation Article 177 was drafted
in three forms, none of which conforms exactly to the text
as it appears in the Treaty. Two prototypes would have given
the Court of Justice greater power than does the definitive
article by making it "alone" competent to decide questions
of interpretation or validity. Travaux Preparatoires, Traite
Instituant 1a. C.E.E. 376-77 (Cour de Justice, Luxembourg,
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with respect to indirect, legal control of Community action
is incongruous when considered in the light of the possibil¬
ities for such questions to come before national courts,,
Those possibilities include, not only the situations we have
been discussing, in which limitations on the jurisdiction of
the Court of Justice force a resort to national courts, but
also cases in which individuals entitled to challenge the
legality of acts directly fail to do so within the prescribed
time limit. In this connection the decisions of the Commis¬
sion in implementing the competition rules immediately spring-
to mind. If left unappealed. Commission decisions on manu¬
facturers5 distribution systems could give rise to consider¬
able litigation in national courts indirectly challenging
the decisions5 legality.
B. Member State Action
The legality of Member State action may be ques¬
tioned directly before the Court of Justice only on the suit
108
of another Member State or of the Community executives.x
A declaration of illegality in such cases obliges the state
ToS ECSC Treaty, Arts. 10, 88; EEC Treaty, Arts. 93(2.2),
169, 170, 180(a), 225(2). Article 16 of the Protocol on
Privileges and Immunities of the ECSC is a special situation
applicable only to Community staff. See, Humblet v. Belgium,
Case No. 6/60, VI Rec. 1125, 16 December i960.
There is a procedural distinction between the ECSC and
EEC systems of control. Under the former the High Authority
determines a violation and a suit contesting legality takes
the form of a state action against the High Authority deci¬
sion. The EEC Commission must in the first instance bring
the question of a Member State's failure to fulfill its
obligations before the Court of Justice for a determination.
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concerned, to take remedial action,109 but it does not annul
the action complained of. ^ There are, however, indirect
means by which these issues may be raised before the Com¬
munity Court by other persons. These procedures are extreme¬
ly important to the ensuring of respect for Community law.
Although the Community executives are charged with effective
implementation of Community norms, their decision to require
strict legal compliance in a given situation may be affected
by long-term policy considerations. Because political con¬
siderations must also be expected to affect the instigation
of inter-Member State litigation, legal control is signifi¬
cantly affected by the ability of private parties who are
aggrieved by allegedly illegal Member State action to obtain
a Community Court ruling on these issues. Their ability to
do so is intimately connected with the question of shared
jurisdiction.
1• Indirect Challenge Before the Court of Justice
a. The ECSC Procedures
The primary, indirect method of relief
for enterprises or associations affected by illegal state
action is an appeal against the High Authority's failure to
take action to end the violation. Since the High Authority's
duty to act depends upon the existence of a failure to
109 ECSC Treaty, Art. 86; EEC Treaty, Arts. 5} 1?1.
110 There is one exception to this rule: ECSC Treaty,
Art. 10, para. 11.
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fulfill treaty obligations,tlie legality of the state
112
action will necessarily be an issue in the suit. This
procedure requires a prior formal demand that the High Author¬
ity ta,ke specific binding action, and the suit is then
against the tacit negative decision presumed from the Author¬
ity's failure to act within two months. should the Au¬
thority act within this period but in a manner not conforming
with the requesting party's demand, relief is available
through the ordinary annulment jurisdiction,11^ In either
case the same interest requirements are made and the same
grounds may be alleged, because the two procedures are com-
piementary.116
The previous discussion of the Vloebergs
case indicated a second indirect means of raising the legality
111 Groupement des Industries Siderurgique Luxembourgeoises
v. High Authority, Cases Nos. 7 & 9/54, II Rec. 53, 23 April
1956.
112 See, Id. at 9O-IO3.
113 ECSC Treaty, Art. 35.
114- See, De Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg v.
High Authority, Case No. 30/59, VII Rec. 1, 3^, 23 February
I96I; Chambre Syndicale v. High Authority, Cases Nos. 24 &
34/58, VT Rec. 609, 15 July I96O; Societa Industrials
Acciaierie San Michele v. High Authority, Cases Nos. 5/H,
13-15/62, VIII Rec. 859, 882, 14 December 1962. (As these
cases indicate, parties often have some difficulty deter¬
mining what procedure to invoke.)
115 Meroni & Co. v. High Authority, Cases Nos. 2.1 & 26/61,
VIII Rec. 143, 6 April 1962, makes it clear that they are
strictly complementary; they may not be used interchangeably
in respect of the same substantive question.
116 See note 82 supra and accompanying text.
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of state action "before the Community Court which applies to
both ECSC and SEC situations? a suit for damages against
the executive based on its failure to put an end to viola¬
tive state practice. This raises the question of legality
in the same way as the appeal en carence, that is, against
a failure to act, but it will be remembered that additional
elements must be proved in the damage suit.
The element of fault may be particularly diffi¬
cult to establish, for complex questions of judgment are
involved. The Court must consider, for example, what powers
the executive has, the flagrancy of the violation, the possi¬
ble consequences of allowing it to continue, and the scope
of the executive's discretion.Perhaps for this reason,
former Advocate General Lagrange has stated that fautes de




The differences between the appeal en
carence under ECSC Treaty, Article 35 and Article 175 of the
EEC Treaty were reserved for treatment in this section be¬
cause it is in connection with relief against illegal state
action that the distinctions take on special significance.
117 VII fiec. at 467-7^ (Conclusions of Advocate General
Hoemer).
118 Lagrange, The Non-Contractual Liability of the Com¬
munity in the ECSC and in the EEC, 3 C.M.L. Rev. 10, 27
(1965).
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Article 1?5 of the SEC Treaty provides1
"Should the Council or the Commission in
violation of this Treaty fail to act, the Member
States and the other institutions of the Com¬
munity may refer the matter to the Court of
Justice in order to have the said violation
placed on record.
No proceedings arising out of the said
reference shall "be heard unless the institu¬
tion concerned has been called upon I* o ac f 9
If within two months cf being so called upon,
the institution concerned has not made its
attitude clear, the said proceedings may be
brought within a further period of two months.
Any natural or legal person may bring
proceedings before the Court of Justice, under
the conditions laid down in the preceding
paragraphs, on the ground that one of the in¬
stitutions of the Community has failed to
direct to him an act other than a recommendation
or an opinion."
Article 35 of the ISCSC Treaty provides?
"Wherever the High Authority is required
by a provision of this Treaty, or of regula¬
tions in implementation thereof, to take a
decision or make a recommendation and fails to
fulfill this obligation, the States, the Coun¬
cil or the undertakings and associations, as
the case may be, shall have the right to bring
the matter before it.
The same shall apply if the High Authori¬
ty, when empowered by a provision cf this
Treaty or regulations in implementation there¬
of, to take a decision or make a recommendation,
abstains from doing so and such abstention con¬
stitutes a misuse of powers (detournement de
pouvoir).
If at the end of two months the High
Authority has not taken any decision or made
any recommendation, an appeal may be made to
the Court within one month, against the High
Authority®s implied refusal to take action,
which is to be inferred from its silence on
the matter."
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When the two provisions are compared, the
difficulty for individuals attempting to raise issues of
Member State legality under the EEC article is obvious.,
Under the ECSC Treaty the private legal person need only
show a request to act and a failure, in violation of the
Treaty, to do so within two months. But Article 175 of the
EEC Treaty requires an allegation that the Community insti¬
tution has, in violation of the Treaty, failed to direct an
a°t the requesting party. Of course, in the context of
a Member State violation the requested action would be
directed to the Member State, and hence failure to address
an act to the individual requesting party could not be in
violation of the Treaty.
It is possible to read Article 175 in a manner
which would yield results similar to those discussed -under
ECSC Treaty, Article 35« This is achieved by separating the
requirements of illegal failure to act and failure to direct
an act to the complaining party. Following this analysis
the plaintiff might be required to show (1) a failure to act
which is in violation of the Treaty and (2) a failure to
address to him an act other than a recommendation or an
opinion, as distinguished from a requirement that he show a
failure, in violation of the Treaty, to address to him an
119
act other than a recommendation or an opinion. Thus, a
119 Compare in this regard the interpretation placed on the
dual criteria of "individual" and "concern" under ECSC
Treaty, Article 33* See Conclusions of Advocate General
Lagrange in De Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg v.
High Authority, Case No. 30/59, VII Rec. 1, 68-69, 23
February 1961.
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failure to answer the plaintiff's request when coupled with
a failure to act in respect of a, Treaty violation would give
an individual standing to sue the Commission and thereby to
raise indirectly the issue of the legality of Member State
action.
This line of approach seems to have been at¬
tempted by the plaintiff in Alfons Lutticke GmbH v. EEC
120
Commission. The Lutticke firm requested that the Com¬
mission (1) declare in a decision that a certain German turn¬
over equalization tax. violated Article 95 of the Treaty,
(2) proceed against the Federal Republic under Article 169S
and (3) inform it of the decision adopted. The Commission
informed the plaintiffs by letter that it did not share
their view that the German measure was illegal. The plain¬
tiffs then brought an action under Article 173 to have the
Commission's decision annulled and, alternatively, an action
under Article 175 complaining of the Commission's failure to
take the requested action.
Both actions were ruled inadmissible. The
Article 173 suit would not lie because under Article 169 the
Commission has no power to take a binding act in respect of
a Member State violation and, thus, the Court reasoned that
there had been no act taken which was subject to annulment
under Article 173« In so ruling the Court validated the
previously expressed opinion of several commentators that a
120" Case" No• 48/65, XII Rec. 2?, 1 March 1966.
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major stumbling block to a suit of this type would be the
difference between the procedures under EGSC Treaty, Article
88 and EEC Treaty, Article I69 rather than the differences
between Articles 35 and 175 of those treaties.-21 The alter¬
native action under SEC Treaty, Article 175 was dismissed
because a precondition to suit is the failure of the Com¬
munity organ to "take a position" within two months of the
request. Here the Commission had by its letter taken a.
position with respect to the issues raised by the plaintiff.
Technical objections may be raised to the
Liittieke decision. Since Article 173 allows a suit for annul¬
ment against acts "other than recommendations or opinions",
it would have been possible for the Court to hold that the
letter to the plaintiffs was an act which did not fall within
either of those categories. It could then have gone further
to hold that the act was within the generic concept of a
"decision" and therefore appealable by its addressee under
Article 173.122
The bases for the Court's brief interpreta¬
tion of Article 175(2) may also be questioned. Is the Court
saying that the Commission may avoid judicial review under
Article 175 of its failure to act by taking an act which is
121 See comments by Lagrange in Zehn Jahre Rechtsprechung
des Gerichthofs der Europalschen Gemeinschaften 392 (1965).
122 No provision of the Treaty prohibits administrative
action of a. novel type, see Bebr, Judicial Control in the
European Communities 52 (1962), and the Court has often
said that doubts should be resolved in favor of appealability.
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not reviewable under Article 173? If so, not only indi¬
viduals, but also the parties with "privileged" standing
under the two articles will be incapable of invoicing the
jurisdiction of the Community Court in such cases.
What if the Commission had not ta.ken a posi¬
tion? Is the Court willing to read the requirements of
paragraphs one and three of Article 175 disjunctively, as
was suggested above, such that the Luttlcke type appeal
would be admissible? One can only guess because the concern
of the parties and the Advocate General in the case with the
interpretation of Article 175 paragraph three receives not
124
an echo in the Court"s motifs.
2, The Importance of Shared Jurisdiction
Because the possibility of raising issues of
the legality of Member State acts indirectly through the
procedures outlined above depends on the scope of direct
appeal against Community action, we arrive at basically the
same conclusions sta.ted with respect to issues of the le¬
gality of Community acts; the opportunity of those affected
123 The"Treaty certainly allows such a development. Articles
173 and 175 of the EEC Treaty are not complementary in the
same sense as Articles 33 and 35 of the ECSC Treaty. See
notes 110-112 supra, and accompanying text. The parties and
the grounds of appeal are different under the two articles
and apparently the Article 175 appeal is not against a tacit
negative act, but against the simple failure to take a posi¬
tion. See Valentine, o£. cit. supra, note 22 at 199•
124 The only other case that has raised a, similar question,
Socidtd Rhenania v. Commission, Case No. 103/63) X Rec. 838,
2 July 1964, was similarly inconclusive on this issue,
because before trial the Commission acceded to the plain¬
tiff" s demands.
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to raise issues of illegal state action in litigation before
the Community Court is considerably greater under the SCSC
than under the EEC Treaty, However, an examination of the
effect on this problem of the jurisdiction-sharing articles -
EC3C Treaty, Article 41 and EEC Treaty, Article 177 - reveals
that the distinction between the two treaties lies more in
where the principal suit must be tried than in the overall
possibilities for having the issues of legality examined in
some form by the Community Court,
a» EEC Treaty, Article 177
It is presumed that national judicial
procedures will provide means whereby citizens and others
subject to the jurisdiction of the state may question directly
in national courts the legality of state measures sought to
be applied to them."'"2^ As the "Rotterdam"^2^ case illus¬
trated, the question before the national court may be
whether such state acts are illegal because in violation of
Community law. Moreover, the Dutch Court's referral question
125 See, e.g., Societe B. P. Colussi v. Ministero, Consiglio
di Stato (Italy), 7 November 1962, 88 (III) Foro Italia.no
143 (1963), [1963] C.M.L.H. I33.
Such procedures exist to some degree In all the Member
States, although in some of them review may depend upon
whether the act is legislative or administrative. Even so,
past practice indicates that national courts may allow ques¬
tions of the conformity of Member State action with the
treaties to be raised in situations where they apparently
have no power to annul the national law. See N.V. Algemene
Transport-en Expidite van Gend & Loos v. Netherlands Fiscal
Administration, Case No. 26/62, IX Rec. 1, 5 February I963;
Costa v, E.N.E.L., Case No. 6/64, X Rec. 1141, 15 July 1964.
126 See note 104 supra, and accompanying text.
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seeking to determine whether the Commission decision author¬
ized the institution of export duties bore directly on this
issue. Thus, by means of an interpretive renvoi the plain¬
tiff was able to present his question of legality, at least
in part, before the Community forum.
However, the question in "Rotterdam" could be
considered as a necessary preliminary issue in deciding the
question of the validity of the Community act. That case
leaves open the question of whether a referral should be
considered outwith the Court's purely interpretive jurisdic¬
tion under 177 because it is directed at a determination of
whether certain Member State action is illegal.
This line of argument was suggested and re¬
jected in the second decision handed down under the interpre¬
tive jurisdiction, N.V. Algemene Transport-en Expeditie van
Gend & Loos v. Netherlands Fiscal Administration."2'7 Briefly,
the argument advanced was that the exclusion of individuals
from the direct appeal procedures of Articles I69 and 170
evidenced an intent to prevent individuals from challenging
the legality of national practices before the Community
Court on the basis of Community law even where that challenge
was limited to questions submitted by a national court. The
Court answered this approach with the countervailing policy
argument that, "The vigilance of individuals concerned with
the safeguarding of their rights entails an efficient super¬
vision added to that which Articles 169 and 170 entrust to
127 Case No. 26/62, IX Rec. 1, 5 February 1963.
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the care of the Commission and the Member States."128 ^
other words, if the Court is to have a significant control
over issues of the legality of state action, that control
must be based on Article 177 as well as Articles I69 and 170.
This function of Article 177 was again
brought out in the Luttieke case, for the Advocate General
there reminded the plaintiff that dismissal of its claims
under Articles 173 175 for lack of jurisdiction did not
entail the loss of all possibility of Community legal protec¬
tion. A suit could yet be instituted against the appropriate
governmental agency in Germany, and in a proper case the
question might then reach the Community Court by means of
Article 177.129
Indeed, as M. Gand certainly knew, the
Luttlcke counsel were not missing any bets.^0 They had al¬
ready been litigating the question in the German courts and
the questions of Community law involved were referred to the
Court of Justice in a proceeding styled, Firma Alfons Liittlcke
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GmbH v, Ha.upzolla.mt de Sarrelouls. Of course, the Advo¬
cate General might have gone further to note that the
125 Id. at 25.
129 XII Hec. at 46-47.
130 This same firm was one of the parties which had pre¬
viously tried to use Article 184 in order to obtain direct
access to the Court of Justice for a determination of the
legality of a Commission decision which was involved in
national legal proceedings. See note 76 supra and accom¬
panying text.
131 Case No. 57/65, XII Rec. 293, 16 June 1966.
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Community Court®s interpretaion of Community law under
Article 177 may eliminate or sharpen the issue before the
national judge of the compatibility of national acts with
Community law, but it will not reach that question directly.
Moreover, within the limits of the requirements of Article
177> the decisions as to when whether and what questions to
refer to the Court of Justice are taken by the national
court rather than by the parties.
We shall return to these problems of the
limitations on the Article 177 jurisdiction in much greater
detail in the chapters to follow. But, without getting into
technical matters for which no proper foundation has yet been
laid, we might at this point profitably consider several
cases which have been decided under the Article 177 jurisdic¬
tion and which have involved issues of the legality of Mem¬
ber State acts, or in alternative and equally applicable
terms, the relationship of Community and national law. A
comparison of their treatment by the Court of Justice well
illustrates the utility of the Article 177 procedure in
handling politically difficult questions.
There are obvious political advantages in
limiting declarations by the Community Court on questions of
Member State violations of Community law raised by private
parties to the Article 177 procedure. Any final statement of
illegality will be made by a national court, and this is on
the whole more acceptable to national governments. But,
equally important is the flexibility with which the Court of
14-8
Justice can operate when answering questions referred by
national courts, a flexibility which can result in both the
strengthening of Community legal control and the avoidance
of political fireworks.
Exemplary of this process is the Court's
treatment of questions of national law involved in Article
177 referrals. As may be discerned from a simple reading
of Article 177, the Court is there given no competence to
interpret national law. Yet a recurrent problem in interpre¬
tive referrals has been the impact of Community norms on
national legal rules. This is certainly to be expected in a
general jurisdiction sharing system which relies in large
part on the replacement or reorientation of national by
Community norms as the technique for accomplishing common
policy goals. In attempting to cope with these problems
national courts need to know, not only whether Community law
has direct effect, but also whether apparently applicable or
conflicting national law is of the type affected by the Treaty
or other Community legal provision in question.
German finance courts, for example, have been
plagued by problems involving the distinction between "in¬
ternal taxes" covered by Article 95 of the Treaty and "taxes
having an effect equivalent to customs duties" which fall
under Treaty Articles 12-17. Thus in Waidemar Deutsohmann
v. Federal Republic of Germany^^ the national court asked,
132 Case No. 10/65, XI-8 Rec. 601, 8 July 1965.
Iks
Should .Article 95(1) of the Treaty be
interpreted in the sense that granting of import
licences for agricultural products originating
in other Member States cannot involve the collec¬
tion of a tax by virtue of the law of 1? December
1951 relative to the collection of taxes by the
Foreign Trade Agency of the Federal Ministry of
Food, Agriculture and Forestry (BGB1.I, 969)'?
To this question the Court replied, "A tax
required for the delivery of an import license and without
which importation is impossible does not fall within Article
95 of the SEC Treaty.""^3 obviously the Court wa.s in this
case willing to take the description of the operation of the
German tax law offered by the national court into account in
rendering its interpretation and, indeed, the Court ends its
motifs by saying simply that "the response to the question
posed by the Administrative Court of Francfort-sur-le-Main
should be negativeIn thus tying the interpretation of
Article 95 very closely to a particular national statute,
the Court saw no infringement upon the province of the
national judge.
1
Yet to read Costa v. ENEL"is to get an
entirely different impression. The national judge asked a
question similar to the one Involved in Deutsohmann, that iss
whether certain Italian legislation and executive decrees in¬
stituting a state electricity system violated various articles
133 Id. at 608 (dlspositlf)»
13k XI-8 Rec. at 608.
135 Case No. 6/6k, X Rec. 11^1, 15 July lS6k.
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of the EEC Treaty, notably Article 37 on state trading monop'
olies. Par from answering by a simple "yes" or "no" the
Court of Justice set forth the purpose of the self-executing
portion of Article 37, to prohibit the introduction of any
neiM discrimination among citizens of the Member States re¬
lating to the conditions of supply and marketing of goods,
and then noted that,
It falls to the judge on the merits to
determine whether this purpose has been effectively
hindered, that is, whether a new discrimination be¬
tween citizens of the Member States in conditions
of supply and marketing results from the measure
contested or will be a consequence of it.x-2°
The Court does not here explicitly deny its
competence to evaluate the national scheme, at least in so
far as it comprises an operative fact bearing on the con¬
text of the requested interpretation, but it does avoid all
discussion of the national law even as an hypothetical
"type."Moreover, the Court in Albatros v. SoPeCo1^
seems very close to disavowing the competence it clearly
exercised six months later in Deutschmann, when it says,
"The Court cannot...respond to the questions askeu in so far
as they presuppose an examination of the petroleum import
scheme established by the French law....""^9
13o Id. at 1165.
137 A procedure the Court has used frequently in dealing
with the "facts" in Article 177 referrals. See further dis¬
cussion in Chapter VI.
138 Case No. 20/6^, XI-3 Rec. 1, 4 February 19^5•
139 Id. at 9.
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Does the Deutschmann case then stand alone?
Par from It. In a number of the social security cases (with
which the Article 177 jurisprudence has been inundated), for
140
example the Dekker case, the Court of Justice has taken a
similar approach. On what ground then are Costa and A1batres
distinguishable from Deutschmann and Dekker? The answer in¬
evitably is on many grounds.
For one thing considerable political tensions
were present in Costa and Albatros. In the former the Italian
Government attacked the Court8s jurisdiction and, Indeed, the
legal underpinning of the Community, by its Insistence that
the ESC Treaty had become national law by incorporation and
that only questions of national law were involved before the
Milanese court. The Court of Justice rejected this argument
on the basis of the independence of the Community legal order
from national legal orders, a rationale which first appeared
14-1
in the Bosch ' case, the first case referred to the Court
under Article 177, and was carried forward in van Gend & Loos
142
v. Netherlands Fiscal Administration. ' While basically
protective of the Community Court8s jurisdiction, this
separate-legal-order rationale also carries with it a strong
impetus toward circumspection in confusing national and Com¬
munity law issues. The Court can thus be seen to be going
14-0 Case No. 33/65, XI-10 Hec. 1111, 1 December 1965.
141 Case No. 13/61, VIII Rec. 89, 6 April 1962.
142 Case No. 26/62, IX Rec. 1, 5 February 1963.
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in two directions at once; it strongly affirms its inter¬
pretive jurisdiction and the duty of national courts to make
referrals on questions of Community law, while avoiding any
implications of encroachment on the domain of the national
judge as interpreter of national law.
Again in Albatros v. SoPeCo political factors,
and perhaps the argument a. contrarlo from Articles 169 and
113
170, J seem to have resulted in a very cautious approach
toward dealing with questions of the legality of Member State
acts in the context of an Article 177 referral. The suit was
brought in Italy by an Italian firm against a French firm.
The complaint alleged a breach of the latter5s contractual
obligation to deliver a quantity of petroleum products. It
appears that the respondent's defense was based, inter alia,
upon force majeur, the denial to it of an import license by
the French authorities, and, alternatively, substantial
error of law, that is, SoPeCo claimed that this denial,
based on the French law and regulations governing the whole¬
sale importation of petroleum, violated certain articles of
the EEC Treaty and that it had presumed tha.t the French pro¬
visions would no longer have effect.
At the parties' request the Italian Court
referred four questions of interpretation to the Court of
Justice concerning the effect of Articles 3°~37 of the EEC
Treaty on the French import rules. The questions clearly
1^3 This argument was advanced both in Costa., X Rec. at
1152, 1157-58, and in SoPeCo, XI-3 Rec. at 5,' 8.
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raised issues of the validity of the French laws, and the
French government submitted comments questioning the Court9s
jurisdiction to deal with them under Article 177.
The questions were poorly drafted and, in any
event, had to be rephrased in order to bring them within the
Court8s jurisdiction to interpret the Treaty. However, the
Court went further than this process required. It combined
all four questions, excluded parts of them that were unnec¬
essary and interpreted the chapter of the Treaty as a whole,
although the articles had been mentioned in separate questions.
This approach is a considerable departure from previous
1 kii
practice and we may well wonder what impelled the Court to
take it.
The major reason that appears from the deci¬
sion is that, considering the situation confronting the
Italian Court, a simple ruling on the juridical effects of
the provisions in Chapter 2 of the Treaty would satisfy the
requirements of the national judge and apply equally to all
four of his questions. However, as the Advocate General
reminded the Court, the importance of its interpretation is
lW" Compare, for example, the Court8 s treatment of the re¬
ferred questions in Costa., X Rec. at 1161-1165. Admittedly,
the articles involved in the present case lend themselves
more to a. consolidated treatment than did those submitted in
Costa, but in that case the Court divided a unitary question,
which doubtless could have been given a single general an¬
swer, into separate issues of interpretation concerning each
Treaty article mentioned. One would expect a fortiori that
separate questions would invite separate interpretations and,
indeed, in no other referral have the questions been so
consolidated.
145 XI-3 Rec. at 10
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Li f)
expected to go beyond the principal case, 4,0 a.nd the comments
submitted by the Commission and three Member States raised a
number of issues tha.t were within the scope of an interprets.-
147
tion based on the referral questions.
Why then the limitation? Certain language in
the opinion suggests a second answer. Immediately after giv¬
ing its general ruling on the effects of Chapter 2, the Court
notes that it always remains open for a party aggrieved by
national practice to bring suit in its own national courts.
Moreover, that in a. proper case, submission to the Court of
Justice under Article 17? may be obtained in order to secure
interpretation of the complex provisions of Chapter 2 and
148
their interrelationships. Apparently, the Court does not
care to undertake a detailed examination of these provisions,
possibly bearing on the legality of one Member State's laws,
in the context of a renvoi by the courts of another state.
This conclusion is re-enforced by a reading
of M. Gand's submissions. If the Court had pursued its usual
procedure of detailed and distinct resolution of the ques¬
tions submitted, it could hardly have avoided, as the Advo¬
cate General could not, a, discussion of the place of the
French petroleum-import system, or systems like it, under
149
the Treaties. Moreover, there was again in Albatros a
T4S Id. at 12.
147 Id. at 407.
148 Id. at 10.
14-9 Id. at 19-20.
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direct attack on the Court®s jurisdiction, this time by the
French Government, and, as we shall see in Chapter V, the
case was connected with similar litigation in the French
courts which had not been referred for interpretation. The
relationship of the Court of Justice to French courts was
thus also at stake. No such specific political factors im¬
pinged upon the Court® s deliberations in cases such a.s
Deutschmann and Dekker.
There were additionally considerable differ¬
ences in the subject matter involved in the two sets of
cases from the standpoint of a recognizable political commit¬
ment to the application of common policy. The major decision
to facilitate free movement of workers by rationalizing the
application of national social security schemes antedates the
150
fifiC Treaty and a commitment to the elimination of dis¬
criminatory taxation must be presumed if even the skeleton of
a common market in goods is to be established. By way of
contrast, the studious obscurity of Article 37 on state trad¬
ing monopolies reflects a lack of agreement among the Member
States concerning the proper place of such organizations in
the Common Market.Indeed, no Community institution is
given more ths,n recommendatory power in this area,
150 See further discussion in Chapter VI at note 68
and accompanying text.
151 See generally, authorities cited infra, Chapter V at
note 85.
156
An Interesting parallel might here be drawn
between SoPeCo and the ECSG practice under Articles 35 and
88. There seems little doubt that in the context of the Coal
and Steel Community the party aggrieved by the French pe¬
troleum regulations would have had no difficulty in obtaining
a Community hearing on their legality by the simple expedient
of charging the executive with failure to put an end to a
treaty violation. In such a case the Court of Justice would
have little room for maneuver. Properly framed pleadings
would require that issues be faced squarely, no matter how
political.
From the standpoint of strict legality the ECSC
system is superior, but in the EEC context the jurisprudential
developments which have shifted individual complaints of
Member State Treaty violations to national courts in the
first instance and to the Community Court only by way of
Article 17? are probably more beneficial than harmful. More
direct procedures for individual redress would surely short-
circuit the processes of political accommodation which keep
the Community viable. Moreover, there is the basic danger
that instead of "legalizing" the political controversies,
such procedures would merely "politicize" the legal organ
and thereby undermine the whole basis of the developing re¬
spect for legality in the Community system. In this context
one hardly knows whether to chide the Court for inconsistency
in dealing with the Article 177 referrals or to applaud the
dexterity with which the potentialities of the shared
157
jurisdiction have been exploited to avoid irreconcilable
political conflicts. We shall have more to say about this
later, but it should be added that, while we have here em¬
phasized judicial restraint when dealing with questions
involving national law, the Costa, case is still the leading
1S2
case on the "supremacy" of Community law. ^
b. SCSC Treaty, Article 4-1
Article 4-1 provides only for a compulsory
referral by national courts of issues involving a question
of the validity of acts of the executive organs of the SCSC.
There is no provision for preliminary referral of the inter¬
pretation of these acts or of the Treaty. Thus, it is only
in the "Rotterdam"-type case, that is, where the legality of
state action can be made to depend upon the validity of
Community acts, that the SCSC referral jurisdiction provides
a. means for raising issues of the legality of state action
before the Community Court. In practical terms this probably
depends upon the resourcefulness of counsel in establishing
some concrete link between the legality of state a.ction and
the validity of Community action. If there is no such link,
either the national court will consider the validity ques¬
tion irrelevant or the Court of Justice when ruling on va¬
lidity will not be considering issues which bear on the
question of the legality of state action. But, of course, as
we have just noted there is much less need for referral as a
152 See discussion in Chapter V at notes 132-134- and
accompanying text.
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basis for obtaining a Community Court hearing on these issues
in the ECSC than in the EEC.
Issues Not Involving Legality of Public Acts
The Court of Justice, of course, has no "Community
question" jurisdiction on the American "federal question"
model. The tortuous, indirect methods described above of
litigating grievances involving the validity of Community or
Member State acts attest to the difficulties this presents.
A table of the real interests involved in ten years of liti¬
gation under the Coal and Steel Treaty reveals five cate¬
gories of cases: (1.) Enterprises v. High Authority, (2)
Member State v. High Authority, (3) Enterprise v. Enterprise,
(^) Enterprise v. Member State and (5) Member State v. Member
State.^53 jn terms of formal parties all of these suits
have come within categories one and two, for categories three
and four are not within the Court's formal grants of juris¬
diction and there have been no intergovernmental cases.
Outside the realm of validity cases, the lack of a.
general competence to decide ca.ses involving a claim based
on Community law means that the Court has very little juris¬
diction to decide substantive controversies. With the excep¬
tion of inter-state suits, suits contesting the imposition
of penalities, Community staff disputes and suits for damages
resulting from Community activities, the Court's jurisdiction
153 Scheingold, The Rule of Law in European Integration
2?0-71 (1965). '
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to decide issues of Community law is based almost wholly on
shared jurisdiction - the referral to it of such issues by
national courts in the form of request for interpretation of
the treaties or of administrative acts.
Admittedly, a general jurisdiction to hear suits in¬
volving rights based on Community law, even where there is
1 ^>4
no specific jurisdictional grant, is suggested ^ by the
Court's statement in Humblet v. Belgian State that
"[IJ1 est normal de supposer qu9un droit
materiel a comme corollaire 1a. faculte du bene-
ficiare de s'en prevaloir lui-meme par "one action
en justice, plutot que par le truchement d°un
tiers, c9est-^-dire de l'un des fitats membres."
However, it is, to say the least, extremely doubtful that
this language properly reflects the Court's overall attitude
to its own jurisdiction. The only question in Humblet, a
case involving infringement of rights granted by the Protocol
on Privileges and Immunities of the ECSC, was whether the
Community employee could sue in his own name, for the Pro¬
tocol gave the Court exclusive jurisdiction over any dispute
involving its interpretation or application.
The lack of a general jurisdiction to hear all suits
based on a claim of right based on Community law makes the
omission of provision for an Interpretive referral in Article
4-1 of the iSCSC Treaty especially significant. With the ex¬
ception of questions concerning the conformity of agreements
- - -•v-....
T35 Migliazza, Per Gerichtshof und naulonales Hecht:
Hauptreferat in Zehn Jahre Rechtsprechung des Gerichtshofs
der Suropaischen Gemeinschaften 145 (19&5)*
155 Case No. 6/60, VI Rec. 1125, 1149-50, 16 December i960.
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and concentrations with Article 65, it leaves in the hands
of national authorities the interpretation of all ECSC pro¬
visions relevant to suits between private parties.
Several methods for remedying this defect, without
attempting a treaty revision, have been proposed. It has
been suggested, for example, that any interpretation of an
executive act by a national court which concerns the extent
of that act5 s application raises a potential question of its
validity. Thus, a compulsory referral on the question of
"validity" would be required whenever there was a, question
of "interpretation."^'0 Apart from other weaknesses this
solves only half the problem. Jurisdiction to interpret the
ECSC Treaty is yet lacking. This difficulty is overcome by
a second solution,which would imply from the statement
in Article Jl of the Court's general function "to ensure the
rule of law in the interpretation and application of the
present Treaty and of the regulations for its execution" a
preliminary jurisdiction to interpret the ECSC Treaty. How¬
ever, this suggestion is made suspect by the inclusion of
1 AQ
almost identical language in the Home Treaties, along with
the specific grants of jurisdiction to make preliminary rul¬
ings. If these general statements of function are additional
156" Be'br, op. oit. supra, note 11, at 182.
157 Valentine, o£. cit. supra, note 23, at 15, n. 8. Dr.
Valentine suggests the solution, but he apparently does not
support it. Id. at 112.
158 EEC Treaty, Art. 164; EUHATOM Treaty, Art. 136,
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grants of jurisdiction, the purpose of the carefully defined
specific grants of jurisdiction becomes obscure.
The Member States could, of course, confer a, referral
jurisdiction on the Court by passing appropriate laws at
1
the national level., J' but the question, given the present
T
status of the law, is what the Court should do if asked by
a national tribunal to interpret the ECSC Treaty. In one
set of circumstances the Court has decided that It may do
160
so.
The facts of the case are of some comic interest. The
plaintiffs brought suit in a district court of Luxembourg
during the few hours of one day of the year in which the
defendants were not covered by the immunity from suit accorded
Luxemburgeois parliamentarians while Parliament is in session.
However, the defendants were also members of the European
Parliament and claimed that the gap in their national par¬
liamentary Immunity was filled by the immunity guaranteed
them tinder Article 9 of the Protocols on Privileges and Im¬
munities of the respective communities. This claim required
a determination of whether the European Parliament was in
session on the particular date involved and resulted in a
referral to the Court of Justice under Article 177 of the EEC
Treaty and Article 150 of the EURATOM Treaty for an
139 ECSC Treaty, Art. 4-3.
160 Wagner v. Fohrmann, Case No. 101/63, X Rec, 38.1, 12
May 196^.
xUt-
interpretation of the concept of "in session" in the
161
treaties. Because the Parliament is an institution common
to the three communities, this question involved an inter¬
pretation of the SCSC Treaty and the Protocol on Privileges
and Immunities of the Coal and Steel Community.
In his submissions Advocate General Lagrange openly
favored reading Article J1 of the EC3C Treaty as containing
a general competence to interpret the Treaty, but concluded
that a decision on that "delicate" question was not required
because the ECSC provision was perfectly clear and aid not
i / p
require interpretation.~ ~ From the reasons given by the
Court for its judgment, it would appear that neither of
these opinions was accepted. The Court seemed to solve the
jurisdictional problem on the eminently practical basis that,
because the sections of the protocols to be interpreted were
identical under all three treaties and because they and the
Treaty provisions in question applied to a common institu¬
tion, the treaties and protocols should all be interpreted
together.-L°3 This result was reached even though it was
necessary to give separate treatment to Article 22 of the
A S i.
ECSC Treaty.'10 However, among the considerations listed in
161 J3CSC Treaty, Art. 22; EEC Treaty, Art. 139; EURATOM
Treaty, Art. 109.
162 X Rec. at 404.
163 Id. at 394-95.
164 Id. at 396, 398.
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the formal judgment (atsposttif) is Article 31 of the ECSG
Treaty.
Did th© Court accept M. Lagrange°s argument? It is
difficult to say, but even if no theoretical ground was
broken, the merger of the executives of the three communi¬
ties might allow some development of the restricted sort of
ancillary jurisdiction here employed. 60 On the other hand
it is clear that the "common-institution, identical-provi¬
sion" rationale will be of limited utility in putting ECSC
interpretive questions before the Court of Justice.
Conclusions
The above analysis reveals that the competence of the
Court of Justice to decide issues of Community law is based
on exclusive jurisdiction over certain classes of litigation
and, outside the limits of that; exclusive territory, it
rests on procedures for sharing jurisdiction with national
courts. Moreover, it has become Increasingly clear that the
latter procedures are extremely important from the stand¬
point of providing a Community forum for questions of Com¬
munity law. In relation to the validity of Community acts
the provisions for shared jurisdiction fill lacunae result¬
ing primarily from restrictive Interest requirements. Where
T<oJ~"X'"lee. at 397.
166 Development of this type would still be necessary be¬
cause Article 30 of the Treaty Instituting a Single Council
and a Single Commission for the European Communities con¬
tinues the division of the Court0s competence under the
three treaties and specifically makes it competent in ac¬
cordance with ECSC rules over provisions of the Treaty
relating only to the ECSC.
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the legality of Member-State acts is in question, Article
1?7 may provide the only means under the EEC Treaty whereby
issues of the non-fulfillment of Treaty obligations raised
in suits by private parties may come before the Community
Court. Finally, outside these two areas, shared jurisdic¬
tion becomes the almost exclusive means through which Com¬
munity judicial jurisdiction can be exercised over the multi¬
farious and increasing instances of litigation involving the
interpretation of Community law.
The general reason why the shared jurisdiction becomes
so important in the Community context may be explained by
what the Community jurisdictional system lacks - concurrent
jurisdiction. If we look again at the situation of the
United States" judicial system, we find that perhaps its
principal characteristic is a. presupposition of concurrent
jurisdiction in state and federal courts over suits involving
federal questions. This has allowed the development of a
system whereby a federal court determination of federal law
may be obtained through an original action in federal court,
removal of an action begun in state court or by review of a.
X o 7
state court determination, ' notwithstanding the preponderance
I67 The appelate jurisdiction of the federal Supreme Court
over cases coming from state supreme courts rests on no
firmer constitutional foundation than this presumption of
reciprocal concurrence, and it was for some years challenged
by the state courts. See discussion in Wagner, The Federal
States and Their Judiciary J10-15 (1959)•
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of state law issues in the litigation."®® As we noted
earlier, the completion of this system allowing a unified
development of federal law took some time and was not accom¬
plished without difficulty. It is a system that suits a
nation unified politically. The European Communities are
patently not so unified, but at the same time the logical
necessity of a unified development of Community law cannot be
denied. Unless Community law has the same effect throughout
the Community, the economies of the Member States will not
be integrated. These competing considerations have resulted
in a delicate, if sometimes inexplicable, balance between
the jurisdictions of the Community Court and national courts
over questions of Community law - a balance which M. G&udet,
Director General of the Community Legal Services, has said
quite plainly is difficult to justify logically.1^
The limitations on the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Court of Justice make it plain that that jurisdiction cannot
be the unifying factor. The effects of Community law on
The U.S. system is here, of course, described in very
general terms. There are exceptions to the concurrent state
court jurisdiction over federal questions and many problems
concerning the extent of original federal question juris¬
diction, the retention of non-federal grounds in suits in¬
stituted under it, the scope of review in appeals from state
courts, the alternative review procedures of certiorari and
certificate, etc. See generally, Hart and Wechsler, Fed-
eral Courts and the Federal System 400-576, 709-890 (1953)•
169 It is, of course, not the only system which would do
so. See generally, Wagner, 0£. clt. supra,, note 167.
170 Gaudet, Communita ficonomica Europa 293 (I960).
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private parties reach far beyond, the Community Court's
original jurisdiction to hear suits at their request, and,
having no concurrent jurisdiction to determine state-law
issues, it has no jurisdiction to hear appeals from Member-
State courts. If the unifying qualities of a system based
1 71
on concurrence""' are to be supplied, they must be developed
through the shared jurisdiction. Whether this will occur
depends in large part on the answers to the questions that
we shall investigate in the next two chapters% (1) What are
the basic jurisdictional limitations on the Court's oppor¬
tunity to interpret "Community law" under Article 177? and
(2) What effect do the techniques that are being developed
in the exercise of the shared judicial jurisdiction have on
the efficacy of the Community Court's interpretations in
shaping a uniform law for the Community system?
171 Lenhoff, Jurisdictional Relationships Between the
Court of the European Communities and the Courts of the
Member States, 12 Buff. L. Rev. 296. 300-01 (I963)s sug-
gests that there is concurrence under ECSC Treaty, Art. 42,
and EEC Treaty, Art. 181, as well as, under EEC Treaty,
Art. 85. This can hardly be admitted. In the case of the
former articles, there is no choice of forums at the incep¬
tion of litigation. If the contract stipulates Community
Court competence, national jurisdiction is excluded; if it
does not, only national courts have jurisdiction. Under
EEC Treaty, Art. 85 any concurrence is between the Commis¬
sion and national courts.
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CHAPTER V: The Qpportunity to Interpret Community Law
There are two fundamental limitations on the opportunity
of the Community Court to deal in any way under the Article
177 jurisdiction with questions of the interpretation of
Community law: (1) Not all "Community law" is within the
scope of the shared jurisdiction. (2) The Court's jurisdic¬
tion is derivative; it can exercise no power until called
upon by a national court.
I• The Documentary Criterion
Up to this point we have been discussing the Court's
interpretive jurisdiction as a jurisdiction to interpret
"Community law." This is not precisely correct. Article
177 includes within the interpretive jurisdiction only ques¬
tions concerning the "Treaty," the "acts of the institutions
of the Community," and the "statutes of any bodies set up by
an act of the Council." The jurisdiction is a. jurisdiction
to interpret particular documents. This limitation does not
mean that the Court of Justice cannot deal with such sources
of Community law as the "customary law" of the Community or
"general principles of Community law." These sources are
aspects of the interpretation of the Treaty or of institu¬
tional acts. Nevertheless, the documentary limitation is
significant.
A. The Possibility of Gaps in a Formal Sense
By defining the province of interpretation in
terms of specific types of documents, the Treaty runs some
168
risk of excluding from the purview of the Court of Justice
certain texts which are formally sources of Community law.
By texts which are "formally" sources of Community law is
meant (1) any Binding text established jointly by the Member
States for purposes of completing or filling out the agree¬
ments made in the principal Community Treaty or (2) any such
texts brought into force on the authority, at least in part,
of a Community organ.
1» Texts Established Jointly by the Member States
The Final Act of the Intergovernmental Confer¬
ence on the Common Market and EURATOM established a number
of texts besides the EEC (and EURATOM) Treaty, which were
designed to complete and make more specific arrangements
included within the scope of the principal Treaty. Whether
these documents fall within the scope of "Treaty" under Arti¬
cle 177 seems to be governed by Article 239 of the EEC Treaty
which provides that all Protocols annexed to or to be annexed
to the Treaty form an integral part thereof. Thus, in Wagner
v. Fohrman^ the Court of Justice quite properly interpreted
the Protocols on Privileges and Immunities of the EEC and
EURATOM Treaties because the Final Act specifies that these
documents are to be annexes to the Treaty. Moreover, since
the other Protocols and Conventions adopted by the Conference
are by their own terms "annexed" to the Treaty, they are, and
1 X Rec. 381 (see Chapter IV, notes 160-65 and accompanying
text).
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presumably any additional Protocols and Conventions could be
made, integral parts of the Treaty under Article 239.
However, certain additional conventions among
the Member States are contemplated by Article 220 of the EEC
Treaty and others may be found necessary. On the basis of
draft conventions thus far prepared, it is impossible to say
what jurisdiction the Court of Justice might have in relation
to such additional texts. The Draft Convention on Recogni-
p
tion and Enforcement of Judgments and the Convention Relat-
3
ing to Mutual Recognition of Companies^ are not, in their
present forms, made annexes to the EEC Treaty. The Member
States have by "Common Declaration" indicated that they recog¬
nize the need for some unifying control over the interpre¬
tation of these documents by the Community Court, but have
postponed consideration of exactly what powers should be
conferred upon it. Thus, the parties* understanding of the
status of these Conventions seems to be that they are not
within the Court's jurisdiction without some special provi¬
sion to that effect. The Draft European Patent Convention,^
which involves accession of non-EEC members and its own
European Patent Court, cannot be expected to confer juris¬
diction on the Community Court.
2 CCH Com. Mkt. Rptr. § 6003.
3 CCH Com. Mkt. Rptr. § 6081.
4 CCH Com. Mkt. Rptr. § 5503.
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2. Institutional Norm Creation
There are also to be treaties between the
Community and third-party states,^ which are sources of Com¬
munity law,^ These treaties are of basically two types;
(1) Commercial agreements such as the ones that have been
7 o
concluded with Israel' and Iran or (2) Treaties of Associa¬
tion, as for example, with Greece^ and Turkey.May the
Court of Justice interpret these documents on referral of a
question from a national court on the basis that they con¬
stitute "acts" of a Community institution?
The Council formally "concludes" such a treaty
by a "decision" which is clearly an official act having
11
legal consequences for the Member States of the Community. -
Although it does not conform to any of the specific types of
12
acts enumerated in the EEC Treaty, that act might be
thought to incorporate the text of the treaty thus concluded.
However this rationale may never be invoked to secure an
interpretation of commercial agreements because the Council
5 See EEC Treaty, Arts. Ill, 114, 228 & 238.
6 Cf., Mathijsen, Le Droit ^e la. Communautd Europeenne du
Charbon et de I'Acier; une Etude des Sources. 157-58 (1958).
7 7/95 J.O. 1518/64, 13 June 1964.
8 6/152 J.O. 2554/63, 23 October 1963.
9 6/26 J.O. 294/63, 18 February 1963.
10 7/217 J.O. 3687/64, 29 December 1964.
11 EEC Treaty, Art. 228.
12 See EEC Treaty, Art. I89.
1?1
practice seems to be to implement the tariff and quota
liberalization specified therein by decisions to the Member
States.^ Thus any litigation in national courts would
probably concern an interpretation of those decisions rather
than the commercial agreements, although the incidental in¬
volvement of the latter, particularly were there a question
of the validity of the implementing decisions, cannot be
ruled out.
Association agreements may pose different
problems. The EEC Treaty does not require association of any
1 ^4-
specific type. However, in relation to associated Euro¬
pean states, such agreements may be expected to contemplate
partial and progressive application of the Community system
looking toward full membership in the Community. Thus the
Convention of Association with Greece copies, paraphrases or
incorporates by reference articles of the EEC Treaty in sit¬
uations where no further Community acts seem to be content-
16
plated to implement the agreement. ^ A good example of the
problems which might be raised with respect to "copied" pro¬
visions concerns Article 12 of the EEC Treaty, which the
13 See Council Decision No. 64/360/CEE, 7/95 J.O. 1524/64-,
13 June 1964, and Council Decision No. 63/573/CEE, 6/152 J.O.
2553/63, 23 October 1963.
14 See generally, Sacle, L'Association dans le Traite de
Rome, 4 Rev. Trim, de Dr. Eur. 1 (1968).
15 Action by the Consell d9association may, however, be
required. See, e.g7^ Arts. 51/52 of the Greek Association
Treaty, 6/26 J.O. 308/63, 18 February 1963-
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Court of Justice has interpreted, to be directly effective
in all the Member States in the sense that it creates sub-
1 6
jective rights which may be enforced in national courts,,
Should the same interpretation be applied to the identical
provision in the Association Convention? Does the "asso¬
ciation" parta,ke of the "independent legal order" of the
Community? A Member State customs court called upon to
determine the legality of the application of customs duties
to Greek goods may well want an asnwer to these questions„
The terms of the Greek Association Treaty cast
some doubt upon the possibility of considering it, or other
treaties concluded by the Council on behalf of the Community,
as Community acts subject to interpretive referral. Mention
is made of a jurisdiction in the Court of Justice to decide
questions of the interpretation and application of the Greek
Convention, but only on a referral to it by the Council of
Association set up under the Treaty, which can in turn be
seized of such questions only by Member States of the EEC,
the Council or Commission of the EEC, or the Greek Govern-
17
ment. ' Moreover, one might say that in general the nature
of a negotiated international agreement militates against
its being considered as equivalent to an "act" of a Community
institution, although powerful arguments have also been
TE N.V. Algemene Transport-en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend
& Loos v. Netherlands Fiscal Administration, Case No. 26/62,
IX Rec. 1, February 5j 1963•
17 Greek Association Treaty, Art, 67, 6/26 J„0, at 312/63.
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18
marshalled, the other way. The issue is very much in
doubt.
Nor are treaties between the Community and
third states the only binding norms emanating from Community
organs which might fall outside the Court®s jurisdiction
under 177. The European Investment Bank, for example, may
19
make certain binding determinations, but strictly con¬
strued it is not an "institution" of the Community. Simi¬
larly questions concerning the acts of special organs es¬
tablished by the Council might not be cognizable under the
interpretive jurisdiction, -unless they were considered as an
20
aspect of the interpretation of the organ's statute or as
21
imputable to the Council.
B. The Substantive Problem
1• Law National in Form
The definition of the legitimate objects of
TH" See, e. Bebr, Judicial Control of the European Com¬
munities 54/55 s 187 (1982).
19 See SEC Treaty, Arts. 129-130, 180; Protocol on the
Statute of the European Investment Bank.
20 The Court of Justice has, for example, been given juris¬
diction under 177(3) to interpret the Statutes of the Ad¬
ministrative Commission created by Regulation 3, Arts. 43-44.
The Regulation does not specify this jurisdiction. It
is in Article 15 of the Commission's statutes which apparently
are drawn up by the Commission itself under Regulation 3,
Art. 44 para. 2. Maas, The Administrative Commission for
the Social Security of Migrant Workers. 4 C. M. L. Rev. 51,
ZTJWSZV.
21 See Societe Nouvelle des Usines de Pontlieue-Aciers du
Temple (S.N.U.P.A.T.) v. High Authority, Cases Nos. 32-33/58,
V Rec. 275, 17 July 1959-
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the Court's interpretive interest in terms of specific
texts also curbs its power to influence the development of
law which is formally not of Community origin but which has
been promulgated in pursuance of a binding Community policy
decision - a policy decision which may be thwarted by the
lack of a coherent interpretation of the measures taken in
execution of it and which gives to those measures a "sub¬
stantive" Community character. This situation may arise
wherever Member State laws, of administrative or legislative
origin, are enacted in fulfillment of obligations created
for the Member States by a Community decision or directive.
Considering what was said earlier about the general "juris¬
diction sharing" structure of the SEC and the importance of
the use of directives and decisions directed to Member States
in that scheme, the inability of the Court of Justice to
interpret national law could place a substantial limitation
on the ability of the Court to exercise an effective influence
over the development of what is in substance "Community law."
The problem is particularly striking in the
area of the harmonization of Member State legislative and
administrative provisions which have a direct incidence on
2 2
the establishment or functioning of the Common Market.
Harmonization is accomplished by directives, and, thus, the
22 See, generally, SEC Treaty, Arts. 100-102. Under other
provisions "direct incidence" is presumed and a. power to
issue harmonizing directives is conferred in respect of
particular subject matter. E.g., Arts. 52-56, 99«
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"harmonized" Member State norms alone are binding on indi¬
viduals. It is these provisions which will fall to be inter¬
preted by national tribunals, and presumably only those tri¬
bunals will be competent to interpret this national law with
a. Community content. On referral of a question of interpre¬
tation concerning such provisions, the Court of Justice would
be forced to say that it had no jurisdiction to interpret
the acts of institutions other than those at the Community
level. Query how long substantive harmonization can be ex¬
pected to last without some overriding Community control of
national court interpretations?
This is not to say that the Court of Justice
may have no influence on the development of harmonized na¬
tional norms. A national court dealing with such national
rules may consider that its understanding of them requires
an Interpretation of the Community directive pursuant to
which they were enacted and may ask the Court of Justice for
an interpretation of that directive. However, national
courts, even at the highest level, need not refer Community
directives for interpretation as an aid in interpreting
national law. Strictly spea.king, the interpretation of the
directive is not relevant. By definition the directive ap¬
parently cannot form the applicable "rule of the case," and,
since the national law may envisage national purposes in
addition to the carrying out of the Community directive, the
interpretation of the directive need not be the same as the
national law or vice versa. The national court may interpret
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the national rule without "raising" a question of the inter¬
pretation of the Community a.ct„
The situation may be somewhat different where
a question of the validity of the national norm is involved,,
If it is alleged that the national act is invalid because it
does not conform to the directive (or because the directive
itself is invalid), the national court may be faced with a
question of the interpretation (or validity) of Community
law which at an appropriate level would have to be referred
to the Court of Justice. The determining factor in each
case is whether the ruling on interpretation (or validity)
would be relevant to the national issue.
Thus, where the allegation is that the national
rule is invalid because it fails to follow the Community
directive, it must appear that failure to do so affects
validity. If, for example, the national act has as its sole
legal basis the implementation of the directive, it may be-
2 q
come invalid under national rules where it fails to do so,
In other situations the directive may be, because of the gen¬
eral impact of Community law on the national legal order,
the only possible legitimate basis for the national act con¬
cerned. This would be true where a directly effective
2*3 jpT"Tudgment of 3 September 19&3* Finanzgericht Bremen,
12 fi.F.G. 102 (1964), 3 C.M.L. Rev. 94 (1965). The Court in
this instance failed to ask for an interpretation of the
Council decision involved, but had it done so it would almost
certainly have discovered that the effect of the decision did
not fulfill the criteria upon which the delegation of author¬
ity to the German executive had been based.
17?
provision of ths Treaty prohibits action by Member States
?2i
except when taken in accordance with Community directives„
The problem may be further complicated for certain national
jurisdictions where the national measure of implementation
is a legislative act not subject to judicial review. The
temptation then is to avoid conflict by a restrictive inter¬
pretation of the national act or the Community norms involved
or both.'"-'
In general, then, the influence of the Court
of Justice on the interpretation of harmonized national laws
cannot be expected to be significant. The question is how
important the lack cf unifying control in this area might be
in the overall functioning of the Community, and, if it Is
particularly detrimental to the effectuation of Community
policy, what might be done about it?
On the basis of the definition of directives
26
in the Treaty, one might easily come to the conclusion that
uniform interpretation of the national rules created in
2k This was essentially the situation in the "Rotterdam"
case discussed in Chapter IV supra, although a. decision was
there In question. The same problem might occur, e.g., in
relation to Articles 95-9? of the Treaty, or under other pro¬
visions which do not specify the use of directives but in
relation to which their use is optional.
25 See discussion of the French position in Prats, Inci¬
dences des dispositions du traltd instltuant la Communaute
Rconomlque guropdenne sur le droit adminlstratif franpais,
4 Rev. Trim, de Dr. Rur. I9» 39 (1968J.
26 Article 189 reads in part; "Directives shall bind any
Member State to which they are addressed, as to the result
to be achieved, while leaving to domestic agencies a. compe¬
tence as to form and means."
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Implementation of them is not a significant concern. The
definition seems to presume that the policy behind a partic¬
ular directive may be effectuated in several ways and that
the means employed only incidentally affect the ultimate
realization of the policy. Since national implementation
may take a variety of forms, interpretation by the Court of
Justice could in any event be directed only at maintenance
of the common policy, not at ensuring that national norms
were given a unified meaning. Moreover, since the choice of
form and means at the national level might allow the concur¬
rent effectuation of national and Community policies in a
single normative act, interpretation of that act by the Court
of Justice would be inappropriate.
However, as was noted in Chapter II, the use
of the Treaty forms of executive action can be so flexible
as to cause the different types of acts to become substan¬
tively almost indistinguishable. Directives may set down
ends to be achieved with varying degrees of specificity and
27
with the use of different types of legal language. ' In
some cases the discretion left the Member States as to form
and means appears to be limited to the determination of the
agency which will copy the Community provision into the
27 Compare, e.g., Articles 1-3 of the First Directive for
the Implementation of Treaty Articles 67, 43, J.O. 921,
July 12, i960, with, e.g., Articles 4, 5» 9» 10 & 22 of the
Council Directive on the Approximation of Legislative, Regu¬
latory and Administrative Provisions Governing Branded
Pharmaceuticals, 22 J.O. 369, February 9S 1965=
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national rule book and on what size paper^® or to the deter¬
mination of the "form and means" of refraining from doing
29
anything. So little doubt is left in some cases concerning
exactly how national law must be affected by the directives
and the directives are so complete and specific that it has
been suggested that they might in certain circumstances be
considered self-executing.3°
Questions may, of course, be raised concerning
the legitimacy of some of the uses to which the directive
form has been put.31 The tendency of directives not to leave
any significant discretion to national authorities was one
of the practices challenged by the French Government in its
January I966 attack, in the Council of Ministers, on the
functioning of the Commission. Perhaps significantly, of the
ten points raised by the French, the attack on the use of
directives was one of the three items dropped in the final,
2E E.g., Council Directive of 25 February 1964- (64/224/EEC),
56 J.O. 869, 4 April 1964.
29 E.g., Council Directive of 25 February 1964 (64/221/ESC),
Art. 4(3), 56 J.Oo 850, 852, 4 April 1964.
30 Desmedt, Les Deux Directives du Consell de la CcEcE.
Concernant la police des Strangers, 1965 Cahlers de droit
europden 194, 211; Pepy, Les Questiones pre.judiclelles dans
le traltds de Paris et de Rome et la .jurisprudence de la Cour
de Justice de la Communautds Europdennes, 1966 Cahlers de
droit europden 55> 69-71» See, e.gl~j Council Directive of
25 March 1964, 62 J.O. 981, April 17, 1964, concerning the
abolition of travel and residence restrictions.
31 See, e.g., the scathing attack by Rodiere, L'harmonlsa-
tion des legislations europeennes dans le cadre de la C.E.E.,
1 Rev. Trim. de" dr. europ. 336 (1965) «
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seven-point Council communique. But, if directives are to
continue to be used in a manner which gives a very restrict¬
ive interpretation to "discretion as to form and means,"
this raises problems from the point of view of the Court.
It means that there may be an effective shift in the juris¬
diction-sharing relationships between Community a.nd national
norm-creating organs without a corresponding shift in the
relationship between judicial organs at the Community and
national levels.
(We should perhaps mention at this point that
some non-judicial procedures for the assurance of national
implementation of Community directives are being developed.
Many directives require that the Commission be kept informed
of the implementing action taken by the Member States, and
certain members of the Parliament have taken it upon them¬
selves to question the Commission pointedly a.nd often con¬
cerning progress in this area.)
To return to the particular case of directives
aimed at "harmonizing" national legislative and administra¬
tive provisions, the arguments are becoming very strong for
the recognition of a. role for the Court in the interpreta¬
tion of the harmonized provisions. This results not only
from the existence of directives, or proposed directives,
32 See the report of the various confrontations and nego¬
tiations in Bulletin CEE, March 1966, pp. 5-19.
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which read, like uniform laws,^ but also from what might be
called the "dual-policy" aspect of these directives. They
seem to be based both on the creation of a particular, sub¬
stantive Community policy in the area concerned and on the
general need to eliminate "conflicts of laws" as a separate
element in the creation of a truly "common" market.^ The
latter ground is based in part on the argument that the mere
existence of non-uniform provisions and practices may retard
commerce across state boundaries by small a.nd medium-si zed
concerns which cannot afford the expensive legal complica¬
tions that might ensue from unwelcome "surprises" in the law
of a neighboring state.J
It begins to appear that an assertion by the
Community Court of a jurisdiction to interpret national law
under Article 177 through a substantive approach to the defi¬
nition of "acts of the institutions of the Community" would
not be "politically inappropriate" in certain situations.
33 See, e.g., Proposed Directive on the Coordination of the
Protective Provisions of the Member States Concerning Com¬
panies, in the Interest of Shareholders and Third Parties
(particularly, Arts. 3(5) & (7), 7, 8, 9(2), 12(2), (3) &
(5)), 68/265 J.O. 8, CCH Com. Mkt. Reps. § 1355; Council
Directive Establishing Specific Criteria of Purity for Pre¬
servatives That May be Used in Foodstuffs for Human Con¬
sumption, 22 J.O. 369» February 9, 1965*
34 See Hallstein, Angleichung des Prlvat-und Prozessrechts
in der Europaischen Wirtschafts Gemeinschaft, 1964- Rabels
Zeitschrift fur Auslandisches und Internationales Privat-
recht 211, 212-15, cited and criticized in Rodidre, supra,
note 31 at 349-50.
35 See speech by M. Weinkamm, 79 Debats IX/65, Session of
June 17, 1965, p. 208.
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Moreover, a fairly respectable argument can be made for the
juridical feasibility of such an approach.
For one thing it must be recognized that in
general there is a rather thoroughgoing form/substance con¬
fusion between Community and national juridical orders. The
Community Treaty and institutional determinations are at the
same time a directly effective and autonomous legal system
and a. legal system made effective through incorporation into
na.tional law. We shall return to this problem in more detail
later. For present purposes we need only note that the prin¬
cipal import of the leading case on the subject of the rela¬
tionship of Community and national law, Costa, v. fi.N.E.L..^
is that Community law remains distinct from national law,
and in its own sphere autonomous, although it has formally
become a part of the latter through statutory ratification.
Secondly, two situations may be mentioned
where the Court seems to have done something very like ad¬
mitting that national action can constitute interpretable
Community law. In Dlngema.nnl)s v. Sociale Verzekerlngsbank,3^
the Court gave the national court an answer, in an Article
177 proceeding, which was based on the amended classifica.-
tion of national legislation stated in Annex F to Article 24
of Regulation 3. However, as Advocate General Lagrange
35 Case No. 6/64, X Rec. 1141, July 15, 1964.
37 Case No. 24/64, X Rec. 1259, December 2, 1964.
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mentions in his Conclusions, the Community institutions
have nothing to do with the amendment of Annex F beyond
listing in the Annex the classifications submitted to them
by member governments. The Advocate General never reveals
why he brings up this peculiarity in the procedure for the
adoption of the text upon which the whole case turns, but it
is suspected that he ma,y have had our present jurisdictional
problem in mind. Unless one adopts a rationale whereby the
Council is said continuously to adopt or re-enact national
classification determinations through the notification pro¬
cedure, it must be admitted that in this situation a national
act, in furtherance of the Community classification system
set out in the Regulation, has become a. Community act for
purposes of an interpretive referral. The Court can hardly
be fs/ulted for failure to deal with this obscure jurisdic¬
tional difficulty in a case where all it had to do was read
the language of the Annex to solve the interpretive problem.
The second and possibly more relevant in¬
stance of what in the language of the international lawyer
might be called the "reverse transformation" of national into
Community acts occurred in the Toepfer case discussed in
39
Chapter IV. There, it will be remembered, measures of
safeguard originally taken by the German Government were
allowed to be contested in a proceeding for annulment
3B X Rec. at 1287-88.
39 Notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
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against the EEC Commission, because the Commission approval
"validated" them and thereby made the Community decision the
act which directly affected the plaintiff. As was noted in
the previous discussion, Toepfer does not enunciate princi¬
ples of general application because the Court avoids all
discussion of the positions of the Advocate General and of
the Commission on the issue of the use of "discretion left
to the Member State" as a criterion for the determination of
the substantive nature of a particular act.
However, if the particularistic approach of
the Court can be combined with the suggested criterion of
the Advocate General, the case might be thought to point the
way toward an increasing role for the Community Court in the
interpretation of national provisions with a Community con¬
tent. A substantive appreciation in pa.rticular instances of
whether the degree of discretion left to Member State organs
implementing Community policy is so small that the national
acts should be interpreted as Community acts seems more in
keeping with the realities of jurisdiction-sharing between
Community and national organs than determinations based on
the formal nature of the Community Act taken.
Yet it is extremely doubtful that any such
development could take place. The approach that we have been
taking to this question is one that is grounded in the "pro¬
gressive logic" of the functioning of the Community. To
fulfill basic alms a practice develops of reaching beyond
"harmonization" to "uniformity" of law. This entails a
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stretching of the function of "harmonizing" directives, and
from this development the logic of extending judicial con¬
trol becomes obvious. But the logic does not have to be
accepted, and in this case there is an aspect which would
almost certainly result in its rejection. To admit a capac¬
ity in the Court of Justice to interpret under Article 177
what is in form national law is necessarily to admit a ca¬
pacity to determine the validity of that law. Juridically
the step from Toepfer and Dingeman's to the sort of substan¬
tive approach we have been suggesting is not great. Politi¬
cally it is enormous. It is to take a giant step toward the
sort of Court of which Justice Holmes of the United States
Supreme Court spoke when he said,
"I do not think the United States would come
to an end if we lost our power to declare an act
of Congress void. I do think the Union would be
imperiled if we could not make that declaration as
to the laws of the several States."40
The converse of that statement more nearly applies to the
jurisdiction of the Court of Justice.
Nor should the technical difficulties of a
substantive approach be overlooked. As we shall see, the
problems of adjusting the jurisdictional relationships be¬
tween the Community and national courts are difficult enough
when the determination of the existence of preliminary ques¬
tions of interpretation is related to a formal listing of
documents. The introduction of an additional variable in
4-6 Holmes, Law and the Court in Collected Legal Papers
295-96 (19201:
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this process, particularly one involving in each instance
an evaluation of overall Community policy and jurisdictional
relationships, can hardly he viewed as conducive to promot¬
ing an efficient collaboration between Community and national
courts under Article 17?.
If any major breakthrough in this area is to
be achieved, it will have to originate in the political in¬
stitutions, and here the proposed Treaty Instituting a Bene-
41
lux Court of Justice offers a constructive model. A large
part of the norm-creating activity in the Benelux Union
takes place through the enactment of harmonized or unified
national laws. Hence, the main role of the proposed Benelux
Court will be to ensure the maintenance of uniformity through
the exercises of a preliminary jurisdiction very similar to
the Article 177 procedure. However, the scope of this juris¬
diction remains under the control of the Council of Minis¬
ters, which decides which provisions are to be considered
"Benelux law" for purposes of the interpretive jurisdiction,^'2
If agreement could be reached in discrete
instances concerning the importance and desirability of uni¬
formity, the Benelux approach might be used in the JSfiC with¬
out modifying the Treaty. Individual directives might con¬
tain a clause requiring (1) the provision in national law of
interpretive jurisdiction in the Court of Justice in relation
5l 1964-2 Bulletin Benelux 5-32.
42 Id. at Article 1, p. 24.
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to the substantive norms enacted pursuant to the directive
and (2) the creation of a capability and a duty of referral
by national courts under the same conditions as stipulated
in Article 177, but omitting questions of validity. Since,
unlike the ECSC Treaty,^ the EEC Treaty does not specific¬
ally empower the Community Court to exercise jurisdiction
conferred by national law, there would be a question of the
Court's ability to function under jurisdictional grants of
this type. However, in the interest of ensuring the "ob-
44
servance of law in the interpretation and application" of
the Treaty, there seems no adequate reason why the Court
should feel constrained to reject such conferrals of juris¬
diction.
A question might, of course, also be raised
about the ability of the Council to "direct" national govern¬
ments to provide jurisdiction for the Community Court. How¬
ever, such a power might be implied from the power to issue
harmonizing directives and certainly could be based on Arti¬
cle 235. Under the latter article it might be possible for
the Council merely to stipulate jurisdiction in the Court
of Justice by a regulatory provision,^ thus avoiding com¬
plications which might ensue at the national level should
¥3 ECSC Treaty, Art. 4-3.
44 EEC Treaty, Art. 164.
45 Note that this would not presume a general power in the
Council to regulate the Court's jurisdiction. Article 235
provides a basis only for granting additional powers.
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the substantive and jurisdictional elements of an harmoniz¬
ing directive have to be implemented by different national
agencies.
2. Law National in Content
The reverse problem may be briefly mentioned.
Community law or rather Community "texts" may occasionally
refer to national law directly or by implication as the con¬
trolling norm in particular cases.Since the Community
Court has said many times that it cannot interpret national
law, such referrals to national law may be thought to deny
any effective interpretive jurisdiction to the Community
Court under Article 177. However, so long as the Treaty or
an act of a Community institution is involved the Court may
at least determine the extent to which such provisions have
an applicable community content and the extent to which only
national law questions are involved.
Implementation procedures vary from state to state, but
in some cases at least administrative agencies are charged
with this responsibility and they would probably not also
have the authority to regulate judicial jurisdiction. See
generally, Solmon, L'Application en France des Directives
de la. C.E.E., 1965 Rev. du Marchb Commun 165.
^7 See, e.g., EEC Treaty, Art. 192 and, indeed, the third
paragraph of Article 177*
We are not concerned here with situations in which
national law is used as a source for the development of
Community concepts, for example, Article 215's direction to
develop principles of non-contractual liability based on
principles common to the laws of the Member States or the
use of comparative data in the interpretation of terms such
as de^tournement de pouvoir.
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Thus, for example, in L.T.M. v. M.B.U.^® the
Court was called upon to Interpret Article 85(2) of the
Treaty which provides, "any agreements or decisions pro¬
hibited pursuant to this Article shall automatically be
null and void." More specifically the question was whether
only the provisions of an agreement which violated Article
85(1) or ra.ther the entire agreement was null under section
(2). The Court had basically three options: It could have
decided that the nullity involved was wholly a question of
Community law, that it depended entirely on national civil
law rules or that both Community and national law should be
used to determine the validity of the agreement involved.
The Court took this latter approach by interpreting the
Treaty to require the nullity of those provisions of any
agreement which fell directly under the interdiction of
85(1) or were inseparable from such provisions, but as
leaving the nullity of other elements of the agreement to
national law.
Of course, the Community Court may develop
the content of national law as a necessary part of deciding
cases under grants of jurisdiction other than Article 177,^
and it uses interpretations of national law furnished by
national courts as a part of the factual context underlying
S5 Case No. 56/65, XIIRec. 337, 30 June 1966.
^9 Gouvernement du Royaume de Belgique v. Socibt£ Commer¬
cials Antoine Vloebergs and the High Authority, Third Party
Opposition, Cases Nos. 9 & 12/60, VIII Rec. 330, 12 July
1962.
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interpretations given on the basis of national court
referrals.Indeed, in order to interpret its own juris¬
diction the Court of Justice has been forced to examine
national procedural rules in order to determine whether a
particular Dutch arbitral tribunal was a "court" within the
meaning of Article 177 But this was not to say that the
tribunal should be considered a court under national legal
categories.
II« National Court Initiative
The influence of national court initiative on the overall
position of the Court of Justice as "unifier" and "main-
tainer" of Community law is not difficult to appreciate -
the Court cannot interpret Community law that it does not
encounter. The problems in this area are reasonably well
known, and we shall not go into them very deeply from the
national court point of view.-' This study is, after all,
concerned with the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice.
While national court practice must be reviewed to some ex¬
tent in order to establish what sort of problems are devel¬
oping, our primary interest is in what the Court of Justice
50 See, e.g., Adrianus Dekker v. Bundesversicheringsanstalt
fur Angestellte, Case No. 33/65j XI-10 Rec. 1111, 1 December
1965.
51 Veuve G. Vaassen-Gobbels v. Direction du Beambtenfonds
voor Het Mijnbedrijf, Case No. 6l/65, XII-4 Rec. 377» 39^-j
30 June 1966.
52 See, e.g., Dumon, Le Role des Juridictions Nationales:
Le Renvoi Prdjudlclel, in Les Semaines des Bruges, Droit
Communa.uta,ire et Droit Nationale 197 (1965) f°r 9X1 extensive
discussion of the problems of national jurisdictions with
the referral jurisdiction.
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has done and might do should national court initiative within
the shared jurisdiction tend to prevent it from performing
its proper role in the Community legal system.
A. Courts from Which Appeal Lies under National Law
There are, of course, limits to the discretion
exercised by national courts to refer or not to refer ques¬
tions of Community law to the Community Court. If the na¬
tional court is one from which no appeal lies under national
law, it must under the terms of Article 177> paragraph 3>
refer questions of Community law raised in litigation before
it to the Community Court. One of the common questions
raised in doctrinal treatment of Article 177 has been to ask
which national courts are affected by this provision. What
is meant by no appeal under national law? No appeal at all?
No appeal of right? No appeal save by extraordinary reme¬
dies? No appeal in the particular case at bar?
The Court of Justice could lay down some criteria
on this point were the question asked by a national court,
for Article 177 is also within the Court's interpretive
jurisdiction. It might do so by dictum in an appropriate
case, and it has made at least one statement which could be
viewed as expressing an attitude on this question.*3 On this
point one need only say that it is suspected that the prob¬
lem will eventually be solved, if at all, by a more detailed
3*3 Costa v. E.N.J2.L., Case No. 6/64-, X Rec. 1141, 1158,
1182, 15 July 1964. The statements made were in no way
critical to a decision in the case.
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spelling out of the national jurisdictions affected, as is
done in the proposed treaty for a Benelux Court of Justice,^
and that the basic policy should be a distinction between
courts exercising a supervisory, unifying and "law-creating"
role in national juridical orders and those exercising trial
and Intermediate appellate jurisdictions. As presently
framed ("une jurldlotion nationale dont les dexcisions ne
sont pas susceptibles d'un recours jurldlctionnel de droit
interne") Article 177(3) applies or seems to apply to a con¬
siderable range of small claims courts and the like whose
judgments are not appealable. This may involve different
types of courts in different Member States depending upon
national jurisdictional rules, and the problem of working
out a solution which will put the Court of Justice in the
same relationship with national jurisdictions exercising
comparable powers in each Member State is, technically, a
difficult one. It will require thoroughgoing comparisons of
national procedures at all levels, and it is certainly a
task better suited to a special commission of inquiry than
to a court rendering a judgment in a particular case.
There seems no great rush on the part of the Court
of Justice to produce firm rules on this point. It is clear
that certain courts, e.g., national supreme courts, courts
54 See, Expose des Motifs, Traite' relatif a 1 • institution
et aux statuts d'une Cour de Justice Benelux, p. 14-, in
1964-2 Bulletin Benelux. Query to what extent this treaty
may be used to interpret Article 177 and vice versa? See,
Schultsz, Rapport nderlandais in 13 Sociale-Economische
Wetgeving 487» 491-92 (1965).
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of cassation, courts of final administrative jurisdiction,
will come within the mandatory referral provisions, and
there is the possibility that national jurisdictions might
interpret the scope of 177, paragraph 3> more liberally
than is strictly necessary,-^ thus increasing the effective
power of the Court of Justice. At any rate it is obvious
from a reading of Article 177 that national trial courts
will in general have no duty to refer questions of the
interpretation of Community law to the Community Court,
although they may do so. A few examples of the widely vary¬
ing treatment that the Community treaties and executive acts
may receive at the hands of these courts will illustrate
the necessity of some unifying control over the latter*s
application of Community law, law which has as its under¬
lying rationale the equalization of conditions of trade and
competition within the Community.
The largest number of cases involving Community
law which have been decided by national courts concern the
Community competition rules, and the confusion among national
courts in this area has been significant. Part of the prob¬
lem is procedural; it concerns the respective competences of
the Commission, national cartel authorities and national
55 See, e.g.. Grundig Radio-Werke GmbH v. Technische
Handelsonderneming Nibeja N.V., Hoge Raad, 12 January 1962,
[1962] C.M.L.R. 205.
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courts-^ to deal with alleged violations of the Community
rules and the effect of notification of agreements to the
Commission. Some courts conclude that the notification of
an agreement to the EEC Commission ousts their jurisdiction
to determine that the agreement in question is void,-^
while others have decided that they retain jurisdiction so
long as the Commission has not acted.There have also
been decisions which recognized the competence of the national
court to enforce the contract in question or to declare it
void, but which refused to do so because of the possibility
3*5" There "is some question about whether national courts are
competent to apply the Community competition rules at all.
In Society Kledingverkoopbedrijf de Geus en Uitdenbogerd v.
Robert Bosch, GmbH, Case No. 13/61, VIII Rec. 89, 103, 6
April 1962, the Court of Justice indicated that only national
cartel authorities were so competent and this would extend
to Art. 9 of Reg. 17 which refers back to Article 88 of the
Treaty. However, since the Court also said that Art. 85 was
in principle applicable in national legal orders from the
inception of the Treaty, it and the Regulations would pre¬
sumably have to be applied by national courts where relevant
to suits before them.
57 Soci^te Union Nationale des Economies Familiales v.
Etablissements Consten, Ct. of App. Paris (lre Ch.), January
26, 1963, (1963) Dalloz. Jur. 189, [1963] C.M.L.R. 176; N.V.
Technische Handelsorderneming Nibeja v. N.V. Graetz Neder-
land, Gerechtshof Amsterdam, June 28, 1962, [1963] Neder-
landse Jurisprudence 521, [1964] C.M.L.R. 306.
One court seems to have decided that the promulgation
of the Community regulations on competition has ousted all
national court jurisdiction. Blume v. Van Praag, Commerce
Court, Antwerp, October 25, 1962, 78 Journal des Tribunaux
733 (1963), [1964] C.M.L.R. 17.
58 Societe Arlab Import-Export v. Etablissements Consten,
Commerce Ct. of the Seine, June 25, 1962, [I963] C.M.L.R.
185.
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of a contrary ruling by the Commission.in one case the
national court seems to have confused the 177 procedure with
the procedure for referring agreements to the Commission.
The result was the doubly incorrect ruling (1) that the
national court could not refer the question of interpreta¬
tion to the Community Court and (2) that it could decide
that the contract was valid under EEC Treaty, Article 85(3)
Substantive questions have also been dealt with,
such as, the effect of the competition rules on general
terms of sale^ or on patent and trademark rights,^ or the
59Judgment of 4 May 1962, Kammergericht (Kartellsenat)
Berlin, 12 Wirtshaft und Wettbewerb (hereinafter MWuW")
697 (I962), [I963] C.M.L.R. 335; S.A. Association General
des Fabricants Beiges de Cement Portland Artificiel v. S.Z.
Carriere Dufour, Cour d'Appel Bruxelles, 25 Jdne 1964,
[1965] C.M.L.R. 193.
60 Compagnie Francals Telefunken, S.A. v. Etablissements
Aubin, Tribunal de Commerce, Marseille, 13 May 1964,
[I965] C.M.L.R. 185.
61 A.S.P.A. v. Superbazars, Commerce Ct. of Brussels, 23
March I962, 77 Journal des Tribunaux 298 (I962), [1963]
C.M.L.R. 28; Bara v. Advance Transformer Co., Commerce Ct.
of Brussels 2 December 1963> 79 Journal des Tribunaux 229
(1964), [1964-] C.M.L.R. 379 (exclusive sale agreements).
62 Biochemie GmbH v. Nogepha N.V., Rechtbank, Amsterdam,
5 May 1964-, [1965] Nederlandse Jurisprudence 270, [1965]
C.M.L.R. 248; Constructa Werke GmbH v. De Geus en Uitden-
bogerd N.V., Hoge Raad, 10 April 1964-, [1964] Nederlandse
Jurisprudent!e 1121, [I965] C.M.L.R. 17; Henkel & Cie v.
Sommer, Oberlandesgericht, Hamm, 20 December 1963, 14 W.u.W.
535 (1964), [1964] C.M.L.R. 509.
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meaning of "affecting trade between the Member States"^
under Articles 85 and 86 and of "involving imports or ex-
64
ports" under Regulation 17. All of these are extremely
complex and important problems, and the failure of national
courts to refer questions to the Community Court, coupled
with what has seemed a very slow process of dealing with ap¬
peals and notifications by the Commission, has allowed the
application of the competition rules by national courts for
several years with no clear Community guidance.
In some cases there seems to be no recognition by
national courts of the problems involved. In N.V. Union de
Remorquage et de Sauvetage v. N.V. Schelde Sleep vaart-
bedrijf,^ for example, a group of tug boat operators were
found by the national tribunal to have abused their domi¬
nant position within the meaning of Article 86. However,
there was no mention that Regulation No. 141 had made the
general competition regulation, Regulation 17, inapplicable
£3 E.g., Judgment of 14 January 1963* Landgericht Munich
(Commercial Chamber), [.1963] C.M.L.R. 268; Spierkel v.
Agence et Messageries de la Presse S.A., Cour d'Appel,
Bruxelles, 1 June 1962, 77 Journal des Tribunaux 459 >
[_1964] C.M.L.R. 142; Lagattolda v. Societa F.E.R.G.A.T.,
Turin Ct. of App., 6 June 1963, 86(1) Foro Italiano 2049
(1963), [1964] C.M.L.R. 84; Judgment of 22 January 1965,
Landgericht Mannheim, 1965(2) Aussenwirtschaftsdienst
(hereinafter "A.W.D.") 60, [1965] C.M.L.R. 231.
64 F.I.V.A. v. Mertens, Kantangerecht, Amsterdam, 9 May
1963, [1963] C.M.L.R. 329.
65 Commercial Ct., Antwerp, 6 July 1964, 28 Rechtskundig
Weekblad 314 (1964), [1965] C.M.L.R. 251.
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to the transport sector nor was there any discussion of how
the operations involved, which were apparently carried on
wholly within Belgium, affected trade between Member States.
The decision may have been correct, but, if so, it would
seem more by luck than by design.
Of course, problems also exist outside the area of
competition. The best examples of confusion are those in
which diametrically opposed conclusions are reached con¬
cerning the same provisions, and somehow German courts seem
particularly adept at producing conflicting decisions. Thus,
the Finanzgericht of the Saar has ruled that the intra-Com-
munity levy may be applied to agricultural products under
certain circumstances where the substantive but not the formal
66
requirements for such treatment have been met, while the
Hamburg Finanzgericht has applied strict formal criteria - no
form D.D.4, no preferential treatment.^ Similarly, it ap¬
peared for a while that the German import adjustment tax was
somehow not equivalent to a customs duty when applied to
68
potato flour and hence not prohibited by Council Regulation
No. 19, but that the same tax was so prohibited when applied
ZE Judgment of 30 January 1964, 12 Entscheidungen der
Finanzgerichte (hereinafter "E.F.G.") 512 (1964), [1965]
C.M.L.R. 77-
67 Judgment of 19 November 1964, 13 E.F.G. 327 (1965)»
[1965] C.M.L.R. 268.
68 Judgment of 9 October 1963? Finanzgericht Nuremberg
(2d Cha.), 11 E.F.G. 326 (1963), [1964] C.M.L.R. 96.
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to tapioca meal.The conflict was made symmetrical by
the reaffirmance of its position by the "potato-flour" court
in a case involving tapioca,^ but should now have been
cleared up by a series of referrals from German finance
4. 71courts.'
Why do these courts not make referrals to the Court
of Justice? The sinister motive of a simple desire to ob¬
struct the application of Community law should probably be
ruled out. If this is the problem, there is not much that
can be done about it, and like a physician, the Court of
Justice would do better to administer treatment for a curable
disease in the hope that the diagnosis of an incurable one
is incorrect. Moreover, a diagnosis of interposition of
national prerogative does not seem to be supported by the
facts. There are probably as many cases which give too far-
reaching an effect to Community rules, as there are those
Z9 Judgment of 9 April 1961, Finanzgericht Bremen, 11 E.F.G.
376 (1963), [1964] C.M.L.R. 304.
70 Judgment of 23 March 1964, Finanzgericht Nuremberg, 12
E.F.G. 282 (1964), [1964] C.M.L.R. 310.
71 See particularly, Firma August Stier v. Hauptzollamt
Hamburg-Ericus, Case No. 31/67, XIV-3 Rec. 347 (4 April 1968).
72 See, e.g., Decision of 17 March 1964, Finanzgericht
Dusseldorf, 702 E.F.G. 572 (1964), [1965] C.M.L.R. 97; Noni
v. Caisse d'Assurance, Paris Ct. of App., 4 March 1964,
[1964] Dalloz. Jur. 419, [1964] C.M.L.R. 334.
See also Judgment of 23 April 1963, Finanzgericht
Nuremberg, [1964] C.M.L.R. 178, which takes a very "Com¬
munity oriented" view of Commission powers in relation to
national powers under Regulation 22, Art. 6(3) & (4) in an
ambiguous situation.
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in which the full force of Community law is avoided in favor
of national norms.
It has been suggested many times that the principal
difficulty is educational; the 177 procedure is new and courts
and parties tend not to know or to forget that it exists.
This is no doubt true. Many of the cases we have just been
discussing make no mention of the possibility of a referral
to the Court of Justice. Counsel are yet unaccustomed to
framing their arguments in a way which brings out the ques¬
tions of Community law involved or which lay the foundation
73
for a request for a referral.
Confusion about the proper use of Article 177 also
plays a part where a question of Community law requiring
interpretation is recognized by the national court. In
Torrekens v. Calsse Reglonale de Securite Sociale an at¬
tempted referral came to nought because the Court of Appeal
Oh.
of Douai' referred its question, not to the Court of Jus¬
tice. but to an administrative commission set up under the
Community regulations on social security. There are also
73 Compare Judgment of 3 September 1963, Finanzgericht
Bremen, 12 E.F.G. 102 (1964), 3 C.M.L. Rev. 94 (1965), Note,
3 C.M.L. Rev. 95 (1965)5 wherein the Community issues are
submerged in arguments on national-law questions, with the
excellent use of alternative argumentation in the Judgment
of 12 December 1963» Finanzgericht Hamburg, 40 Zolle und
Verbrauchsteuern 151 (1964), [1965] C.M.L.R. 270, which
brings out all the Community law questions involved and
how they are related to the national law problems.
74 8 October 1963, [1964] Dalloz. Jur. 299, [1965] C.M.L.R.
26.
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tales of French decisions being shuttled from desk to desk
at the Quai d'Orsay and of a Luxembourg decision which stayed
the national proceedings but which was not made known to the
Court of Justice until some months later, when a clerk at
the latter telephoned to check a rumour that such a decision
existed.
Moreover, the ability of national courts to inter¬
pret the Treaty means that they may also interpret Article
177 • Thus, they may find that they are not a "court"''7^
(juridiction) within the meaning of 177, that the type of
proceeding before them rules out the possibility of an inter-
rp kT
pretive referral, that the question that they might ask
would involve an "application" rather than an "interpreta¬
tion" of the Treaty and hence would not come within the
jurisdiction of the Court of Justice"^ or that the Court of
Justice may not decide "conflicts of laws" questions
These types of decisions prevent the Court of Justice from
functioning as unifier and maintainer of Community law in the
5 Judgment of 22 July 1964, Dutch Arbitral Tribunal,
1964] Arbitrale Rechtspraak 240, 1964 Revue de 1'Arbitrage 28.
76 Judgment of 30 May 1963> Oberlandesgericht Munich, 13
W.u.W 626 (1963), [1964] C.M.L.R. 87. Contra, Grundig Radio-
Werke GmbH v. Technische Handelsonderneming Nibeja N.V.,
Hoge Raad, 12 January 1962, [1962] C.M.L.R. 205-
77 Henckels & Hammes far Holland N.V. v. Henckels Zwillings-
werk Nederland N.V., Ct. of App. Arnheim, 5 December 1962,
[1963] C.M.L.R. 322.
78 Etat Franqais v. Nicolas, Cour d'Appel, Amiens, 9 May
1963, [1963] Dalloz. Jur. 556, [1963] C.M.L.R. 239.
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very cases which seem to admit that its guidance is needed.
Can anything be done about them or about the disparate
treatment of Community law at the hands of lower national
courts?
Of course, nothing can be done to compel national
courts, which have no obligation to do so, to refer questions
to the Court of Justice. On the other hand strenuous, "un¬
official" efforts by members of the Court of Justice and
others have been and are being made to educate national
judges and lawyers in the problems and techniques of coop¬
eration between the Community Court and national courts
79
within Article 177. The present direction of these efforts
seems to be toward getting national courts (1) to recognize
questions of interpretation and (2) to refer these questions
to the Community Court.
This is certainly a worthwhile approach over the
short-term, but the second part of it will probably have to
be revised in the not too distant future. A really con¬
scientious effort by national courts to refer all questions
of Community law would, as the incidence of litigation in¬
volving Community norms increases, become onerous both for
the Community Court and for national litigants subject to
repeated delays.
79 See, e.g., Dumon, La Cour de Justice des Communaute's
Europeennes et les Jurl dictions des Etats Membres, 14 Rev.
Int*l de Dr. Compard 369 (1962).
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Moreover, it is reasonably certain that national
judges will not be persuaded to make a habit of referrals
at the trial court level. National courts recognizing that
they are faced with questions appropriate for referral to the
Court of Justice have in several cases exercised their dis¬
cretion not to make a referral on grounds that to do so
would not be conducive to an efficient administration of
80
justice. There may, for example, be competing views of
the applicable national law. Choices made at the appellate
level could then be determinative of the relevance of the
question of interpretation of Community law. Moreover, there
is no guarantee that the point of Community law will be
maintained on appeal, and, if it is, the case should event¬
ually reach a national court which is required to make a
referral to the Community Court. Of course, it is also
possible that an interpretation by the Court of Justice on
referral at the appellate level would raise new issues of
fact which would require an remand back to the trial court
and thus result in a delay rather than an expedition of the
final resolution. The weighing of these possibilities is
within the discretion of the trial judge.
But, how then is some uniformity of understanding
of Community law to be achieved at the trial court level?
It is suggested that this can only be accomplished by the
Fo Judgment of 9 October 19&3* Finanzgericht Nuremberg, 11
E.F.G. 326 (1963), Ll96^] C.M.L.R. 96.
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development of procedures which will ensure extensive oppor¬
tunities for the rendition of authoritative interpretations
by the Community Court on referral from national reviewing
courts which have a duty to refer questions. These inter¬
pretations will impinge on lower national jurisdictions in
two ways. First, they have influence simply as judgments of
the Court of Justice. Such interpretations are not generally
considered "binding" on courts other than the one to whom
they are addressed in the sense that a hierarchically super¬
ior court's decisions are binding on lower courts in a na¬
tional system. However, national courts are bound to apply
Community norms of which the Community Court is the authentic
interpreter, and there is little doubt that national courts
O A
do tend to follow existing interpretations. Second, the
interpretations by the Court of Justice become incorporated
in the decisions of national courts which, because of their
supervisory power within the national judicial system, exert
a unifying influence on national law.
B. Courts from Which No Appeal Lies Under National Law
We turn then from courts which have absolute dis¬
cretion concerning whether to refer interpretive questions to
the Court of Justice to those which apparently have an abso¬
lute duty to do so. But, like most legal "absolutes," there
are techniques by which this duty may be made relative.
8l See note 102, infra.
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1. The Question of "Questions"
a. The Problem
One of the principal problems in rela¬
tion to courts which supposedly have no "discretion" about
referring questions under Article 177 is to get them to rea¬
lize that they have a "question" of Community law at all. A
good example of this is the celebrated Re Societe des Petroles
Op
Shell-Berre decided by the French Conseil d«Etat. In that
case the plaintiff requested that several questions, in¬
cluding the effect of Article 37 of the EEC Treaty on the
position of French laws and regulations governing petroleum
importation, be submitted to the Community Court. No referral
was made because the Conseil decided, in accordance with the
well-known French doctrine of l'acte claire, that no "ques¬
tion" of the interpretation of Community law was involved.
The submissions of the Commissalre du Gou-
vernement in this case are illuminating. She suggests that
a practical solution to the problem of when an interpretive
question exists may be found in the form of proceedings be¬
fore a national court. The national judge is always concerned
with particular facts. If, when he views these facts in rela¬
tion to the allegedly applicable text, a solution appears, he
can no longer formulate an abstract question for the Community
32 19 June 1964, [1964] R.D.P. 1019, [1964] C.M.L.R. 462.
The Shell-Berre case continues to exercise a strong influence
in the Conseil. See, e.g., Syndicat national des importa-
teurs franpais en produit laitiers et avicoles, 27 January
1967, [1967] R.D.P. 781.
205
Court. Thus, a possible difficulty is dismissed because in
the context of the facts of the case the text is clear.
The Shell-Berre theory is, of course, open to
criticism for its presumptions: (1) that the Court of Jus¬
tice deals only with completely abstract questions,®® and,
more importantly for present purposes, (2) that the inter¬
pretation which "appears" to the national judge in a specific
instance is a correct one in the context of the general pur-
84
poses of Community law. It may also be questioned whether
the text was clear with respect to the particular issues in
the Shell-Berre litigation.®® One month prior to the Conseil
d'Etat1s decision, an Italian court, faced with almost
exactly the same issues concerning the relationship between
Community law and the French law and regulations attacked in
Shell-Berre, had referred the Albatros v. SoPeCo case to the
Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling.
The use of the acte claire approach is, of
course, evidence of the resilience of national modes of
thought or juridical techniques where national courts are
dealing with Community problems. A great deal has been said,
for example, about the indebtedness of the jurisdiction of
$3 See Chapter VI, infra.
84 See, e.g., Chevallier, Note, 3 Com. Mkt. L. Rev. 100
(1965); Gaudet, Exposd devant la Commission Juridique, [.1965]
Rev. Trimestrielle de Droit European 198, 205 (1965)*
85 See, e.g., Colliard, Lcobscure clartd de l'article 37 4u
Traits de la Communautd economique europdenne, [1964]




the Community Court to the French contentleux administratif. °
This is no doubt true, but the correlation must be applied
discreetly where Article 177 is concerned. That article
builds in part on Article 4l of the ECSC Treaty, which in
turn may be related directly to the renvoi prejudlciel en
appreciation de validlte of the French administrative law.
However, a similar institution in different contexts may have
different purposes, and this becomes evident if the compari¬
son is sought to be extended to the renvoi prejudiclelle
d'interpretation.^ Although this procedure has an histor¬
ical attachment to questions of the division of political
power, as does the whole of the divided jurisdictional sys-
O O
tern in France, ° its present purposes are limited to the
retention of administrative court jurisdiction over ques¬
tions requiring peculiar techniques of interpretation. Thus,
in relation to general acts (reglements) of the administra¬
tion, French judicial jurisdictions retain their interpretive
competence because the same techniques may be applied to
them as to any norms which might be relevant to cases before
the ordinary courts.^ In the Community system, on the
83 See, e.g., Cartou, Le March^ Commun et le Droit Public
55 (1959).
87 A concise exposition of the French practice in relation
to renvois prejudicielles may be found in Heurte, Le Recours
sur Renvoi des Tribunaux Judiciares, 1958 Actualitd Juridique
111-120.
88 See, generally, Waline, Traite e'le'mentaire de droit
administrat if 42-^-9 (6th ed. 1952).
89 Auby et Drago, I Traite de Contentieux Administratif
576-77 (1962).
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other hand, it is precisely these general texts, including
the Treaty, which should be interpreted by the Community
Court in order to maintain uniformity of law.
If the relationship between the Community and
national courts is to be viewed as a relationship between
general and specialist jurisdictions,^ it must be so viewed
in a peculiarly Community context, wherein the whole of Com¬
munity law requires "specialist" treatment.^ Although the
Community Court clearly does not have a position equivalent
to the Bundesverfasungsgerioht, the underlying rationale of
the interpretive renvoi under Article 177 may have a closer
affinity to the referral procedures applicable in German
constitutional practice, which are designed to ensure uni¬
fied interpretation of the basic norms and which have strong
overtones of federal control,92 than to French administrative
practice.
Yet, however erroneous its application may
have been in the particular situation of the Shell-Berre
90 Chevallier, ojd. cit. supra, note 1, at 183-86.
91 Gaudet, Expose devant la Commission Jurldlque, [1965]
Rev. Trimestrielle de Droit Europ^en 198, 199) stresses that
the "education" of national judges must be not only in the
techniques of Community law but also in the political import
ance and consequences of any decision they might make con¬
cerning Community problems.
92 See, Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, Art.
100.
There is a rather similar constitutional question pro¬
cedure in Italy under Article 23 of Law No. 87 of 11 March
1953) hut it is restricted to cases where the referring
court has a serious doubt about a question of constitutional
validity. See, Acciaierie Ferriere di Roma S.p.A. v. High
Authority, Pretore, Rome (Civil Cases), [1965] C.M.L.R. 135)
30 June 196^.
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litigation, the acte olaire approach is in some sense justi¬
fied by the approach that the Court of Justice has taken to
the meaning of "question" under Article 177 • In Da Costa en
Schaake v. Netherlands Fiscal Administration, for example, a
Dutch court referred a question which was virtually identical
to one which had previously been answered in N.V. Algemene
Transport-en Expeditie Orderneming van Gend & Loos v. Nether-
93
lands Fiscal Administration. The court held that it was
properly seized of the question and had to answer it, but
noted that a prior interpretation on the same point might
deprive the national court's obligation of its object and
Oil
thus empty it of its purpose.
The Commission sought clarification of this
position in the next case that was referred under Article
177^ by seizing upon a tangential point involving Article
12 of the EEC Treaty and asking whether an interpretation of
that article was necessary. It was Article 12 that had been
interpreted in van Gend & Loos and in Da Costa. The Court
agreed that the Dutch court's approach in the present case
presumed a particular interpretation of Article 12, but
denied that the national court was interpreting it; the
93 Case No. 26/62, IX Rec. 1, 5 February 1963*
94 Case No. 28/62, IX Rec. 59, 75, 27 March 1963.
95 N.V. Internationale Crediet-en Handelsvereniging "Rotter¬
dam" v. Minister of Agriculture & Fisheries, Cases Nos.
73/63, 74/63, X Rec. 1, 18 February 1964.
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latter had merely applied the interpretation given by the
Court of Justice in the two previous cases.
The Court has persisted in this position, and
it is, from the point of view of an efficient administration
of Community law, an understandable one. However, is it not
a position which leads almost inexorably to the Shell-Berre
usage of the theory of l'acte claire, a theory which was, in
fact, broached by M. Lagrange in his Conclusions in Da
Costa?^ Surely, it is reasonable to suppose that texts may
be clear, not only because they have been interpreted, but
also because, as the French Commissaire argued, they are
simply clear. The acte claire and Da Costa approaches are,
of course, not identical, but they have similar tendencies
to emphasize the exercise of discretion by national courts
on the question of whether there is a "question" which must
be referred. Moreover, Da Costa may give a false impression
of the res judicata effect of Article 177 interpretations^?
9l IX Rec. at 88-89.
97 See, e.g., Grundig Nederland N.V. v. Ammulaan, Ct. of
App. of the Hague, [1964] Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 405,
£1964] C.M.L.R. 373» 20 February 1963» an(^ Judgment of June
14, 19^3j Bundesgerichtshof, 40 Entscheidungen des Bundes-
gerichtshofs 135 (1964), [1964] C.M.L.R. 59, both of which
hold that rulings in 177 cases are generally binding on all
national courts. However, the weight of opinion among com¬
mentators is that the binding effect of an interpretation
is limited to the court referring the question. Compare
M. Lagrange's Conclusions in Da Costa, IX Rec. at 81-83,
with Chevallier, Commentaire de 1'article 177 du Trait^
CEE a l'usage des juges et des justiciables frangais 183-86,
These, Paris, 1964 (polycopie).
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and, also, prevent new referrals of old questions which
could, because of subsequent developments or a changed con-
98
text, require a slightly different interpretive approach.
The problem is to adjust the relationship of
Community and national courts in order to provide an effi¬
cient administration of justice and, at the same time, cut
down the possibility of divergent interpretation of Community
law in different parts of the Community. It is suggested
that this might be accomplished by a reinterpretation of the
concept of "question" under Article 177, combined with a
streamlining of the procedure for dealing with interpretive
referrals by the Community Court.
b. An American Analogy
This solution is suggested by two develop
ments in the American federal court system Ttfhich, although
they took place in a different political context and solved
different problems, might be adapted to the situation of the
Community Court. The first development is concerned with
the extent of original federal court jurisdiction in cases
9*8 A number of national court cases have relied upon the
ruling in Socie'td' Kledlngverkoopbedrljf de Geus en Uitden-
bogerd v. Robert Bosch, GmbH, Case No. 13/61, VIII Rec. 89,
April 6, 1962, and sometimes apparently without recognizing
the possibility of a change in circumstances with respect
to "old agreements" after the expiration of the notifica¬
tion period under Article 5 of Regulation 17* See, e.g.,
Syndicat National des Importateurs Frangais en Produits
Laitiers et Avicoles, Conseil d'Etat [France], [1967]
Recueil du Conseil d'Etat 41, 7 C.M.L. Rep. 81 (1967);
Kadee v. Grundig (Nederland) N.V., Hague Court of Appeal,
[1964] Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1230, [1965] C.M.L.R. 40,
14 November 1963*
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"arising under" the Constitution, laws or treaties of the
United States - viz. the "federal question" jurisdiction.
This jurisdiction was described earlier as being concerned
with any case wherein there was a claim of right based on
federal law. That is a reasonably accurate description of
the contemporary understanding of the extent of the federal
question jurisdiction; however, not all commentators would
agree with this description, and there is jurisprudence
which casts some doubts upon it. The alternative view is
that, not only must a claim based on federal law be involved
in the litigation, there must also be a "present controversy"
concerning the operation and effect of the Constitution or
99
laws upon the facts involved. y
In terms of the division of powers over fed¬
eral law between federal and state courts in the United
States, this dispute over the nature of federal questions is
really concerned with which set of courts should be the triers
of fact in litigation involving federal law. For our pur¬
poses the dispute is interesting because it indicates a dual
approach to the idea of "question." According to the view
which is presently ascendant, "question," or really
99 Compare Bergman, Reappraisal of Federal Question Juris¬
diction ^6 Mich. L. Rev. 17 (19^7); Chadbourn & Levin,
Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions, 90 U. Pa. L. Rev.
639 (19^2); Forrester, The Nature of a "Federal Question",
16 Tul. L. Rev. 362 (19^2), Federal Question Jurisdiction
and Section 5. 18 Tul. L. Rev. 263 (19^3); London, "Federal
Question" Jurisdiction - A Snare and a Delusion, 57 Mich. L.
Rev. 835 (1959); Mlshkln, The Federal Question in the Fed¬
eral Courts, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 157 (1953)•
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"controversy" In the American terminology, should be viewed
formally. A finding of jurisdiction should require no more
than that the suit involves a potential conflict concern¬
ing the meaning and effect of some federal provision, al¬
though only the application of its well-understood meaning
to the particular circumstance may actually be required.
Transplanted to the Community context this would mean that
"question" in Article 177 could be understood, not in the
sense of present "difficulty" or "doubt" or "ambiguity,"
but simply as involving a potential interpretation of Com¬
munity law.
Clearly, this is a possible approach, but is
it not going to play havoc with the administration of justice
if a referral must be made every time some party decides to
include a Treaty article in his pleadings? Will not many
referrals be useless because the Community Court has pre¬
viously set out the "meaning" of the provisions involved and
because, unlike American federal courts, it has no jurisdic¬
tion to apply that meaning? This is not really so serious a
problem as it might seem. For one thing this whole proce¬
dure would apply only to those courts which are bound to re¬
fer questions of interpretation to the Community Court.
Thus, by and large only cases which had spent some time get¬
ting to appellate jurisdictions would be involved, and here
great speed would not be a crucial factor. Moreover, counsel
should not be expected to keep previously decided issues of
Community law open on appeal when the effect of doing so
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would be to subject the party Involved to the danger of pay¬
ing what might be substantial court costs incurred in a
referral to the Court of Justice. Interpretive decisions
always leave the matter of costs to the national judge, who
will probably be free under national rules to charge them
against a party which has caused a referral to be made by
keeping a frivolous issue alive.
However, even given these qualifying factors,
the considerable time that referral cases seem to spend in
the Court of Justice before decision indicates that some
speeding up of the process will be required if an efficient
cooperation between the national, and Community courts is to
be achieved. This difficulty might be solved if the Court
were to recognize, contrary to its apparent attitude in Da
Costa and Dingemans v. Sociale Verzekerlngsbank, that it
need not accept all the interpretive referrals that are made
to it. Article 177 says that the Court "shall have juris¬
diction to interpret," not that it "shall exercise" that
jurisdiction. There seems no reason why the Court could not
refuse to take jurisdiction in cases where it considers that
no substantial question of the interpretation of Community
law was involved. In this way any referrals which raised
questions that had been answered previously, or that were
too obvious to require comment, could be speedily dealt xvith
and the national procedure could get under way again without
undue delay.
TOO Case No. 24/64, X Rec. 1259, 1275-76, 2 December 1964.
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This, again, is the sort of solution that the
Supreme Court of the United States has adopted for dealing
with the crushing load of appeals to it from state supreme
court and lower federal court decisions. The Supreme Court
simply rules that the case is dismissed for failure to raise
a "substantial federal question." In the manner that this
procedure has come to be used, such a decision does not mean
that the ruling below is correct. It only means that for
some undisclosed reason the Court does not think it necessary
to deal with the question involved. In this way, with no
textual authority to rely on, the Supreme Court has made its
appellate jurisdiction discretionary in the same manner as
101
its review by writ of certiorari.
The practice of the U. S. Supreme Court can
be criticized because it may be said to involve a denial of
justice, but this charge could not be levelled against the
Court of Justice. Its role in Article 177 proceedings is
not concerned with substantive justice in a particular case
but with ensuring the rule of law under the Treaty. Refusal
to exercise jurisdiction where the effectiveness of Com¬
munity law is not affected would not be to shirk that func¬
tion. Nor should summary dismissal offend national juris¬
diction. Such a refusal to exercise jurisdictions would mean
only that the national judge could proceed In the light of
101 Schubert, Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Behavior
25-67 (1959).
previous interpretations or the obvious import of the text
without fear of overlooking some special problem that might
exist from the Community point of view. It would not mean
that the referral was improper or unnecessary.
Two types of problems might be presented in
adopting these solutions. The first is technical. Under
Article 20 of the Protocol on the Statute of the Court, it
seems that jurisdiction attaches upon notification to the
Court of a decision of stay of proceedings by a national
court. The whole extensive procedure of notification to
Member States and Community organs, written and oral pro¬
ceedings, and formal judgment would then seem to be involved
in a simple decision that jurisdiction should be declined.
However, it is suggested that under Article 92 of the Rules
of Procedure, the Court could decide, before the notification
to parties process begins under Article 20 of the Protocol,
that it lacks jurisdiction in the case on grounds of "public
policy," i.e., that an interpretation would serve no useful
purpose and would cause delay in the administration of
justice.
There is also the technical difficulty of
placing sufficient information before the Community Court
for it to make an informed judgment about whether an inter¬
pretation is necessary. The disparaties in the manner of
asking questions chosen by national courts and in the scope
of the data supplied by them when asking such questions have
been considerable. This problem perhaps underlies the
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apparent attitude of the Court concerning the necessity of
exercising jurisdiction whenever a question of interpreta¬
tion is referred. In the French phrase, "une Cour unique
risque d*etre une Cour inique," but, as we shall see in
Chapter VI, the Court of Justice should be able to develop
adequate procedures for informing itself on these matters.
The second problem is political. Is it ac¬
ceptable from the overall viewpoint of Community Court-
national court relationships that national courts from which
no appeal lies under national law should be deprived of all
discretion concerning when they should stay their proceed¬
ings in favor of the Community Court*s special competence?
If so, how is this position to be gotten across to national
tribunals? The first question is a bit too broad, for, as
we shall see below, inability to determine the substantiality
of "questions" will probably not take all discretion away
from national courts of last resort. Even if it did, there
seems no reason why this should not be acceptable. The
language of Article 177, paragraph 3> is clearly designed to
require submissions from those courts whose decisions have
far-reaching effects in the national legal orders.
The second query is no more difficult. A
number of national decisions have expressed the understand¬
ing that questions need not be referred if the court plans
to follow an outstanding interpretation of the Community
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Court. This is obviously reinforced by and sometimes
based on the Da Costa attitude, and there is no reason why
an opposite approach would not have been, and could not now
be, equally effective in influencing national practice. In
some places the "cult of jurisdiction" may exist, but there
is little if any evidence that national courts are not pre¬
pared to adapt themselves to the Community Court's interpre-
103
tations. Since their failure to do so might involve the
international responsibility of the Member State concerned,
there is a strong incentive for compliance.
c * A Community Approach
Yet there is no need to be carried away
by comparative analogies. In order to forestall the acte
claire problem, one need not accept the whole of the Ameri¬
can formal approach to the definition of "federal ques¬
tions.""'"^ Indeed, it would seem that in Da Costa, "Rotter¬
dam" and later cases the Court of Justice may already have
102 See, Alexander, Questions et reponses pre'judlclelles
dans la procedure de la Cour de Justice des Communautes
Buropbennes, Publications de l'9 Institute d"£tudes Euro-
pbennes, No. 8 (Bruxelles, 1964) for a listing of national
cases following previous Community interpretations.
103 In discussions of means of getting national courts to
avail themselves of the Article 177 procedure, education
seems to be the major problem, but it may be wishful think¬
ing to assume that it is the whole of the problem. See
Speech by M. Sassen, 79 Debats ix/65, p. 224, 17 June 1965-
104 See, Gaudet, "La cooperation judicaire, instrument
d»edification de 1'ordre juridique communautaire" in Prob¬
lems Des Europaischen Rechts: Festschrift fur Walter
Hallstein 202, 214-220 (1966).
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taken the middle ground. The sanctioning of the national
court practice of "applying" previous interpretations is not
necessarily the approval of the Shell-Berre approach. The
Community Court has never suggested that national courts
should seek to weigh the "substantiality" of Community law
questions in relation to which there has been no previous
interpretation.
Moreover, while admitting that a previous
interpretation may make a referral otiose, the Court of
Justice has not held either that its interpretations are
generally binding on all national courts or that further
referrals are always unnecessary. The Court may "dit pour
droit" in its interpretive judgments, but it recognizes that
it does so in a particular factual context. Different
situations may require further explication of the rule, and
it is always open to a national court to request a recon¬
sideration of a previous decision.
Hence it is possible to suggest that develop¬
ing practice by the Court of Justice and national courts
recognizes a distinction between novel questions and those
previously referred, but a distinction which does not al¬
ways result in opposite treatment. In both cases the process
of mandatory referral should be actuated whenever there is a
105 Auguste de Moor v. Caisse de Pension des Employes Prives,
Case No. 2/6?, XIII-3 Rec. 255, 5 July 1967.
106 See, e.g., Firma Molkerei-Zentrale Westfalen/Lippe
GmbH, Case No. 28/67, XIV-3 Rec. 211, 3 April 1968.
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potential issue of the interpretation of Community law.
Such a potential issue exists whenever a party relies on a
Community norm, unless there is an outstanding interpreta¬
tion made in a substantially identical context.
2. Relevance
A second and somewhat related area of "discre¬
tion" left to national courts of last resort involves the
determination of whether a question of Community law is prop¬
erly "raised" before the national court. Here again a
"classic" doctrinal question has developed concerning the
ability of national courts to refer under Article 177 ques¬
tions of Community law which have been raised d'office: Is
a question "raised" before a national court when the court
"raises" it itself? This is really a rather academic query.
Since the 177 jurisdiction is not one in which there are, in
a formal sense, any "parties" before the Community Court,
the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice can hardly depend
upon what the parties put at issue by their arguments be-
107
fore the national tribunal.
The important point in relation to the ques¬
tion of whether an issue of Community law is "raised" in
national litigation is the converse of that question. Should
107 The Court of Justice has answered a question in Caisse
Commune d8Assurances "La Prevoyance Sociale v. Bertholet,
Case No. 31/6b, XI-6 Rec. Ill, 11 March 1965j which accord-
ing to the ordonnance submitted to the Community Court by
the Tribunal de Premidre Instance a Maestricht (lre Ch.) was
raised by the latter d9 office.
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national courts be able to decide that provisions of Com¬
munity law interjected into a suit are not properly "raised"
by the substantive issues involved because the Community law
questions cannot affect the judgment of the controversy? In
other terms, should national courts of last resort be compe¬
tent under Article 177 to declare Community law "irrelevant"
to litigation before them?
We must begin by admitting that "relevance"
is an ambiguous term. It can describe several types of
problems which probably should be treated in different ways
in adjusting the relationship between Community and national
courts under Article 177• Perhaps what is most confusing is
that the question of whether national courts should judge
relevance is not a complementary question to one of whether
the Community Court should do so. In some situations both
questions may receive the same answer, and, again depending
upon the situation, each question may be answered both 'Yes®
and ® No ® .
a. "Relevance" in the Court of Justice
The early and important case of N.V.
Algemene Transport-en Expeditie Orderneming van Gend & Loos
<| AO
v. Netherlands Fiscal Administration sets forth the basic
rule: the relevance of the interpretation sought to the de¬
cision of the case at the national level is a question exclu¬
sively for the national judge. It will not be examined by
108 Case No. 26/62, IX Rec. 1, 5 February 1963.
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the Community Court. The latter's jurisdiction rests solely
on the presence of a question of interpretation. This was
a firm ruling, coming as it did in a case in which a deci¬
sion that the basic question referred was irrelevant might
have been supported on three separate grounds."'"0^ Indeed,
in the next case in which an issue of relevance was raised,1^
the Court did not even discuss the problem, and the Advocate
General merely referred to the "precedent" established that
the Court had no jurisdiction to review the considerations
111
impelling the national court's referral.
Advocate General Lagrange, among others, has
had second thoughts about this rule, and he has questioned
whether the Court is bound to give completely abstract inter¬
pretations which have no relation to the solution of a prob¬
lem before the national court, particularly where such inter¬
pretations might bear upon matters of importance or create
112
serious conflicts with national jurisdictions. However,
the Court has continued to state the principle that it is
109" (1) That there was a solution on independent state-law
grounds; (2) That an answer to the second question referred
might make the first, and most significant, question unnec¬
essary; (3) That the national court would yet be faced with
a question of primacy between EEC and Benelux law after the
interpretation was given.
110 Unger v. Bestuur der Bedrijfsvereniging voor Detail-
handel en Ambachten, Case No. 75/63, X Rec. 347> 19 March
1964.
111 Id. at 372.
112 Costa v. E.N.E.L., Case No. 6/64, X Rec. 1141, 1173-74,
July 15, 1964.
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incompetent to decide questions of the relevance of its
interpretations to the solution of national litigation. How¬
ever, this "incompetence" must be understood in a somewhat
limited sense.
It will be remembered that in Albatros v.
SoPeCo the Court gave the national judge a single answer to
four connected questions.Clearly, in deriving the over¬
all interpretive question implicit in the national court's
submissions, the Community Court had to decide, tacitly at
least, what interpretive question was relevant to the na¬
tional litigation in the light of the questions submitted
and of the facts and issues before the national court.
In so doing the Court may have missed the point. Although
the decision gives a concise answer to what the Italian
Court seems to be asking, the national judge may have been
less interested in a firm general answer than in a rather
abstract discussion of the various Treaty articles included
in his submissions. The ordonnance^^ by which the Rome
113 Chapter IV supra, notes 143-1^9 and accompanying text.
Ilk See, e.g., the Court's language at XI-3 Rec. 10:
"[q]u il n'y a pas lieu non plus de trancher,
en l'espece, la question de savoir si 1'application
de 1'article 37 au-X monopoles nationaux exclut ou
non I'application de toute autre disposition du
chapitre relatif a 1'elimination des restrictions
quantitatives entre les £tats membres, l'effet de
l'une et de 1'autre interpretation etant identique
dans le cadre des donnees juridiques fournies par
le tribunal;"
115 Ordonnance of 18 January 196^, Tribunal Civil de Rome
(lre Ch.), p. 6 (polycopie).
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court stayed the national proceedings and referred the ques¬
tions of interpretation makes it clear that its interest in
an interpretation by the Community Court is primarily, if
not exclusively, based on the necessity of appreciating the
reasonableness of the subjective opinion of the defendant
concerning the effect of the Community Treaty on the system
of French import regulations. The extensive discussion by
the Advocate General of the problems involved in the indi¬
vidual and collective interpretation of the pertinent Treaty
articles was probably of greater value on this point than
the "strictly relevant" answer of the Court of Justice.
The Court cannot really be faulted for bending
its rule about relevance in Albatros. The Albatros litiga¬
tion, including within its context the Shell-Berre case, de¬
cided only a few months earlier and concerning basically the
same issues, is certainly one of the best examples of the
complex political considerations which impinge upon the
Court of Justice in the exercise of its jurisdiction under
Article 177o The Italian Court had asked questions to
which it clearly thought it needed answers. However inart-
fully questions are framed, the Court of Justice must attempt
to give a helpful reply to national courts if that "fruitful
collaboration" of which M. Lagrange has spoken is to be de¬
veloped. On the other hand, as was noted in Chapter IV, the
substance of the questions was politically significant. They
were directed at a determination of the compatibility of a
Member State's acts with its Treaty obligations, and they
22i+
arose in private litigation in a foreign jurisdiction. In
this context a thorough analysis of the problems involved
might have gravely offended the French government. Nor was
the French position wholly unjustified. The facts of the
Albatros case make it appear an extremely friendly law suit.
There is little doubt that, in conjunction with Shell-Berre,
Albatros should be viewed as involving an element of "forum
shopping'" in an attempt to get the Court of Justice to rule
on the French import rules. Thus, a thorough analysis might
also have been interpreted as a condemnation, and perhaps as
a sanctioning, of the French Conseil d'Etat for its failure
to refer similar questions in Shell-Berre.
Although it, in a sense, encroached on the
Italian judge*s jurisdiction by deciding what was relevant
for him to know, the Court was faced with a potential con¬
flict of Member State jurisdictions and with the problem of
respecting both of them. With perhaps the goodwill of the
French government and the whole French judiciary at stake,
the Court of Justice seems to have made the best of a very
sticky situation. Nor was the Italian Court really left
without sufficient guidance. While the Court placated polit
ical interests, the Advocate General carried on with a full
scale analysis of each question asked. Here, as with other
cases involving sensitive or difficult problems, the combi¬
nation of the opinion with the Conclusions may produce an
overall result which takes into account as many interests as
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possible by covering the same ground in different ways or
with different emphasis.
Albatros situation brings out a point, for
which there is other evidence, i.e., that the whole principle
of lack of jurisdiction to investigate relevance is based on
"comity" rather than on any immutable precept derived from
the nature of the shared jurisdiction. In Wagner v. Fohr-
mann,^^ for example, relevance to the national court's prob¬
lem was used as an aid in determining precisely what texts
the national court wanted interpreted. Both M. Lagrange and
the Court found that allowing the Community Court to judge
relevance in this case was justified because the national
court submission asked for an interpretation not only of
the texts specified, but also of all others that would permit
117
it to resolve the litigation. ' Here again the necessity of
allowing the shared jurisdiction to establish a fruitful col¬
laboration between national and Community courts makes itself
felt. The incapacity of the Court of Justice to examine
relevance is absolute only in the sense that the Court has
116 Case"No. 101/63, X Rec. 381, May 12, 1964.
117 Id. at 395, 404.
Likewise in Dingemans v. Sociale Verzekeringsbank. Case
No. 24/64, X Rec. 1259, 1275, 2 December 1964, the logical
connection between the questions asked allowed a deter¬
mination that a particular answer to one question made the
remaining ones irrelevant. Query whether the logical con¬
nection must be explicit in the formulation of questions by
the nations,! court in order for the Court of Justice to take
this approach. Id. at 1288-89 (Conclusions of Advocate
Genera,! Gand) .
226
decided, that it will not dismiss referrals on grounds of
irrelevance.
b. National Court Treatment of Relevance
In developing the present Community Court
position on relevance, we have treated it as an unitary prob¬
lem, although the cases involved really were concerned with
several different types of relevance. When we turn to a
consideration of what national court procedures should be in
relation to this question, the discrete types of relevance
problems must be examined in more detail.
A rather simple rule based on Article 177 may
be formulated as a guideline for national courts whose re¬
ferral of questions is mandatory: Those courts should forego
a referral to the Community Court on grounds of relevance,
only when their conclusion that Community law is irrelevant
does not presume an interpretation of that law. However,
the application of this standard may be more difficult than
it appears at first blush.
(1) Irrelevance as a Function of a
Particular Interpretation of
Community Law
In l£tat Franqais v. Nicolas^"^ the French
■ C ii..
Cour de Cassation, a court which on any reading of Article
177 must be considered as bound to refer questions of inter¬
pretation raised in cases before it to the Community Court,
ITS October 22, 1964, [1964] Dalloz Jurisprudence 753> 4
C.M.L.R. 36 (1965).
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held, that no referral to the Community Court need be made
because the transactions involved in the litigation were not
of a nature to affect commerce between Member States. Hence,
the Community competition rules, on the basis of which the
defendant had urged the provisional validity of its resale
price maintenance scheme, were irrelevant. Clearly this is
to interpret what "affecting commerce between Member States"
means in the Treaty and the regulations and thus to take an
improper approach to the question of when national litigation
"raises" questions of Community law.
(2) Irrelevance Based on the General
Relationship Between Community and
National Law
Indeed there was another ground of ir¬
relevance which could have been invoked in the Nicolas case
119
and which was, in fact, mentioned by the Court below: y the
Cour de Cassation might have refused to quash the appealed
decision and to refer questions to the Court of Justice by
saying that the only question involved in the case was
whether French law had been violated. The defendant was
charged with a "refusal to sell" under French law, and
whether Community law was or was not also infringed was
totally irrelevant. This would have been a more subtle use
of relevance but an equally erroneous one; it would implicitly
have interpreted the affect on French law of Community law
119 Etat Frangais v. Nicolas, Cour d'Appel, Amiens, May 9»
1963, [1963] Dalloz Jurisprudence 556, 2 C.M.L.R. 239
(1963)/.
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in the same substantive area - an area in which the Treaty-
presumes that an authoritative interpretation of the inter¬
action of Community and national norms is required.-1-^
This seeond possible ground of irrelevance is
particularly important in the Community context because a
national court decision of relevance or irrelevance in a
particular case may presume an interpretation of the overall
relationship between Community and national law. This was
essentially the problem in Costa v. E.N.E.L. The Italian
Government argued that the litigation involved only Italian
law, the act ratifying the EEC Treaty and the subsequent law
nationalizing the Italian electricity industry. It con¬
cluded that the Italian judge had no question of Community
law susceptible of an interpretive referral before it and
that the referral was, therefore, "absolutely inadmissible."
The Community Court rejected this argument because the argu¬
ment presumed that the Treaty became a part of the national
legal order through ratification to the extent that its sub¬
sequent status could be determined by unilateral action at
the national level. In so doing the Court examined the ques¬
tion of the overall "relevance" of Community law to national
judicial decision-making in as much as this question involved
the interpretation of the Community Treaty.
Similarly, in van Gend & Loos, where the Court
was called upon to determine whether Article 12 of the Treaty
120 EEC Treaty, Art. 8?(2)(e).
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created subjective rights which might be enforced in national
courts, the national judge might erroneously have considered
that no question of Treaty interpretation was raised because
an obligation addressed to Member States was involved - an
obligation which could not, "under standard rules of Treaty
application, be invoked in support of the plaintiff's claim.
Fortunately, in both van Gend and Costa the national courts
recognized that a determination of whether Community law was
properly "raised" by the litigation involved an interpreta¬
tion of that law - an interpretation not only in the sense
of "meaning" but also in the sense of "effect" on the nation¬
al legal order.
This type of interpretation of Community
norms is both peculiarly important to the process of legal
and economic integration in the Community and particularly
difficult. It is almost wholly purposive rather than lin¬
guistic interpretation and hence there is no simple formula
by which national courts can be guided. Firma Alfons
121
Lutticke GmbH v. Hauptzollomt Saar louis is a good ex¬
ample o
There the Finanzgericht des Saarlandes had
asked for an interpretation of the direct effect of Article
95 of the Treaty which provides:
A member State shall not impose, directly or
indirectly, on the products of other member
States any internal charges of any kind in
121 Case No. 57/65, XII-3 Rec. 293, 16 June 1966.
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excess of those applied directly or indirectly
to like domestic products.
Furthermore, a member State shall not impose
on the products of other member States any
internal charges of such a nature as to afford
indirect protection to other productions.
Member States shall, not later than at the
beginning of the second stage, abolish or
amend any provisions existing at the date of
entry into force of this Treaty which are
contrary to the above rules.
The plaintiff firm had relied on the direct applicability of
this text in a suit to recover payment of a compensatory
turnover tax which was levied by the German government on the
basis of national provisions antedating the EEC Treaty.
The German, Dutch and Belgian governments
argued quite plausibly that this was not a situation such as
van Gend & Loos where only a "standstill" provision was in¬
volved which prohibited the institution of any new measures
of discrimination. Here, they said, the third paragraph of
Article 95 requires affirmative national action to bring
municipal legislation into line with the Treaty. Thus it
would be illicit for a national judge to give direct effect
to the Treaty as if the appropriate national measures had
been taken.
This argument was rejected by the Court of
Justice in favor of an interpretation of Article 95 which
gave to paragraph one the status of an absolute prohibition
whose application was only delayed until the beginning of the
second stage, January 1, 1962, by paragraph three. After
that time member governments have no discretion concerning
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the abolition of the affected levies, and, therefore, national
courts will not, in giving direct effect to Article 95> be
infringing on the prerogative of national administrations as
to the means of carrying out the Community policy. Hence to
find that Article 95 is not strictly speaking a standstill
provision is not to deny that it may have direct effect in
national legal orders. It is only necessary that the provi¬
sion be of sufficient importance to the establishment of the
Common Market, that it contain an unconditional obligation
without any margin of appreciation by national governments as
to its time of application, and that the norm be susceptible
of application without further elaboration by Community or
national organs.
Lutticke is, indeed, a decision of signal im¬
portance. First, it illustrates how the ability to rely on
Community norms and their interpretation by the Court of
Justice in national courts tends to minimize the effect of
the limited recourse of private parties against their member
governments or the Community executives before the Community
Court. It was this same plaintiff whose suit to compel the
Commission to take action against the German government for
failure to abolish the countervailing levies here involved
1 P P
was dismissed in Case No. ^-8/65.
Of perhaps greater significance is the poten¬
tial impact of the Lutticke approach is other areas. A
l22 XII-1 Rec. 27, 1 March 1966.
232
number of other articles of the EEC Treaty might be sus¬
ceptible of the same interpretation. ^ Indeed, one might
go further to suggest that a similar analysis be made of
directives or decisions of comparable clarity and simplicity
directed to Member States after the time limit for their
1 Pll
execution has elapsed. This would, of course, require the
recognition that no real discretion had been left to national
authorities as to implementation and would call in question
the propriety of the Executive's use of the directive form or
the legality of the act where directives are the only mode
126
of execution available.
However, strong arguments can be made on the
basis of Lutticke for a slightly less radical approach with
similar effects in respect of certain directives, e.g., those
4 n/'
issued under Article 13(2). These directives might be
considered not as having independent normative force, but
l"23 "^3e"e~discussion by Mailander, 4 Com. Mkt. L. Rev. 330s
335 (196?).
124 See, e.g., Directive of the Council of February 25, 1964
(64/221, EECTT Art. 10, 64/56 J.O. 850, 852-53.
125 See discussion in Chapter IV, notes 69-71 and accompany¬
ing text, and in this chapter, part I, B, supra.
126 See, e.g., directives issued to the German Federal Re¬
public at 6~5/120 J.O. 2074 and 65/143 J.O. 2437.
Article 13(2) provides in part:
Taxes having an equivalent effect to customs duties
on imports in force as between Member States shall
be gradually abolished by them during the transi¬
tional period. The Commission shall determine by
means of directives the timetable for such abolition.
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merely as setting the time limit for the coming into force
of the unconditional obligation contained in the Treaty.
Indeed, should Member States not take the required action and
should Article 13(2) not be given direct effect on this
basis, the recurrent problem of distinguishing between charges
covered by Article 95 and those within the meaning of "cus¬
toms duties and charges having equivalent effect" would be
continued beyond the transitional period. Since the elimina¬
tion of both types of restrictions might be called the twin
pillars of the establishment of free trade in goods, there
is a strong policy argument for giving comparable legal force
to the norms governing each, even if such an interpretation
involves in some sense the giving of direct effect to a
directive.
We can at least say on the basis of the Lut-
ticke case that the problem of the general relevance of Com¬
munity law to litigation in national courts is much more
complex than might appear from a reading of the texts in¬
volved - even a reading made in the light of previous rulings
on the direct effect of Community provisions.^''7 A national
127 Advocate General Gand, for example, expressed the opin¬
ion in the Deutschmann case, No. 10/65, XI-8 Rec. 601, 8
July 1965, that Article 95 could not be considered as having
direct effect.
Unfortunately the French Conseil has failed sufficiently
to recognize this danger despite the warnings of Madame
Questiaux. See, S. A. fitablissements Petitjean, 10 February
1967, [1967] Recueil du Conseil d'etat 63.
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court must be extremely careful in rejecting suggested Com¬
munity norms on the basis that it has only a question of
national law. It should probably never do so when specific
provisions of the Treaty or other Community acts are relied
upon by the parties as applicable to their claim.
(3) Irrelevance Based on Qualification
of the Problem
Another twist to the question of whether
national or Community law is involved in national litigation
concerns the qualification of concepts as having a national
128
or a Community content. Thus in the Unger case, a sig¬
nificant issue was whether "wage earner or comparable worker"
in Article 19 of Regulation No. 3 should be interpreted by
reference to Dutch social security legislation or Community
law. If the former, the plaintiff would not be considered
as covered because she was voluntarily affiliated with the
scheme. Under Dutch law there was no "legal fiction" by
which non-workers could be considered as "comparable workers."
The Court of Justice ruled, however, that in
order to effectuate the purposes of Articles 48-51 of the
Treaty on free movement of persons, it was necessary that
the provisions of Regulation 3 be given an uniform meaning.
This could be thwarted by a referral to national law for
definitions, and therefore "wage earner or comparable worker"
128 Case-No. 75/63» X Rec. 347, 19 March 1964. See also,
M. Gand's Conclusions in Firma Schwartzwaldmilch GmtH v.
Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle fur Fette, Case No. 4/68, XIV-4
Rec. 549, 569-70 (11 July 1968).
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must be given a Community content. The Court went on to
define the pertinent terms as including any one covered by
social security under national law because a worker or be¬
cause, having been a worker, he was now affiliated with a
voluntary social security program.
This decision and its progeny have been
roundly criticized as improperly creating a new status of
"Community worker," with attendant social security benefits,
under Treaty and Regulatory provisions designed only to co¬
ordinate the effects of national social security rules on
migrant workers. However, if the impact of Regulation No.
3 is not to extend benefits to certain persons who might not
otherwise be covered by any national scheme, it will fail in
its purpose. This is necessary to create new rights and in
some sense a new "status" - a status which should not depend
wholly upon the vagaries of six national schemes, although
130
it is ultimately derivative from them.
Perhaps the more telling criticism of Unger
is that levelled, not at the development of an unified Com¬
munity concept, but at the content of the concept developed.
At any rate, the case indicates that the question of whether
a Community provision makes a referral to national law, which
129 Lyon-Caen, La .jurisprudence sociale de la Cour de Jus¬
tice des Communautd's en 19^^ 1965 Rev. Trim, de Dr. Eur. 8^-,
85-87.
130 See discussion by Advocate General Lagrange at X Rec.
377-
131 Lyon-Caen, supra note 129.
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would then be controlling, is a question of interpretation
which should be submitted to the Court of Justice.
(Irrelevance Based on Lack of
National Court Jurisdiction
The Costa and van Gend cases also concern
a fourth type of relevance problem. There was an issue
raised in both cases which concerned, not the meaning of
the Treaty or its direct effect in the national legal order,
but the jurisdiction of the national courts involved to
apply the interpretation given them by the Community Court
should that interpretation reveal a conflict between Com¬
munity and national law. In Costa and in van Gend the Court
of Justice stated its established position that this problem
did not concern it when giving an interpretation of Com¬
munity law. But would national courts be justified in re¬
fusing to refer questions on grounds of irrelevance to their
final judgments because they consider themselves incompetent
to apply the answers which they might receive from the Com¬
munity Court?
Some might argue that this is no longer a
problem for national courts. One reading of the Costa case
is that the Court of Justice gave the Milan judge a ruling
to the effect that Community law is supreme "not only in the
Community legal order but also in the national legal orders
and that the supremacy rule is directly applicable by na¬
tional courts, any contrary national provisions regarding
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ordinary treaties notwithstanding...."1^2 If it did so, the
suggested ground of irrelevance is impossible because the
national court will simply apply Community law in case of
conflict.
However, it is extremely doubtful that the
above-quoted interpretation of Costa is correct. The Court
uses language, such as, "preeminence" or "supremacy"1^ in
discussing the relationship of Community to national law, but
these statements must be connected with the conclusions to
which they lead in the instant case. ^ The Court is demon¬
strating the admissibility of a recourse to Article 177 when¬
ever there is a question concerning the Community treaties.
The argument is that the treaties establish a separate legal
order which is supreme within its own system, that is, which
is unaffected by changes in national law. This separate
legal order creates independent obligations for national
courts and hence they may use the 177 procedure whenever they
are faced with a question of interpretation. However, this
is not necessarily to say that the national law has no effect
132 Stein, Towards Supremacy of Treaty-Constitution by Ju¬
dicial Flat; On the Margin of the Costa Case, 63 Mich. L.
Rev. 491, 513 (1965).
133 X Rec. at 1158-60.
13^ The disposltlf neatly links the preeminence argument to
the use of Article 177: "Les questions posees par la Guldlce
Consillatore de Milan en virtue de l'artlcle 177 sont re-
cevabl.es en tant qu1 elles portent, en 1' dspece, sur 1' inter¬
pretation de dispositions du traltd C.E.E., aucune acte uni¬
lateral posterieur n'btant opposables aux regies communau-
talres;"
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in the national legal system or that the national judge must
give preference to Community law. The Italian Government did
not claim that national law prevailed over the Treaty; it
claimed that the Treaty was national law. Moreover, since
the Community Court cannot declare national law invalid or
inapplicable, when it is challenged directly under Article
169j it could hardly consider that it had jurisdiction under
Article 177 to instruct a national court not to apply con¬
flicting national rules.*35
There is no denying that the language of
Costa is ambiguous, perhaps purposely so, but it is clear
that the conflict problem is still a real one for national
courts. The Court states quite forcefully the necessity
from the Community point of view of equal application of com¬
mon rules, and makes reference to the theory of "substitu-
"1
tion," developed further in M. Lagrange's Conclusions,
which would place the applicability of Community norms on
the basis of a recognition that the creation of Community
competences results from a parallel cession of competence on
the part of Member States. Yet the Avocat General expressly
recognized the difficulty created by this theory for national
135 This is not, however, to say that the direct effect of
Community law is in any way limited by the Article 169-170
procedure. See, e.g., Firma Molkerei-Zentrale Westfalen/
Lippe GmbH, Case No. 28/67, XIV-3 Rec. 211, 227 (3 April
1968).
136 X Rec. at 1176. See also Lagrange's statements in
Semaine de Bruges, Droit Communautaire, Droit National 2k-
(1965).
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courts who consider themselves incompetent to stay the appli¬
cation of national legislation.-^7 These courts may be
tempted to avoid generating a clear conflict between national
and Community law, and hence a concrete dilemna for them¬
selves, by interpreting their own jurisdiction to exclude the
relevance of the Community law.
This is the quite critical problem raised by
Syndicat general des fabricants de semoules de France1^ de¬
cided by the French Conseil d'Etat in March of 1968. Plain¬
tiffs attacked certain decisions of the Minister of Agri¬
culture allowing the importation of Algerian grain free of
Community levies established by Council Regulation No. 19,
effective 1 July 1962. The Minister justified his decisions
on the basis of a national ordinance of 19 September 1962,
having the force of legislation and requiring internal treat¬
ment for such Algerian products. Assuming that the Minister's
decisions were authorized by the national measure and that
the Community regulation in question applied to products
imported from Algeria, there was a clear conflict between
Community and national law.
The first assumption obviously raises a ques¬
tion of interpretation of the national measures involved
which is within the normal exercise of national administra¬
tive jurisdiction; the second should be tested by making a
referral to the Community Court, for the Conseil is a court
137 X Rec. at 1180.
138 1 March 1968, L1968J Dalloz Jurisprudence 286.
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from which no appeal lies. This latter procedure was not
used. It was not used apparently because the Gonseil con¬
sidered itself without jurisdiction to review the validity
of a national legislative measure except on the basis lex
139
posterior derogat anterior!. Thus any interpretation of
the Community regulation would be irrelevant. Yet, even on
the restricted reading of Costa here suggested, this is im¬
proper. National courts have an independent obligation to
apply Community law, and, therefore, to find such law ir¬
relevant on the ground that they cannot apply it is contra-
140
dictory and impermissible.
M. Lagrange's solution to the dilemna is
straightforward: States having such difficulties should
l4l
amend their constitutions or withdraw from the Community.
Of Course, in the Conseil, of which M. Lagrange is such a
distinguished member, the problem is not "the Constitution"
but a "constitutional tradition." This tradition could be
modified by a clear textual mandate, but there also seems to
be no insuperable obstacle to a recognition that the Com¬
munity as a juridical fact changes the context within which
139 This was the express position of the Commissaire du
Gouvernement. Article 55 of the French Constitution gives
treaties superior status in relation to national legislation,
but the principle that courts may not review legislation for
conformity with the Constitution is solidly implanted in the
French judicial tradition.
140 The Community Court has reaffirmed its position on this
point in Flrma Molkerei-Zentrale Westfalen/Llppe GmbH v.
Hauptzollamt Pad'erbornj Case No. 28/67, XIV-3 Hec. 211,
226-29 (3 April 1968).
141 X Rec. at 1180.
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this tradition operates and requires its amelioration.
Apparently there are analogies in national practice upon
which such a recognition could be based, were there a suffi¬
cient reorientation of thought in the direction of Community
142
policy and Community responsibilities.
There is also another reason why "lack of
jurisdiction" is an illegitimate ground of irrelevance. It
presumes an interpretation of Community law which will create
a conflict. As the ruling by the Community Court in the
143
Costa case demonstrates, v this interpretation may not be
forthcoming, and it may be possible for the national court
to decide the case with equal respect for Community and na¬
tional norms. Moreover, a decision by the national court is
not the only means of solving a conflict should it materialize.
The Dutch court was never faced with this problem after the
van Gend interpretation because, apparently on the strength
of the Community Court's ruling, the Netherlands Fiscal Ad¬
ministration repayed the contested sums and the suit was
settled.
Of course, in some cases an interpretation of
the applicability of Community law also answers the national-
law question of the applicability of the relevant national
1772 See annotation by Constantinide' s-Megret, 4 Rev. Trim,
de Dr. Eur. 396-99 (1968).
143 See Chapter IV, supra, notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
144 See Alexander, o£. cit. supra note 102.
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provisions. A case in point is again Unger v. Bestuur du
Bedrljfsvereniging voor Detailhandel en Ambachten. The
plaintiff in that case had applied for benefits relating to
expenses incurred when she became ill while on a visit to
Germany. The Dutch authorities refused payment because,
under Article 11(2)(a) of the Dutch social security law, no
benefits were payable in relation to foreign medical expenses
unless the beneficiary had received previous authorization
to reside outside the country during his illness. The
plaintiff claimed that this exclusion was inapplicable since
the promulgation of Council Regulation No. 3 on the Social
Security of Migrant Workers, which in its Article 19 gives
wage earners or comparable workers a right to claim benefits
under their national schemes where those benefits are re¬
quired while on a temporary sojourn in another Member State.
In addition to the question of whether the
plaintiff should be considered a "wage-earner or comparable
worker" within the meaning of the regulation, the national
court also specified that it wished to have an interpreta¬
tion to the extent necessary to determine whether Article 19
of the regulation conflicted with the Dutch law in relation
to persons in the plaintiff's situation. In this regard the
Court of Justice held that Article 19(1) admitted of no ex¬
ception on the basis of the reason for going abroad and that
it conflicted with any national rule which made the condi¬
tions for benefits more onerous when the beneficiary fell
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ill in the territory of a state other than that to whose
social security scheme he was affiliated.
Referring specifically to the section of the
dispositlf of the judgment of the Court of Justice which set
forth this conflict and to the sections which made Article
19 clearly applicable to persons affiliated to the social
security system under the conditions whereby the plaintiff
was so affiliated, the Centrale Raad van Beroep, the Dutch
Court making the referral in Unger, quashed the judgment and
decision which had denied benefits to the plaintiff on the
basis that the national law had been improperly applied to
her.Although there was a conflict between mutually ex¬
clusive Community and national norms, the Community law ques¬
tion - Does Article 19 apply? - and the national law question -
Can the national rule be applied? - were two sides of the
same coin. To say "yes" to the first was to say "no" to the
second because, in the national legal order involved, the
Community provision is admitted to be controlling.
Indeed, Advocate General Lagrange described
the relationship between Community and national law as pre¬
sented by Unger somewhat differently. Rather than suggest¬
ing the existence of a conflict, he took the more diplomatic
approach of saying that Community law might in this instance
modify the effect of national law. This, of course, is a
correct appreciation of what has occurred and perhaps a more
P+5 Decision of 7 July 1964, 1964 C.M.L.R. 546.
helpful one than ideas based on conflict and preemption.. In
substance the plaintiff in Unger could not rely on Community
social security benefits0 There are none. The Community in¬
stitutions may only coordinate the application of existing
national programs to the extent necessary to achieve, or at
least not to hinder, free movement of workers. This might
be thought a distinction without a difference because without
the Community regulation the plaintiff had no right to bene¬
fits whereas with it she did. On the other hand, it must not
be forgotten that with the Community regulation and without
the national scheme she also would have received nothing.
In classic jurisdiction-sharing style it takes activity at
both Community and national levels to produce a single result.
Here, in fact, we see a practical breakdown
of the strict theoretical dichotomy between Community and
national law. They may both apply to a single substantive
issue, not only a in a conflicting, but also in a mutually
reinforcing manner. But this is not to disprove the dichotomy.
In Unger the question was how Community and national law com¬
bined to produce an integrated result, because the Community
law question was, under national rules, a determinative step
in judging the applicability of national law. As we have
seen, if the question of the applicability of national law
is approached in the national legal order on some basis
other than the consideration of what Community law says about
its application, the two legal orders tend to come
245
146
unstuck. The Costa-type separation of Community and na¬
tional law questions may preserve the Community Court's
power to interpret Community law, but at the same time negate
the effect of the Court's interpretation of the applicability
of that law,
(5) Permissible Areas for the Appre¬
ciation of Relevance by National
Courts
Are there, then, any situations in
which a national court of last resort might be justified in
finding that a suggested question of Community law is not
"raised" by the litigation? Well, certainly on national
procedural grounds it may be decided that the Community law
question has not been properly presented by the pleadings or
the record. But, here again a warning note must be sounded.
Particularly in proceedings of a cassatory nature it may be
very easy for the reviewing court to find that no question
of Community law is before it by misconstruing the bases of
a contested decision or by taking it at face value. This may
have occurred, for example, in a case before the Dutch Su¬
preme Court. The plaintiff sued for a preliminary injunc¬
tion in support of its patent rights to be met by the defense
that such enforcement would allow the abuse of a dominant
position within the meaning of Article 86 of the EEC Treaty.
The trial court refused the injunction because of its
146 For the constitutional position of the EEC Treaty in
the various national legal orders see generally, Bebr,
Judicial Control of the European Communities 216 (1962),
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far-reaching effects in a situation where "new developments
in the law of competition" made it unclear whether the plain¬
tiff could get full enforcement of its patent rights„
The appellate court affirmed this ruling on
the grounds of the doubtfulness of the eventual outcome of
the trial of the main cause, which might involve a referral
to the Court of Justice,, Finally the Dutch Supreme Court
refused to quash the appellate decision on the basis of a
misinterpretation of Article 86, saying that the appellate
147
court had placed no interpretation on that article„ But
did not the appellate court have to place some interpreta¬
tion on Article 86 in order to determine that the defense was
sufficiently plausible to deny the injunction? Or, are
Dutch courts going to deny preliminary injunctions every
time defense counsel is resourceful enough to suggest that a
treaty article is involved? If not, was there not a question
of interpretation before the Supreme Court which should have
been referred to the Court of Justice?
The Hoge Raad was not clearly in error in
this case. If under national procedural rules the state of
the record would not have allowed reversal on grounds of mis¬
interpretation of the Treaty, an interpretation from the
Court of Justice could have served no useful purpose, and
the Dutch Court was correct in not considering that a
147 Construeta Werke GmbH v„ De Geus en Uitdenbogerd N.V.,
Hoge Raad, 10 April 1964, [1964] Nederlandse Jurisprudentie
1121, [1965] C.MoL.R. 17o
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question of Community law was raised before its. On the
other hand, if, for example, the Cour de Cassation had cast
its refusal to quash the contested judgment in Nicolas in
the form that there could have been no misconstruction of the
Treaty in the court below because no construction had been
made, the situation would have been quite different. Here
the same fault could be found with the decision, based
ostensibly on national procedural grounds, that was found
with the actual Nicolas decision.1^® The failure to "raise"
the question under national procedural rules would camou-
flage an interpretation of the Treaty. These situations
must be distinguished from those in which no position on
a point of Community law is being taken because some na¬
tional procedural rule has barred the introduction of the
issue into the litigation or has caused it to be absent from
the record on appeal.
A national court may also legitimately decide
that, because of the facts of the litigation, its resolution
of the dispute must be the same whatever interpretation
might be placed on the Community-law provision in question.
Thus, in Waldemer Deutschmann v. German Federal Republic
the plaintiff claimed that the collection of a certain Ger¬
man tax violated Articles 9, 12, 30 and 95 of the EEC
Treaty. In its referral to the Court of Justice the
148 See~discussion supra at note 118.
149 Case No. 10/65, XI-8 Rec. 600, 8 July 1965.
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Verwaltungsgerloht, Frankfurt, asked only for an interpreta¬
tion of Article 95• Articles 9 and 30 were excluded from the
referral on grounds that we have considered illegitimate;
Article 30 was said to be clear and inapplicable to the
facts (i.e., no "question" raised) and Article 9 was ir¬
relevant because no question of lack of conformity with im¬
plementing directives had been raised (i.e., Article 9 inter¬
preted as having no direct effect).On the other hand,
Article 12 was rightly excluded on factual grounds. Since
1958 there had been no change in the tax, and hence on any
reasonable interpretation of Article 12, that provision
151
could not have been infringed. ^ On the other hand, even
here it might be argued that a determination of irrelevance
in some degree prejudges the interpretation of the Treaty.
This is true, but it only illustrates that in the end even
severe limitations on national court discretion leave areas
in which that discretion must operate.
C. Concluding Comments
It may be thought that the suggestions made above
concerning national courts which are bound to make referrals
to the Community Court are rather strict and mechanical.
This is not denied. If the Court of Justice is to have any
real unifying effect on the interpretation and application
of Community law in the national legal orders - and largely
150 Ordonnance of 9 February 19,65* Verwaltungsgericht,
Franckfort/Main, p. 5 (polycopie).
151 Ibid.
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this means interpretation and application by the most import¬
ant elements of national judicial systems, national trial
courts - it is submitted that a strict construction of the
referral duty of national courts exercising supervisory
jurisdiction in the national legal orders is a necessity.
A contrary argument may certainly be made. The
Court of Justice depends upon the cooperation of national
courts and that cooperation may in turn depend upon a flexi¬
ble attitude by the Community Court. It is, perhaps, an
affront to reasonable men to tell them that they should not
exercise their powers of reasoning to forego referrals that
seem to be a ridiculous waste of time. Moreover, might not
rigidity by the Court of Justice in relation to national
courts which fall within Article 177, paragraph 3j result in
fewer referrals by national courts which have no obligation
to make them?
To take the second point first, the answer may be
"yes", but does this matter? We have already questioned
whether attempts to influence lower courts to make greater
use of the referral jurisdiction can be successful or, in
the long run, even desirable. The important element from
the point of view of giving the Court of Justice sufficient
influence on the development of a unified Community law within
the various national legal orders is to make certain that
national courts exerting supervisory control within the
national judicial hierarchy receive the "authentic" rulings
of the Court of Justice. Control at the top of national
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judicial orders will filter down to the lower eschelons
even if the latter maintain an exclusively "national"
mentality.
Nor should a rigid approach in this instance be
an affront to national jurisdictions. To say that any dis¬
cretion concerning the exercise of the Community Court's
jurisdiction under Article 177) paragraph 3, should be exer¬
cised by the Community Court is only to maintain the clearly
exclusive jurisdiction of that court to interpret Community
law. The shared jurisdictional system leaves the parties
and the case as a whole, including its national law elements,
exclusively within the jurisdiction of the national courts.
As we shall see in the following chapter, this division of
function leaves significant power over the development of
Community law in the hands of national judiciaries. The
necessity of flexibility in building up M. Lagrange's
"fruitful collaboration" is not denied, but it must be recog¬
nized that to have any "collaboration" at all the Court of
Justice must be involved in the decision-making process.
Strictness in interpreting Article 177> paragraph 3) seems
appropriate under the system and can, through the imple¬
mentation of the "streamlining" techniques suggested above,
or some similar schemes, be made to provide an efficient
administration of justice. These are, at least, less radi¬
cal suggestions than some have made, for example, that
private parties be given an immediate direct appeal to the
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Court of Justice from a national court determination not
to refer questions.
152 See intervention of Pescatore in the Liege Colloquia,
La Fusion des Communaute's Europdennes 281-83 (1965).
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CHAPTER VI: The Technique of Judicial Jurisdiction Sharing
The problems that were encountered in Chapter V in
educating or inducing or compelling national courts to
"share" suits involving questions of Community law with the
Court of Justice and concerning the restricted scope of that
court's jurisdiction to interpret "Community law" are diffi¬
cult ones. Moreover, there is not a great deal that the
court can do directly to solve these problems. The sugges¬
tions that have been put forward represent, perhaps, the
outer limits of what might be politically feasible in increas¬
ing the court's control. Certainly, some might say that they
go outside those limits.
However, as we turn now to the division of functions
between Community and national courts in situations where
questions of interpretation have been submitted under Article
177, the Community Court's control over its own jurisdiction
is vastly increased. What the court does or says in a par¬
ticular case concretely establishes its relationship with a
particular national court and their respective control over
specific issues of Community law. The practices developed,
of course, may also affect the attitudes of other courts and
thus the subsequent opportunity of the Court of Justice to
deal with other interpretive questions. But, this prospective
effect is only one of the considerations that the court must
take into account in interpreting its powers. As we noted
in Chapter V, no one has produced any concrete data tending
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to show that a restrictive approach by the court to the
scope of its competence to interpret will produce a greater
degree of cooperation by national courts, and a rather per¬
suasive argument can be made the other way.
Leaving this problem aside for the moment, we must ask
what division of control over Community law has been devel¬
oped between the Court of Justice and national courts refer¬
ring questions under Article 177 and upon what criteria that
division is based.
I. A Division of Function Based on Linguistic or Technical
Criteria
A. Interpretation - Application
It has been widely accepted that the definition of
the Community Court's function under Article 177 as "inter¬
preter" of Community law excludes the correlative judicial
function of the "application" of that law. That function is
left to the national court. It is certainly true that the
Court of Justice cannot give a judgment in an Article 177
case which sets forth how the relevant Community provisions
affect the substantive rights of the parties, but this pro¬
position could be derived from the fact that the Community
Court is giving a "preliminary," not a definitive, ruling in
the case. Our question really concerns the degree of control
exercised respectively by Community and national courts over
the "meaning" of Community texts as applied to the facts of
particular cases, excluding issues of national law which ef¬
fect the eventual outcome.
25^
To say that control over the subsumption of facts
under a legal rule is to be allocated on the basis of a dis¬
tinction between interpretation and application does not get
us or the court very far toward an answer. A moment's re¬
flection reveals the limitations of such a distinction. Ob¬
viously, application involves interpretation and interpreta¬
tion is of little use unless it indicates to what situations
the law applies. According to Radbuch, "L'interpretation
cons iste non pas simplement a retrouver la signification
primitive d9un instrument jurldlque mais a lui donner toujours
sous reserve du respect du text la slgnificatlon specifique
que postule son application pratique; non pas seulement a
X / 1.
'repenser'; mais a achever de penser une idee."
Apparently recognizing both the difficulty of
separating "interpreting" and "applying" into discrete func¬
tions and that the distinction is designed to separate the
legal and factual elements of a decision, the Advocates
General and certain of the Member States have attempted to
clarify the division of jurisdiction under Article 177 "by
describing the Community court's role as that of rendering
p
"abstract" interpretations. To the extent that this
1 Quoted in Pepy, Les questions prejudicielle dans les
Traitbs de Paris et~de Rome et la jurisprudence de la Cour
de Justice de la Communautes Europ^ennes", j 1965J Cahlers de
Droit Europden 19^-» 2OCT.
2 See, e.g., M. Lagrange's Conclusions in Society Kleding-
verkoopbedrijf de Geus en Uitdenbogerd v. Robert Bosch,
GmbH, Case No. 13/61, VIII Rec. 89, 126, 6 April 1962, and
the submissions of the French Government in Albatros, XI-3
Rec. at 6.
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description is meant to indicate the inability of the Court
of Justice to prescribe the concrete legal consequences of
its interpretation when applied by the national courts, it is
unquestionably correct. However, it has become increasingly
obvious that in concrete instances the division of functions
between Community and national courts cannot be predicated
solely on definitional distinctions which allocate jurisdic¬
tion in terms of capacity to deal with factual elements in
the litigation.
Advocate General Roemer attempted to make this sort
of distinction by defining "application" as the determination
of whether certain facts come within a certain legal rule
and of the facts which result from that subsumption.^ But,
he was forced to note at the same time the difficulty of
distinguishing such "application" from "interpretation"
which is limited to a narrow point and which has been made
in the context of factual submissions by the national court.
The problem is summed up by M. Lagrange's Conclusions in
Unger v. Bestuur der Bedrijfsverenlging voor Detailhandel en
Ambachten when he says,
"Gentlemen, in this case as in all cases brought
under Article 1??, the Court of Justice is bound to
give an abstract interpretation of the texts submitted
to it.... One must not, however, forget that the
Article 177 procedure always takes place within the
framework of a suit and that the substantive aspects
of the suit frequently shed light on the matter
3 N. V. Algemene Transport-en Expeditie Orderneming van
Gend & Loos v. Netherlands Fiscal Administration, Case No.
2.6/62, IX Rec. 1, ^9, 5 February 1963.
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involving an abstract interpretation, as does an
example in support of a theory. Of course, in
court, the example is not chosen by the theoretician,
but is thrust upon the judge as reality."^
Moreover, if the court fulfills the sort of consti¬
tutional role that has been described for it, an inability
to consider in any way the application of its interpretations
to particular facts would seem inappropriate. "Constitutional
problems of federalism are likely to present issues of judg¬
ment which cannot be solved wisely by mere examination of
verbal texts, but which require the fullest possible under¬
standing of the ... legislation in the context of social and
economic facts."5
To return to the practical level, we know from the
discussion of the Albatros litigation in Chapters IV and V
that the Court of Justice will derive questions which are
within its jurisdiction from questions submitted by national
courts which are outwith that jurisdiction, and that in so
doing it must be influenced by the factual data supplied by
the national court. This is not a practice reserved for
politically difficult cases. In the first case submitted
under Article 177 the Court decided explicitly that national
courts could refer their questions in a simple and direct
form from which the Court would develop interpretive questions
£ Case No. 75/63, X Rec. 3^7 at 372-73, 19 March 196^.
5 Freund, "The Federal Judiciary" in Studies in Federalism
110 (195*0-
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using the legal data submitted.^ To talk in terms of "ab¬
stract" interpretation is to ignore one of the basic prac¬
tical requirements of the 177 jurisdiction: the necessity
of using the facts of 177 cases to develop the meaning of
7
the questions asked.1
Nor does the Court's use of the factual data stop
with the development of questions which have been "inartfully"
drafted. It tends to give answers to preliminary questions
which are formulated with reference to the facts. In the
Unger case, for example, the national court had asked whether
persons in the plaintiff's position were covered by the term
"wage earner or comparable worker" in Regulation 3 on the
Social Security of Migrant Workers. The Court of Justice
generalized this question into one of the definition of
O
"Wage earner or comparable worker," but its definition des¬
cribed exactly the sort of situation in which the national
g
court had indicated that the plaintiff found himself.
1 0
Moreover, as later interpretations have revealed, the
5 VIII Rec, at 102 (Bosch).
7 See particularly the Court's statement in Auguste de
Moor v. Caisse de Pension des Employes Prives, Case No.
2/67, XIII-3 Rec. 255, 267, 5 July 1967, and Advocate Gene¬
ral Roemer's suggestion in Cossutta v. Office National des
Pensions pour Ouvriers, Case No. I8/67, XIII-4 Rec. 3999
409 9 30 November 19&7> that the Court might under certain
circumstances request further elucidation of the facts by
the referring court.
8 X Rec. at 363.
9 X Rec. at 364.
10 E.g., Caisse commune d'assurances "La Prevoyance Sociale"
v. Bertholet, Case No. 31/64, XI-6 Rec. Ill, 11 March 1965°
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concept of "travailleur salarl<^ ou assimile" in the regula¬
tion may have a broader meaning than the one given in Unger»
Indeed, one could easily trace the effect of the factual
data submitted on every interpretation given by the Court
of Justice, and in a few cases the Court has answered fact-
based questions with a simple "la reponse a la seconde ques¬
tion du tribunal — doit etre affirmative."^
This is not, of course, to say that the Court of
Justice denies the legitimacy of a division of competence
between itself and national courts based on a distinction be-
12
tween interpretation and application. It is only to say
that the Court seems to recognize the inherent flexibility
of the distinction. This flexibility leads inevitably to an
attempt to analyze the real division of functions between
Community and national courts by refining the technical
distinctions used in the analysis.
Bo The Bosch-Opsahl Hypothesis
In this regard a rather promising hypothesis was
put forward by Professor Opsahl in 19&3" He suggests a di¬
vision of the judicial function in applying legal rules into
three processes: (1) interpretation, (2) fact determination,
and (3) subsumption of facts under the interpreted rule.
TT Betriebskrankenkasse der Heseper Torfawerk, GmbH v.
Van Dijk, Case No. 33/6^, XI-6 Rec. 131, 141, 11 March 1965.
12 See, e.g., the Court's language in Da Costa en Schaake
v. Netherlands Fiscal Administration, Cases Nos. 28-30/62,
IX Rec. 59, 76, 26 March 1963.
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Applying this to the Community context Opsahl suggests that
the Community Court has the interpretive power in an ab¬
stract sense, national courts retain fact determining power,
and the locus of the power of subsumption is an open ques¬
tion. The latter is a process common to both jurisdictions,
and who does the subsuming seems to depend upon the measure
of fact supplied to the Community Court by the national
11
jurisdiction.
This argument is clearly based on various elements
1^
of the Bosch case: a combination of the language of the
Advocate General, which stressed the "abstractness" of the
Court's interpretive power, with the language of the Court,
which indicated that it could not answer the question posed
in precisely its original form because it had not been sup-
1 f)
plied with sufficient facts to make a proper determination.
Later cases may also be used as authority for the type of
concrete division of functions with a variable "subsumption"
element which Opsahl has described. As far as it goes (and
since Opsahl only had one case to work with, it cannot be
expected to go too far), the Opsahl hypothesis is reasonably
33 "Opsahl, National Courts and the Community Court under
Article 177 of the EEC Treaty, in Legal Essays - A Tribute
to Fred Casberg 280, 29^-97 (1963).
1^ Socie'te Kledingverkoopbedrijf de Geus en Uitdenbogerd v.
Robert Bosch, GmbH, Case No. 13/61, VIII Rec. 89» 6 April
1962.
15 Id. at 126.
16 Id. at 106.
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descriptive of the way in which the 177 jurisdiction has
workedo However, an examination of the various elements of
the division of function suggested will reveal, not only the
manner in which the Court uses its jurisdiction to interpret,
but also the limitations of this or any attempt at a rigid
division of function between Community and national courts.
1. Fact Determination
To begin with, Opsahl's divisions of functions
may be questioned. His allotment of fact-determining power
to national courts accords with the language of the Bosch
17
decision, but that language is vaguely disturbing. Why
the Court of Justice denied its capacity to take a preliminary
examination in the Bosch case, when only one month earlier
it had brought into effect rules of procedure which clearly
make preliminary investigation applicable to 177 proceed-
18
ings, is difficult to understand. Perhaps the Court has
decided not to use its investigatory powers in Article 177
cases. To this writer's knowledge the procedure has never
been applied in a referral context, although oral hearings
are regularly held, and in Nonnenmacher v. Bestuur der
Sociale Verzekerlngsbank"^ the Court seems to admit the
17 VIII Rec. at 106.
18 See Rules of Procedure, Art. 103.
19 Case No. 92/63, X Rec. 557, 9 June 1964.
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possibility of having an instruction. A widely-quoted
thesis by R. M. Chevallier argues that the instruction and
oral hearing are redundant in the 177 context because they
are concerned primarily with the development of facts which
cannot be used by a court rendering abstract interpreta-
<*\ A
tions.~ If the inevitability, indeed, the necessity for
making some use of factual data is accepted, and the prac¬
tice of the Court seems too clear on this point to admit of
doubt, this argument must be rejected.
M. Chevallier5s proposals are, of course, not
so naive. His thesis, like many of the notes and articles
he has published, seems directed at inducing French judges
to make use of the 177 procedure. One certainly gets the im¬
pression that he is deliberately playing down the flexi¬
bility of that procedure in order to convince a particular
national judiciary that they will not relinquish significant
power over their cases by submitting question to the Commun¬
ity Court. This is really a quite separate "political" argu¬
ment in favor of a limitation of the Court's interpretive
function, and while the Court's practice goes beyond what
20 Id. at 5^7« (This is also the first reported use of the
juge rapporteur. His function in 177 cases is to produce a
coherent summary of the data submitted by the national court
and the arguments made by parties eligible under Article 20
of the Protocol.)
21 Chevallier, Commentaire de l'article 177 du Traite' C.E.E.
a 1'usage des juges et des justiciables franpais 115-124.
These, Paris, 1964. (polycopie)
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Chevallier would call "interpretation," its failure to em¬
ploy the instruction may well be based on this type of con¬
sideration.
The problem, of course, is that consideration
of the effect of the Court's use of fact on its subsequent
opportunity to interpret may lead to an opposite conclusion
from M. Chevallier. If the Community Court does not suf¬
ficiently appreciate the factual context of a particular
referral to give relevant and helpful interpretations, na¬
tional judiciaries may decide that referrals are a waste of
time and money.
At any rate failure to make use of the instruc¬
tion has not meant that the Court always accepts only the
factual data supplied by the national courts. In Nonnenmacher,
for example, the Court notes among the operative facts the
receipt from the plaintiff of two documents tending to prove
that she was not entitled to a pension under the French so-
22
cial security scheme. This fact bore directly on the sec¬
ond part of the question of interpretation submitted by the
national court, a point which became irrelevant after the
Court's treatment of the first part.2-^ More concretely, the
Court decided that Regulation No. 3 did not in general pro¬
hibit payment of social security benefits to one party from
22 X Rec. at 566.
23 Id. at 57^-75.
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more than one Member State, and thus did not reach the
narrower issue of whether there might be an exception to
the alleged prohibition of such cumulative payments where
the worker failed to qualify under the national scheme made
applicable by Article 12 of the Regulation. In Wagner v.
oh
Fohrmann the Court asked two questions of the European
Parliament and received some factual information from it,2-5
and in Firma C. Sohwarze v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle fur
p X!
Getreide und Futtermittel, the Court uses an admission by
the Commission in its submissions to establish a relevant
fact.2? However, since the latter case involved a referral
on validity framed as an interpretive referral, not too much
weight can be given to its procedural quirks as indications
of accepted "interpretive" practice.
Another of the seemingly endless aspects of
the Albatros case might be brought in here. Although the
Court said that its interpretation applied to all of the
national court's questions and hence that they need not be
treated separately, the terms of the dispositif in that case
25 Case No. 101/63, X Rec. 38I, 12 May 1965.
25 Id. at 391• Query to what use this information was put
or to what end the Court asked the questions in the first
place. The first seems concerned with whether the immunity
issue is now moot and the second with obtaining a legal
opinion from the Parliament, which complied by sending in¬
formation relevant to such an opinion.
26 Case No. 16/65, XI-10 Rec. 1081, 1 December 1965.
27 Id. at 1097.
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do not cover one of the questions referred. To say that
"none of the dispositions of the Treaty envisaged by the
home tribunal imply the complete abrogation from the effec-
tive date of the Treaty of all quantitative restrictions,
discriminations or measures of equivalent effect existent at
that date, nor do they oblige the state to suppress them
completely by 1959,"28 not to answer the national courtfs
question of whether those provisions have a "standstill"
effect preventing the introduction of new restrictions, here
allegedly contained in the French ordonnance of 2k September,
29
1958. The Court could, perhaps, have justified the omis¬
sion of this question on grounds that it involved the inter¬
pretation of national law,-^ but it did not do so,^ at
least not explicitly. For this reason it is suspected that
the Court may have accepted the Commission's suggestion-^
that the French regulation in question was totally irrelevant
to the lawsuit because the denial of an import license had
in no way been predicated on it. If so, the Court made use
28 XI-3 Rec. at 11. (Translation is mine.)
29 This was the national court's question 'B'. XI-3 Rec.
at k.
30 As did the Advocate General. XI-3 Rec. at 23.
31 The only conclusion that the Court draws from the enun¬
ciation of the rule that it may not interpret national law
is that it is therefore not appropriate to discuss whether
the French import scheme constitutes a national monopoly.
XI-3 Rec. at 9.
32 XI-3 Rec. at 5-6.
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of data which, not only was not submitted by the national
court, but which seemed to contradict the national court's
understanding of the facts of the suit.
2• Interpretation
The allocation of sole interpretive power to
the Court of Justice in 177 cases also meets with some diffi¬
culty. For one thing national courts may exert an influence
over the interpretation given by the manner in which they
submit referrals. If the Court of Justice is hesitant to
use the instruction procedure and yet gives interpretations
within the context of specific facts, the national court's
selection of pertinent facts and legal arguments must cer¬
tainly affect the Community Court's decision. Further, na¬
tional courts may specifically suggest what the answers to
their questions should be, and while those submissions do
not bind the Court of Justice in any way, they will probably
at least impel the Court to substantiate a contrary conclu-
33
sion with particular care.
There is also the problem that any referral
from a national court requires some interpretation by that
court of the provisions referred, some elimination of
33 See discussion in Chevallier, op. cit. supra, note 21
at 178-180.
The ordonnance of the Hessisches FInanzgericht of 26
February 1965 in the Schwarze case is a good example of
referral questions with suggested answers. (Mimeograph on
file at Court of Justice, Luxembourg.)
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34
inapplicable texts. Advocate General Roemer has suggested
that the Court could not accept a completely general re¬
ferral which merely set forth the facts and arguments and
asked for an interpreta.tion of any applicable Community pro-
visions. v Nor should national, courts be expected to make
referrals in this manner. They submit specific provisions
for interprstation, and this necessarily requires some selec¬
tion of potentially applicable texts.
This selection is in general binding on the
Community Court. We have noted that the parties or others
concerned in the 177 procedure are not allowed to expand the
questions asked by the national court.^ Nor generally is
the Court of Justice capable of doing so,^ at least not to
the extent of bringing in additional provisions which do not
bear on the interpretation of the texts submitted.^ in
This was explicitly recognized by the Milan Justice of
the Peace in his referral decision of 16 October 1963 in
Costa v. E.N.E.L. (Mimeograph on file at Court of Justice,
Luxembourg.)
35 N. V. Internationale Credit-en Handelsvereniging
"Rotterdam" v. Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries, Case
No. 73/64, X Rec. at 51 j 18 February 1964. (This was a re¬
ferral on a question of validity rather than interpretation,
and Herr Roemer does admit of an "extensive interpretation"
of the questions referred.)
36 See Chapter IV supra, note 77 and accompanying text.
37 This would agree with French referral procedure. See,
e_._g., Heurt^, Le Recours sur renvoi des Tribunaux Judiciare,
1958 Actuality Juridique 111, 113-14.
38 This latter practice is, of course, a necessary part of
rendering the interpretation requested. See, e.g., the
Courtes treatment of the context of Article 12 of the Treaty
in van Gend & Loos, IX Rec. at 22-24.
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Wagner v. Fohrmarm-^ the Court went into additional and
unreferred texts at the invitation of the national court,
but even there the additional provisions were directly re¬
lated to the interpretation of those specified.
Admittedly, the Court of Justice has not
ruled directly on its ability to raise questions of addi¬
tional provisions d'office, but its treatment of the problems
40
ln Dekker v. Bundesversicherungsanstalt fur Angestellte
indicates that it recognizes this limitation. In that case
it seems that the plaintiff was covered by a German old age
pension xtfhich included the payment of contributions for
sickness insurance. However, when the plaintiff, who had
been resident in Holland since 1958, transferred his sickness
insurance from a German to a Dutch Agency, the German pension
authorities refused further contributions. The plaintiff
sued for reinstatement of his right to contributions, and
the question referred by the national appellate court was
whether the contribution to insurance premiums was, as the
lower court had held, included within the meaning of "pres¬
tations en nature" of Article 22 of Regulation 3 which would
require payment of such benefits to the plaintiff although
he was affiliated with an insurance plan in another Member
State. It was reasonably clear that "prestations en nature"
39 See Chapter V supra, notes 116 and 117 and accompanying
text.
^0 Case No. 33/65, XI-10 Rec. 1111, 1 December 1965.
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referred to benefits accorded after the risk - here sickness -
materialized, not to payment of insurance premiums, and the
Court found little difficulty in simply answering the ques-
4l
tion in the negative.
The problem with this case is that the wrong
provision may have been referred. What should have been in¬
vestigated was, not whether Article 22 of Regulation3 affected
the application of the sickness plan, but whether Article 10
of the Regulation affected the application of the pension
scheme in such a way that a change of residence and situs of
insurer to another Member State cannot be invoked to termi¬
nate the benefits payable. But, as the Advocate General
pointed out, this question was not asked and the Court could
42
not examine it.
At this point the problem raised by the Dekker
case may seem very familiar, I.e., that the Court of Justice
cannot interpret Community law unless national courts recog¬
nize that a question of interpretation exists. However,
this failure by a national court to refer a relevant provi¬
sion in the context of its referral of other provisions may
have a slightly different type of effect than has a simple
failure to refer any interpretive questions. Here the inter¬
action of two interpretations may, in effect, subvert the
meaning of the Community Court's ruling. Because the
41 Id. at 1117.
42 Id. at 1121.
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national judge must tend to combine his initial interpre¬
tation of potentially applicable provisions with the inter¬
pretation given by the Court of Justice, the national court
may think it has received an answer which has not been given.
In Dekker such a combination produces the impression that the
Community rules on social security do not require the contin¬
uance of the contested payments, whereas the Court of Justice
might have come to the opposite conclusion had the national
court framed its question to include Regulation No. 3 as a
whole. Such misunderstandings would be particularly serious
were the question one of validity rather than interpretation.
Herr Roemer has suggested that the Court should not consider
itself confined to an examination of the issues raised by
the national court's referral in such situations
Indeed, it is always possible for national
courts to misunderstand an interpretive decision and, thus,
to negate the effective power of the Court of Justice to
control the interpretation given to Community law in a
particular case. Nor is such an effective negation unim¬
portant. We noted earlier that, although the Court's inter¬
pretations may be given a wider force, they are generally
considered to be "binding" in the strictest sense only on
the national court submitting the questions. If the Court
of Justice does not effectively control the interpretation
^3 Firma Max Neumann v. Hauptzollamt Hof/Saale, Case No.
17/67, XIII-5 Rec. 572, 597, 13 December 1967.
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of a Community provision in the specific case in which that
interpretation is given, it is deprived of any binding power
to interpret at all. Here then is another reason why inter¬
pretation must be tied reasonably closely to the facts of
specific litigation: the more abstract the interpretation
the greater chance of misunderstanding by the national
court and hence of a failure by the Court of Justice effec¬
tively to fulfill its interpretive role.
3• Subsumption
This consideration brings us to the third
function described above, subsumption of facts under the
operative rule, and to an investigation of the extent to
which the sharing of the subsumption function is based on
the factor indicated to be controlling in the Bosch case -
the completeness of the record submitted by the national
court. To a certain degree, of course, the Bosch statement
is refuted by the ability of the Court of Justice to develop
its own factual record and its occasional practice of ad¬
mitting facts other than those submitted by the national
court. Instances may also be cited in a contrary direction,
that is, where the Court gives a less fact-oriented inter¬
pretation and hence assumes less of the subsumption function
than the submissions of the national court or the develop¬
ment of the case on oral argument would seem to allow.
The manner in which the Court of Justice gen¬
eralized the specific question asked in the Unger case has
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already been mentionedThe answer was still related to
the facts of the case, but related to them in the sense of a
general, hypothetical situation rather than to the specific
parties involved, although the total "context" of the litiga¬
tion in the Bosch sense seems to have been before the Court,^
The Court might simply have said "the provision applies to
people in the petitioner's position." Again in Wagner v.
46
Fohrmann the national court apparently wanted a concrete
determination of whether European parliamentary immunity ap¬
plied to certain persons on a specific date, but the Court
of Justice merely instructed it how it might make the deter-
47 48
mination for itself. ' Costa v. E.N.E.L. might also be
brought in here. A comparison of the Conclusions of Advocate
49 ^0
General Lagrange ' with the Court's decision-^ reveals that,
"44 See notes 8 and 9 supra and accompanying text.
45 In Unger the Dutch appellate court sent a memoire to the
Court of" Justice which set forth the facts of the case, the
legal issues and the questions of Community law that it want¬
ed answered. Annexed to the communication were (1) the
judgment of the lower Dutch court, (2) the appellate plead¬
ings of the petitioner including a special argument on the
point referred to the Community Court, (3) a proces verbal of
the portion of the audience on appeal which dealt directly
with this point, and (4) the appellate court's decision to
stay proceedings pending an interpretation from the Court of
Justice o
46 Case No. IOI/63, X Rec. 38I, 12 May 1964.
47 Id. at 390 (first paragraph).
48 Case No. 6/64, X Rec. 1141, 15 July 1964.
49 Id. at 1188-1190. (It seems that M. Lagrange got most
of his "facts" on this question from submissions made under
the provisions of Article 20 of the Protocol in the Statute
of the Court.)
50 Id. at II65.
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while the former thought the facts developed warranted an
interpretation of whether an electricity industry such as
the Italian one could be considered as coming within the
meaning of a prohibition aimed at "commercial" monopolies
dealing in products subject to exchange between the Member
States, the latter leaves this determination to the national
judge.
The practice in recent social security cases-5"
of giving answers in the motifs simply in the positive or In
the negative after developing a more abstract interpretation
does not necessarily indicate that the Court of Justice is
shifting to a firm position of performing the subsumption
function in decision making to the full extent permitted by
the "legal data" referred by the national court. The ques¬
tions submitted in these cases reveal that national courts
are becoming more adept at asking interpretive questions
within a factual context but without framing those questions
solely in terms of the litigation before them. Thus, in
Unger the national court had asked whether a certain provi¬
sion applied "to persons who find themselves in the situation
described as concerns the petitioner"^2 whereas in the later
51 See, e.g., Hessische Knappschaft v. Maison Singer et
Fils, Case No. 44/65, XI-11 Rec. 1191, 1200, 9 December 1965;
Dekker v. Bundesversicherungsanstalt fur Angestellte, Case
No. 33/65, XI-10 Rec. 1111, 1117, 1 December 1965; Betriebs-
krankenkasse der Heseper Torfwerk GmbH v. Van Dijk, Case No.
33/64, XI-6 Rec. 131, 140-41, 11 March 1965; Caisse Commune
d'assurances "La Prevoyance Sociale" v. Berthelot, Case No.
31/64, XI-6 Rec. 109, 118-19, H March 1965.
52 X Rec. at 376.
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Bertholet case the national court asked whether a provision
was applicable "where the domicile of a worker and his place
of work are situated in the same Member State, in this case
Efupen and Kessenich in Belgium, although geographically these
two places are situated in a fashion that the road habitually
used by the worker between his domicile and place of work
and back crosses the territory of another Member State, here
Holland?"-^ To say "yes" to this latter question is not nec¬
essarily to appropriate any more of the subsumption function
than the sort of ruling that has been described above in
Unger.
This variation in the manner in which national
courts ask questions and the necessity in certain cases of
reframing these questions to bring them within the Court's
177 jurisdiction make it very difficult to make precise com¬
parisons between cases in terms of exactly how much the Court
of Justice is limiting or expanding the discretion national
courts might exercise in applying an interpretation of Com¬
munity law to the facts before them. However, the foregoing
illustrations make it reasonably certain that variations in
the Court's use of fact do not necessarily turn on the amount
of background the national court or others have supplied.
Considerations other than those of a technical nature must
53 XI-6 Hec. at 113.
54- See also the technique of framing questions in the other
cases cited in note $1 supra.
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be playing a part. The question is on what basis flexi¬
bility is introduced into the division of functions between
Community and national courts in an Article 177 proceeding.
II• The Flexible Approach
In rather free translation, it is suggested that the
following language from the Schwarze case represents, in its
most general form, the attitude of the Court of Justice con¬
cerning the extent of its jurisdiction to answer preliminary
questions requiring an interpretation of Community law and,
hence, the balance of power between itself and national
courts to control the application of that law. The Court
said that:
If a ... formal rigor is conceivable in conten¬
tious procedures among parties whose reciprocal
rights must be made to conform to strict rules, this
is not so in the very singular framework of the judi¬
cial cooperation instituted by Article 177j through
which national courts and the Court of Justice, within
their respective competences, contribute directly
and reciprocally to the elaboration of a decision
with the purpose of assuring the uniform application
of Community law in the whole of the Member States.->->
Here we hark back to what was said in Chapter I about the
basic concept of "jurisdiction sharing." As "jurisdiction"
implies divisions based on legal rules, so "sharing" implies
a flexibility sufficient to promote effective cooperation.
A description of the techniques of jurisdiction sharing be¬
tween Community and national courts can only attempt to
isolate what firm jurisdictional divisions exist and to
55 XI-10 Rec. at 1095*
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indicate the factors which may contribute to the manner in
which sharing takes place in particular instances.
There are, abstractly at least, certain firm jurisdic¬
tional principles which regulate the Community Court/national
court relationship, e.g., that the Community Court interprets
while national courts apply, that the Community Court can
interpret only Community law, that referrals will not be dis¬
missed on the basis of the irrelevance of the requested in¬
terpretation to the litigation in the national court. Yet,
as we have seen, these principles are difficult to apply
consistently while at the same time developing an effective
cooperation. The manner in which the Community Court views
its role varies from case to case.
A primary example of the variability of the Court's
approach was discussed in Chapter IV where we noted the in¬
consistencies in the treatment of national law questions
involved in Article 177 referrals and sought to illuminate
those inconsistencies by reference to both the general and
the specific political contexts within which the decisions
were rendered.^ An investigation of the use of the Article
177 jurisdiction in the development of Community competition
policy as compared with the exercise of that same jurisdic¬
tion in the social security field may further serve to
5^ See Chapter IV supra, notes 131-151 and accompanying
text.
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illustrate the extremely complex set of variables that comes
into play in this sharing process.
We have had occasion previously to mention the rather
byzantine procedures by which competence to rule on the
compatibility of agreements or practices with Articles 85 and
86 of the EEC Treaty are allocated between Community and
67
national authorities. These rules have to some degree
discouraged national courts from dealing with competition
problems.-^ However, despite early reluctance-59 national
courts are handling these issues and occasionally making re¬
ferrals to the Court of Justice for interpretations of the
Community policy.
Requests for interpretations of Articles 85 and 86 place
the positions of the Community Court and national courts in
sharp relief, for in the competition area the "facts" are
crucial. Whether agreements "prevent, restrict or distort
competition" or whether there has been an "improper exploi¬
tation by one or more undertakings having a dominant position
within the Community or a substantial part of it" are not
questions which can easily be resolved in the abstract. Here
we might expect that the Court of Justice would take a fairly
57 See Chapter II, note 96.
58 Buxbaum, Incomplete Federation: Jurisdiction Over Anti¬
trust Matters in the European Economic Community, 52 Calif.
L. Rev. 56, 59-80 (1964).
59 See discussion in Chapter V supra, at notes 56-59 and
accompanying text.
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particularistic approach to interpretation in the interest
of assuring -uniformity.
This sort of approach is, of course, the negative preg¬
nant in the Bosch opinion's suggestion that a more direct
response could not be given there because of the lack of ade¬
quate factual data.^ Interestingly enough, this same lang¬
uage was relied upon by the plaintiff in the next interpretive
61
referral concerning the competition rules, but for a quite
different purpose. The argument made was, not that because
adequate facts had been supplied the Court should give a
specific answer, but that the provision of a full description
of the factual context by the referring court would constrain
the Court of Justice to apply rather than interpret the
Treaty and therefore to operate outside its proper jurisdic¬
tion. The Court of Justice rejected this argument on the
basis of its consistent refusal to dismiss requests for in-
O
terpretation because of their form. The Community Court
can always select from the data supplied the issues of inter¬
pretation which are within its competence.
Indeed, in the instant case, La Technique Miniere
(L.T.M.) v. Maschinenbau-UIm (M.B.U.), the question for in¬
terpretation had been carefully drafted. The national court
SO Note 16, supra.
61 La Technique Miniere (LTM) v. Maschinenbau-UIm (MBU),
Case No. 56/65, XII-^ Rec. 337, 30 June 1966.
62 Id. at 357.
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asked.
What interpretation should be given to Article
85(1) of the Rome Treaty and to the Community regu¬
lations enacted for its application in regard to a
contract which has not been notified [_to the Com¬
mission] and wThich grants a right of exclusive sale
(1) which does not prohibit reexportation to other
Member States of the grantor's merchandise, (2) which
does not require that the grantor prohibit his con¬
cessionaires in other Member States from selling his
products in the territory of the grantee in the con¬
tract, (3) which presents no obstacle to parallel
importation by dealers and users in the state of the
concessionaire through dealers or concessionaires in
other Member States, and (4) which requires prior
authorization by the grantor for the sale by the
concessionaire of machines which might compete with ,
the merchandise which is the subject of the contract.^
The referring court has here framed its question so that
a direct answer to it would involve only a decision of the
effect of the competition rules on a particular "type" of
contract, while at the same time the "type" described by
the Paris court reflected the concrete situation before it.
This technique is virtually identical to that we noted pre¬
viously in certain of the recent referrals involving Regu¬
lation No. 3 on the Social Security of Migrant Workers,
wherein the Motifs of the Court of Justice have, after some
abstract exegesis, provided answers simply in the positive
6b
or the negative. Yet in L.T.M. v. M.B.U., far from adopt¬
ing an approach which tied the interpretation very closely
to the facts, the Court gives a relatively abstract although
detailed exposition of the criteria by which national courts
£3 Ibid."
6b See cases cited at note 51> supra.
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should judge whether the Instant or any other agreement falls
within the prohibition of Article 85(1). Why was the approach
of the social security cases, as presaged by the Bosch case,
not followed?
One answer might be that here, contrary to L.T.M.'s as¬
sertion, the Court did not think an adequate context had been
provided. Although the national court's question adequately
described the provisions of the contract, it did not describe
how it, or contracts of its type, actually affected competi¬
tion in the relevant market. There was extended argument,
both written and oral, concerning whether accepted behavior
under such contracts involved considerably more restrictive
practices than appeared within the four corners of the agree¬
ment. The Court of Justice makes clear in its opinion, and
has since reiterated,^ that both the law of the contract
and the objective facts of its operation should be considered
in determining its effect on commerce between Member States
and its effect on competition.
Should we then take this to mean that the provision of
this further factual background would in subsequent competi¬
tion cases produce more specific replies? Some support for
such a view can be gleaned from Parke, Davis & Co. v.
86
Centrafarm in which the Court was willing to reply that on
the basis of the facts supplied by the national court and
F5 Brasserie de Haecht S. A. v. Consort Wilkin-Janssen,
Case No. 23/67, XII1-5 Rec. 525, 12 December 1967.
66 Case No. 2^/67. XIV-2 Rec. 81, 29 February 1968.
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developed in the course of argument it did not consider
Article 85(1) of the Treaty applicable. Although there had
been some allusions to the contrary, the record indicated
fairly clearly that only an attempt to protect a patent by
an individual firm was involved and hence no agreement be¬
tween enterprises, decisions of associations of enterprises
or concerted practices within the meaning of Article 85.
Yet the Court of Justice was careful to note that the final
evaluation of the facts remained entirely within the compe-
rj1
tence of the national judge. Moreover, the Community Court
made no effort to tie its very limited interpretation of
the potentially applicable provision, Article 86, to the
facts presented in Parke-Davis. The national court was left
complete freedom to determine whether the practices involved
resulted in the existence and abuse of a dominant position
in the Common Ms.rket.
In sum, the practice of the Community Court when ren¬
dering interpretations in the competition field seems to di¬
verge significantly from its practice when interpreting the
social security regulations, and for reasons not fully ex¬
plainable on the basis of the type of questions asked or the
amount of factual data supplied. A number of bases for this
divergence may be suggested.
The most obvious difference between the two classes of
cases is the subject matter. In the social security field
6*7" IdT-at 110.
281
the Court is dealing with a very specific set of rules about
which little of real value to national courts can be said in
the abstract. In the competition area, on the other hand,
considerable explication can be made in terms of criteria for
application, as L.T.M. v. M.B.U. illustrates, without tying
the interpretation very closely to specific facts. Yet, this
distinction is somewhat unsatisfying. Clearly the Court's
development of the content of Articles 85 and 86 is more
helpful to the national judge in solving his particular
problem the more specific it becomes. If the Court of Justice
feels justified in interpreting in terms of "types" of sit¬
uations abstracted from the real context in Regulation No. 3
cases, why is it not so disposed when dealing with Articles
85 and 86?
I would suggest that the answer lies, at least in part,
in pursuing this question of subject matter from a slightly
different perspective. The contrast between the specificity
of Regulation No. 3 and the generality of Articles 85 and 86
and even Regulation No. 17 reflects something more than a
difference between a technical approach to technical subject
matter and a general approach to a conceptually difficult
area. A social security scheme becomes technical only after-
general political decisions have been made which allow the
technical work to be done. Indeed the common commitment to
a rationalization of social security benefits for migrant
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workers antedates the EEC Treaty. When basic policy com¬
mitments are clear, the Court can move with more assurance.
The same can hardly be said for competition policy.
Latin and Germanic ideas of the degree to which competition
should be fostered as a market regulator have a considerable
history of divergence. There is still considerable disagree¬
ment over many questions, such as, the relative value to be
given the rationalizing effects of exclusive distribution
systems as against their market-dividing effects^ or the
proper approach toward mergers when the impact on both in¬
ternal and external markets must be taken into account.'®
There is perhaps much to be said for allowing a period of
experimentation through decentralized administration by na¬
tional authorities in the hope of developing some sound pol¬
icies through experience. This basic approach, as well as
the political difficulty of providing a completely centralized
6>8 See Kahn-Freund, Labor Lax<r and Social Security in Stein
& Nicholson, American Enterprise in the EEC, 297j 320-21
(I960).
69 Indeed, in L.T.M. v. M.B.U. the Italian Government was
still of the opinion that Article 85 did not apply to verti¬
cal agreements. XII-4 Rec. at 3^7 •
See generally, discussion in Deringer, The Competition
Law of the European Economic Community 45-46, 151-52 (1968).
70 The Commission seems to have delayed taking a clear
position on concentration policy by a preliminary determina¬
tion that only Article 86 will be applicable to mergers. See
Deringer, o£. cit. supra note 69 at 38.
See also discussion in Kelleher, The Common Market
Anti-Trust Laws; The First Ten Years, 12 Anti-Trust Bull.
1219, 1249-52 (1967).
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administration,'71 may underlie the preservation of the
competence of national authorities in Regulation No. 17.
Moreover, there is in the competition area the counter¬
balancing safeguard against harmfully divergent tendencies
of the Commission's powers of enforcement and intervention.
Indeed, the position of the Commission may have an
additional impact on the Community Court's approach to inter¬
pretation of the competition rules. One of the primary
direct powers of the Commission over Community enterprises Is
its power to take decisions in application of the competition
policy. These decisions are then reviewable by the Court of
Justice in the exercise of its "administrative" jurisdiction.
If the Court were to exercise a large measure of discretion¬
ary judgment with respect to particular cases under Article
177) it might put itself in the position of making decisions
there of the same type that it is to judge on the basis of
legality rather than opportunity in its role as administra¬
tive court. This dual role must certainly have been brought
home to the Court of Justice in relation to L.T.M. v. M.BoU.t
for it was at the same time considering the Grundig-Const en''
case contesting Commission decisions applying Article 85«
This discussion, however conjectural, suggests that
the provision of a technique for sharing jurisdiction between
national judiciaries in Article 177 is not only a reflection
71 Bebr, Judicial Control of the European Communities 210
(1962) .
72 Etablissements Consten S.A.R.L. v. Commission, Cases
Nos. 56 & 58/64-, XII-4- Rec. 4-29, 12 July 1966.
284
of the overall jurisdiction sharing scheme in the Community;
it is a jurisdiction whose exercise is in some considerable
degree influenced by an appreciation of what is appropriate
in the context of that general scheme. Indeed, this is
probably the only legitimate standard by which the consistency
of the Community Court's practice under Article 177 can be
judged. It is a standard which requires an investigation of
the total context of a particular case in the widest possible
sense and which recognizes that judicial jurisdiction sharing
is an organic part of general jurisdiction-sharing procedures
in the European Communities - a part which could not long
survive if cut off from the vital forces at work in the whole
organism.
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CHAPTER VII% Concluding Comments: Frustration and
Accomplishment
In some ways the description of the functions and func¬
tioning of the Court of Justice of the European Communities
under Article 177 reads like a catalogue of frustrations.
We begin by noting the "pluralism" which dominates any anal¬
ysis of the political and economic bases of the Community,
These divergent ideas work themselves out in a compromise
institutional structure which contains not only a variety of
organizational powers and relationships, but a considerable
potential for shifts in authority and influence. Clearly
oversight by a Court is required if legality is to be re¬
spected in such a system, and as we discovered the policing
of this complex jurisdiction-sharing structure is the funda¬
mental task of the Court of Justice. Yet the same factors
which require judicial review based on principles of le¬
gality make the development of those principles extremely
difficult,
Nor do the Court's obstacles in fulfilling its role end
with the indeterminacy of the political base in respect of
which any such constitutional reviewing function must be
exercised or with complex allocations of competences and
modes of action which diffuse responsibility and require
that much law which is "Community" in substance be national
in form. The Court of Justice is also a part of this jur¬
isdiction-sharing system, and its competence as established
by the Treaty places significant restrictions on its ability
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to make decisive resolutions of constitutional issues and
to implement those decisions when made.
To be sure the Court of Justice has a powerful adminis¬
trative jurisdiction in relation to acts of Community insti¬
tutions, but even here there are limitations on effective
control which result from the rather severe interest re¬
quirements of Articles 173 and 175 in respect of individuals
and the alternative "political" avenues for control available
to Member States. When we turn to questions of the control
of Member State action and the assurance of uniformity in
the application of Community law, further weaknesses appear.
The Court's jurisdiction extends to only a "declaration" of
the non-fulfillment of treaty obligations. Of course, this
is also broadly descriptive of the position of national
judiciaries in respect of governmental acts, but the ability
of the national court to withhold traditional in rem or in
personam enforcement adds something to its political muscle.
Since national authorities will never be looking to the
Court of Justice for enforcement of its demands on private
parties, that Court lacks this further opportunity for ef¬
fective judicial review. Moreover, in state federations the
position of the national government as the enforcing agency
for the federal judiciary may be sufficiently powerful to
coerce compliance with national policy by recalcitrant
political subdivisions. An additional limiting factor on
Community Court control over Member State action is the
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reservation of access to this jurisdiction to parties who
have strong political interest in avoiding direct clashes of
this sort. Nor can individuals force the Commission to
initiate proceedings through the procedures for control of
the administration,. It is in this area that Article 1779 s
interpretive referral procedure was found to take on immense
constitutional significance.
Yet, again the Court's powers are not great under Arti¬
cle 17? when compared with the importance of the issues with
which it is expected to deal. It can act only at the behest
of national courts. It interprets only "Community law" and
that law only in its formal sense, that is, as embodied in
the treaties and acts of Community institutions. Moreover,
because it lacks jurisdiction under Article 177 to decide
specific cases, the Court is to some extent deprived of that
flexibility inherent in the ability of most constitutional
courts to narrow the policy implications of their judgments
by relating decision-making closely to the solution of a
particular conflict.
Given these difficulties, the Court of Justice has made,
it seems to me, substantial progress toward the establish¬
ment of a system of constitutional control appropriate to
the Community structure. In summary, two somewhat contra¬
dictory patterns of development seem especially significant.
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A. National Courts and Community Law: The Establishment of
Basic Principle
In the context of the general EEC pattern of jurisdic¬
tion-sharing, which leaves concrete implementation of Com¬
munity policy to national machinery, national courts take on
a signal importance in the assurance of individual rights
based on Community law. Through its interpretations under
Article 177 the Court of Justice has extended and reoriented
this position of the national judiciary in two rather funda¬
mental ways. First, the Court has recognized the principle
of effectiveness as a paramount interpretive guide in deter¬
mining whether individual legal rights are created by Com¬
munity law. As concerns the basic Treaty text, the van Gend
& Loos and Lutticke decisions have significantly undermined
the traditional "treaty contract" approach, and have called
upon national courts to apply the Treaty as a directly ef¬
fective basis for decision in large numbers of cases. More¬
over, although the Article I89 definitions of the Community
modes of action apparently place restrictions on this sort
of development in relation to institutional acts, we have
noted the logic of extending these interpretations to cer¬
tain directives and decisions.
Second, the Court of Justice has firmly established the
"separate legal order" idea and its concomitant "independent
obligation" for national judicial organs. In some ways this
is to turn weakness into strength. The Court of Justice
cannot interpret national law - therefore it has treated all
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claims of the irrelevance of Community law under national
rules as irrelevant to the admissibility of an Article 177
referralo Moreover, because the Court does not see in
"Lorsqu°une telle question est soulevee..." in Article 177(3)
a reference to national criteria of relevance, the obligation
to refer questions of Community law implies the independent
impingement of Community law on national judiciaries» To be
sure, national courts must decide questions of relevance in
the first instance, but Costa makes clear their responsibility
to appreciate such issues from a Community perspective.,
In short, national courts are being required, to the
extent that the Community Court can by hammering away at
first principles so require them, to assume an identification
with and a major role in the Community jurisdictional system»
The role is inevitable; it is a basic presupposition of a
predominately normative federal structure. The identifica¬
tion is necessary to the assurance of legality, and the
Court of Justice leaves no doubt that it considers such
identification a fundamental principle of the Community
legal order.
B. Flexibility in the Exercise of Jurisdiction; The Ques¬
tion of Technique
Compared with the virtual dogmatism of the independent
legal order principle, the variableness of the Community
Court's approach to its role under Article 177 verges on
anarchy. Questions need not be framed in any particular
manner; they may be dissected or amalgamated in the process
290
of interpretation; answers may come as a 9yes9 or a #no' or
in the form of relatively abstract criteria; instruction is
never used in interpretive referrals, but there may be oral
argument on the facts and data outside the submissions of
the national court sometimes seeps in. Does all this con¬
tribute to substantive legality or to an appropriate devel¬
opment of the Community constitutional system?
I would suggest that it does. A substantial portion of
the variation in techniques of cooperation with national
courts seems clearly designed to facilitate that cooperation.
In this category should certainly be included the lack of
clear standards for national court submissions and the rela¬
tively specific answers that have sometimes been proferred.
Of course, in addition to these instances we have noted
other factors which seem influential, e.g., the level of
commitment to common policy and occasionally specific polit¬
ical problems. Particularly where our explanations have
been cast in political terms we may wonder whether the Court
is fulfilling its role of ensuring the rule of law in the
interpretation and application of the Treaty.
However, the development of a totally consistent prac¬
tice or set of principles concerning the role of the Court
under Article 177 is not in any way critical to the protec¬
tion of private interests or to the maintenance of the Com¬
munity institutional order. Indeed, to the extent that the
variances in the Court's approach have tended to make its
substantive decisions either more acceptable or more
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meaningful to national courts, they may be furthering those
goalso In this way the Court of Justice creates for itself
some of the flexibility in approaching constitutional issues
that most national constitutional courts develop through
their power to manipulate the importance assigned to the
factual elements of particular litigation., The basic aim
of Article 177 is, after all, uniformity of law. There seems
no reason why the Court of Justice should not consider the
total context of each referral in order to appreciate how
its action is likely to affect the ultimate realization of
that end. All constitutional decision-making must rely ex¬
plicitly or implicitly upon a political foundation. At
the very least a choice must be made to reinforce or to sanc¬
tion particular directions in political development, and that
choice cannot be articulated by the Court or by students of
the Court in terms of wholly neutral principles. So long as
substantive non-uniformity is not introduced, flexibility of
interpretive technique seems appropriate under the juris¬
diction-sharing system as we have described it.
For this is the general pattern: firmness coupled with
flexibility; jurisdiction that is shared. A system structured
in paradox when viewed as a whole; but somehow on a particu¬
lar da.y in respect of a particular problem it is a system
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